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Too many, long dead and still living, have been crucial in pushing me to finishing this essay; the 
debts I owe are so diverse that they are inarticulable. My wife, perhaps most of all, deserves 
thanks: by showing love through my various episodes of angst, she has taught me how to love, 
radically changing the focus of my research and moral development. 
 
“When I first knew you, you lifted me up, so that I might see that there was something to be seen, 
though I was not yet fit to see it. And you beat back the weakness of my sight, shining forth upon 
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Abstract: The purpose of this essay will be to set out an analysis of a certain philosophical, 
metaethical angst, which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to the extent it can be), 
and offer up hopeful suggestions regarding consolation of this angst. In short, I take absurd angst 
to be a painful worry that there are no normative, non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it 
seems to me, can only come about under a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a 
large amount of time here to understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to 
accept several non-trivial beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their 
application in true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a 
strongly ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately, 
I argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts which lead 
them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons (reasons which do not 
depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents), or that normative 
reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or explanations for the normative force 
and authority of reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative 
states of agents) (these possibilities are not exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because 
external sources of normativity are theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, 
make moral claims problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought to 
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My purpose in writing has been to describe a particularly painful anxiety over metaethical 
theory. I have called this ‘absurd angst.’ This angst presents in many different ways, and so 
demands a careful treatment. Some describe their worry as regarding the ‘objectivity’ of 
morality; others seem to fear that anti-realist metaethical systems undermine the notion of 
intrinsic value. Worries over the ‘meaning’ of life are also frequently attested to. Each of these 
worries, however, are vague, and teasing out exactly what they amount to is no easy task. For 
instance, why would grounding intrinsic value in human psychology undermine the existence of 
intrinsically valuable objects? Why is ‘objectivity’ a necessary or desired feature of moral 
systems? Why do we worry about all these things? 
To understand angst of this sort, we must answer these questions. My approach has 
been to unify all of these disparate worries by postulating a common cause: worries over 
meaning, objectivity, and anti-realism are all worries about the reason backed nature of morality. 
That is, the angsty feel threatened by certain metaethical theories because they take it that 
these theories are incompatible with having normatively forceful or justifying reasons to act. 
Others worry that objectivity is a necessary condition for justifying reasons. The various forms of 
internalism--any views which analyze reasons or moral properties as emerging from the internal,  
evaluative states of agents like us--are similarly felt to leave no room for moral reasons. My first 
suggestion, then, is that analyzing worries over metaethical theory in terms of reasons reveals 
to us the fundamental concern: a lack of normatively forceful or justifying reasons to act 
(Chapter I).  
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I have not argued for the unification of metaethical worries under worries over reasons. 
Rather, I have assumed it at the outset. I have described the intuitive notions of justifying or 
normative reasons, and have attempted to show by example, not by argument, that thinking 
about these problems in terms of worries over reasons can reveal much to us. 
 But this is only the beginning of the essay; the question still remains, ‘why do we worry 
that there are no normative reasons to act?’ My explanation is simple: those who worry about 
moral reasons have adopted a conceptually rich moral paradigm, and this paradigm--or moral 
conceptual scheme--describes morality as ultimately relying on a set of reasons to act which are 
both justifying (normatively forceful) and non-instrumental. Further, this conceptual scheme 
features a commitment to externalism about reasons (the view that moral reasons are, in some 
significant way, independent of the psychological states of moral agents like us). That is, the 
angsty understand the notion of ‘justifying, non-instrumental reasons’ to contain the notion of 
psychological-independence (though exactly what this independence amounts to is a complex 
issue best left for the essay). Angst sets in, on my view, when those who have already 
internalized this paradigm discover the theoretical difficulties surrounding it. Absurd angst is the 
painful worries over an involuntary paradigm shift, similar to the worries regarding a shift from 
Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomical models. The angsty moral paradigm might be expressible 
in part by visual representations of the great chain of being, though a full explication of this 
thought would require too much time. Most notably, the angsty find themselves unprepared to 
answer the question: ‘what are external reasons, and do they exist?’ 
This way of thinking about and understanding normative claims regarding ‘reasons’ is 
not necessarily derived by the angsty through inference or intuition. I make no claim to 
understand how this conceptual scheme comes to be so strongly held by the angsty. However, 
it seems to me that the angsty do in fact ‘see moral claims and concepts’ through this externalist 
lens. Just as we might adopt conceptual models to make sense of and predict events in the 
perceptible realm, I posit that the angsty have adopted a model for moral thinking and 
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deliberation. The moral conceptual scheme of the angsty is just their set of concepts which they 
utilize when making, interpreting and evaluating moral claims. The critical aspect of this 
paradigm is understanding ‘moral justification, ‘the ‘justification of reasons to act,’ or ‘the 
normative force of reasons’ as requiring independence from mere human preferences.  
This conceptual scheme is not assumed to be necessary or universal, but, on the 
contrary, I find it plausible to think that one can abandon or modify these mental models with 
enough effort. Further, I make no attempt to show that this moral paradigm is correct, or ought 
to be adopted by all. Rather, after roughly describing the moral paradigm of the angsty, I offer a 
set of arguments which are meant to illustrate the plausibility of the angsty conceptual scheme 
to all (Chapters II-IV). These arguments are not meant to show that normative, non-instrumental 
reasons must be conceived of as external reasons. For, even if all these arguments went 
through, one would still be free to adopt a different concept of moral justification. One could, in 
fact, insist that we adopt a new, internalist concept of normatively forceful reasons, even while 
admitting that our ‘common sense’ concept of moral reasons requires externality. What could, in 
principle, we say in response? Why think that the angsty model of reasons is the only viable 
understanding? At best, my arguments are intuition pumps, revealing to my reader whether or 
not they find the angsty moral paradigm attractive. At worst, my arguments are mere conceptual 
analyses of the angsty concept of normative, non-instrumental moral reasons. 
After having contented myself with my description of the angsty moral paradigm, and 
with my explanation of metaethical angst, I moved to offer up some hopeful suggestions 
regarding consolation of this angst (Chapter V). In short, I sketched what consolation would 
require: either preservation and reaffirmation of the angsty moral paradigm (by overcoming the 
relevant theoretical difficulties), or revision and replacement of that paradigm (due to those 
theoretical difficulties warranting abandonment of the angsty paradigm). Finally, I close this 
essay by offering up a few rhetorical moves the angsty can make to overcome the relevant 
theoretical issues: internalist thinkers have provided compelling arguments which remove the 
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skeptical problems surrounding normative thought; further, theistic-reliabilist models of moral 
knowledge may allow us to bypass skepticism regarding the metaphysics of moral ‘entities’ like 





Just prior to finishing undergraduate work, I found that I had become increasingly anxious about 
the authority of my moral and aesthetic beliefs. Beliefs regarding the activities which filled my 
life with meaning and about the artworks which I cherished--both kinds of my most important 
value-judgements--suddenly seemed to be totally unjustified. Those close to me didn’t see the 
value in my pursuits, and any suggestion that there might be normative, aesthetic standards 
was taken as a dangerous insult. My appeals to the concept of “intrinsic value” and what 
intuition might indicate, having forced us to consider at least something as intrinsically valuable, 
fell on deaf ears; some even confessed to have never thought about intrinsic value, and claimed 
to have been unaware of the concept. This painful moral disagreement confused me: how could 
the moral statuses I, with total confidence, ascribed to objects worthy of my love seem to have 
no weight in the minds of my peers? I would have preferred to encounter moral disagreement 
rather than total moral apathy. For how could the judgements of my more thoughtful peers be 
backed by moral authority, given that their judgements appear to be totally irrelevant to so 
many? 
Finally free from undergraduate busy work, I turned to focus on major metaethical and 
aesthetic issues full-time. But the greater number of sources I tucked under my belt, the more 
clearly I began to realize that my anxiety was terribly confused: what exactly was I worried 
about? Concerns about the potential subjectivity or even relativity of moral and aesthetic 




 Neither did any cliche worries over the “meaning of life.” There seemed to be something 
more fundamental underlying these sorts of concerns, but I could not identify it on my own. 
Understanding this vague, philosophically induced angst became the first issue I would have to 
deal with. Did other, more self-aware philosophers also feel this way? Had any others come to 
understand this angst, and had they found any source of consolation? 
I am now convinced that many others suffer from this same philosophical angst. T.M. 
Scanlon has identified a shift in metaethics towards questions of normativity and reasons, and 
away from analysis of the meaning of moral claims.1 This shift, I take it, has come about due to 
an increased awareness of, and perhaps angst over, the problems surrounding normativity. I am 
not, however, fully satisfied with any analysis of this angst that has been put forward. Even 
worse, I have not found a metaethical theory which can fully or satisfactorily console, once one 
is aware of the (conceptual) causes of their angst. The contemporary author who has come 
closest is Christine Korsgaard, and, in her analysis of the “normative question,” she describes a 
skeptical worry over normativity that I feel lies at the heart of the angst in question.2 However, I 
take it that Korsgaard has not, in her work, devoted enough time to exploring in full detail the 
thinking which produces this angst, and does not explicate, especially for those not in its throws, 
                                                 
1 “Contemporary metaethics differs in two important ways from the metaethics of the 1950s, 1960s and 
even the later 1970s… Today, although morality is still much discussed, a significant part of the debate 
concerns practical reasoning, and normativity more generally: reasons for action, and, even more 
broadly, reasons for belief and other attitudes, which are increasingly recognized as normative, and as 
raising questions of the same nature as those about reasons for action” (Scanlon, T.M. Being Realistic 
About Reasons). 
2 (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity.) Nagel, in (Nagel, Thomas. “The Absurd.”) also puts 
forward a highly similar analysis of the absurd. His conception of absurdity--or, in my terms, absurd angst-
-is of a worry about a lack of reasons or normative significance to human life, caused an epistemic 
situation of inescapable doubt over moral claims. This epistemic situation arises from the foundational 
nature of all cognition--we cannot get beyond first principles--and moral knowledge, or our moral systems, 
rest also on foundational claims/evaluations. Since these are self-justifying, but not certain or strongly 
self-evident, one can always doubt them. My account is highly similar, as an epistemic problem (how do 
we decide whether normative reasons exist?) fuels a worry that the world is absurd. My account, I think, is 
a synthesis of Camus (who viewed the absurd as a metaphysical conflict between human aspirations and 
reality) and Nagel (who viewed the absurd as a primarily epistemic conflict between human aspirations 
and reality). In my terms, Nagel tells us the cause of absurd angst, in part, and Camus tells us about the 




the importance of this philosophical angst. Further, Korsgaard’s consoling solution to the 
normative question is, I think, ultimately unsatisfactory precisely because it does not confront 
the (conceptual) causes of angst over the normative question. 
The purpose of this essay, then, will be to set out an analysis of this philosophical angst, 
which I call “absurd angst,” defend angsty thinking (to the extent it can be), and offer up a 
potential means of consolation. In doing so, I will show that the sorts of concerns raised by 
Scanlon and Korsgaard are not only recent, but have been plaguing thinkers prior to the 
metaethical shift Scanlon has described. In short, I take absurd angst to be a painful worry that 
there are no normative, non-instrumental reasons to act. This worry, it seems to me, can only 
come about under a certain moral conceptual scheme, and I will devote a large amount of time 
here to understanding it. This moral conceptual scheme leads the angsty to accept several non-
trivial beliefs about the relationships between moral concepts and their application in 
true/accurate moral ascriptions. The angsty are led to these beliefs by, I think, a strongly 
ingrained set of moral concepts which form the basis of their moral system(s). Ultimately, I 
argue that absurd angst arises in some because the angsty possess moral concepts which lead 
them to believe either that normative reasons require external reasons (reasons which do not 
depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative states of agents), or that normative 
reasons require external sources of normativity (grounds or explanations for the normative force 
and authority of reasons which do not depend, in some critical way, on the internal evaluative 
states of agents) (these possibilities are not exclusive). This worries the angsty. First, because 
external sources of normativity are theoretically problematic, and this is felt to, in some way, 
make moral claims problematic. Second, because a host of painful consequences are thought 
to follow from a lack of these external sources and a denial of normative reasons to act. 
So, conceptual analysis of (what I take to be) the conceptual scheme underlying absurd 




commitments of the angsty, and will also do my best to explicate the lines of thought which lead 
them to their metaethical, angst-inducing beliefs. 
The consoling solution I briefly offer up towards the end of this paper is that justified 
belief in at least revelatory, Abrahamic religions can justify our belief in whatever sorts of 
metaethical entities (ie external reasons or external sources of normativity) we deem to be 
necessary for moral truths. This will be accompanied by a brief discussion of the function of 
religious belief in writers like James and Kant. In laying out religious belief as a means of 
consolation, I will have to defend it against obvious objections, and describe and evaluative 
alternative, metaethical accounts which seek to console. I will not be too concerned with 
showing that rival accounts are insufficient for consolation--I welcome, for my own sanity, as 
many rival, metaethical theories which purport to console as possible. The only need to argue 
for the inadequacy of these rival theories is that they seem to be inconsistent with the moral 
conceptual-scheme shared by the angsty, and so cannot console the angsty without major 
revision of moral concepts. 
That last caveat (that certain metaethical accounts can only console given a revision of 
the angsty conceptual scheme) should raise a red flag for my reader, however. One might 
suggest that the angsty, in order to console themselves, should do away with their deeply 
ingrained moral concepts. For these concepts are, after all, the causes of absurd angst (at least 
once the person disposed to angst is made aware of them and gives themselves to reflecting on 
them). I have no objection to this line of thinking, except that, first, I seem unable to do away 
with the angst-inducing moral concepts without incurring more angst, and, second, that this 
suggestion begs the question against the angsty conceptual-scheme’s accuracy. That is, while 
one may be able to rid themselves of angst by ridding themselves of the moral conceptual 
scheme that produces angst (and thereby, while retaining their form, modifying the contents of 
their moral beliefs significantly), if the faculty which utilizes those concepts to produce the 




those moral concepts. Doing away with the concept of normative reasons which requires 
external sources of normativity may, then, prevent one from pursuing the truth, just to make the 
angsty feel more comfortable. 
Overall, my suggestion is that one cannot simply seek to do away with these angst-
inducing moral concepts, at least if one already has them. First, one must do their best, to avoid 
begging the question, to check whether or not these concepts and the moral beliefs which utilize 
them are true or capable of being used to form true, moral ascriptions. If these concepts are not 
truth-relevant, then, perhaps, we can safely throw them out to console ourselves. Still, I am 
suspicious of this suggestion, because, though it is beyond the scope of this essay, I feel that 
moral beliefs utilizing these angsty concepts are the only sort that can console the angsty 
(including myself).3 
What this introductory discussion should reveal to my reader is that all I purport to do in 
this essay is to explicate absurd angst and the thinking behind it. I will (continue to) operate 
under the angsty, moral conceptual scheme, and evaluate metaethical accounts in light of it. But 
just as, in my view, we cannot defeat the global skeptic who raises the possibility that our most 
basic concepts and cognitive processes are not fit to describe reality,4 we cannot do much to 
counter the suggestion that the angsty moral conceptual scheme might not be the only one, or 
even an accurate one. One can always ask, for instance, “why care about normativity at all?” 
                                                 
3 This is not to say that an ability to console should count as evidence for some metaphysical position. I 
point this out merely to defeat the suggestion that the angsty should swap out their moral conceptual 
system to avoid angst. In sum, this suggestion, when offered up without argument, (1) begs the question 
against externalist moral realism, and (2) is motivated by practical concerns which may not be helped 
even if one went along with the suggestion. 
4 Kant, though not a skeptic, argues that theoretical reason can never deliver knowledge of the truly real--
the unconditioned--because there is no reason to think that our concepts and faculties line up with how 
the world really is, independent of our perception and conceptualizations. In fact, there seems to be good 
reason to suspect that this is impossible. Kant argues that there is a contradiction (or at least a tension) 
between supposing that one can apprehend the unconditioned. For apprehension of the unconditioned 
would be to apprehend the unconditioned through conditioned thought. But then one is thinking of a 
conditioned subject in conditioned thought… (Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, B16-B17, B20, 





And one can always suggest that, maybe, if our moral concepts and faculties were slightly 
different, we could perceive a source of normativity or normative reasons which would console 
our angsts without external sources of normativity. That is, if we were slightly differently 
arranged, perhaps we would "see" that our longing for normativity is really a longing for this 
something-else which is already within our grasp. For instance, one might think that, if our 
concepts and faculties were different, we would not longer crave an external source of 
normativity at all. Or, perhaps, if our perspective from which we observe rational agents like us 
and experiences with them were different, we would give more normative weight to the internal 
states of agents like us, thus finding that internal sources of normativity are sufficiently weighty 
to supply us with normative reasons, and thereby finding that we have no need, from this new 
point of view, for external guarantors for normativity. That is, perhaps the only reason that the 
angsty have developed a concept of normativity which includes externality is that they 
negatively evaluate agents like themselves, and feel the need to defend themselves against 
their untrustworthy kin by positing an external arbiter--"normativity." Still, the converse might be 
entertained: perhaps those who are satisfied with merely internal accounts of normativity are 
only so satisfied because they surround themselves with like minded people, sheltering 
themselves from the experience of painful moral disagreement and the morally apathetic. Thus, 
I do not suppose that this conceptual scheme is universal--perhaps its non-universality might 
explain the behaviors and beliefs of violent sociopaths and other types of wantons. 
All that I have to offer here is an analysis of a kind of metaethical angst, in which I lay out 
the causes of this angst, what this angst consists in, and what a consoling solution to this angst 
would require. I am not, to be clear, attempting to survey all the metaphysical, epistemic and 
practical problems for the moral realism which the angsty desire (other works have done this 
well),5 nor am I putting forward a thorough solution. Instead, I am trying to state, fully and in one 
                                                 
5 Again, see Scanlon and Weilenberg for surveys of these issues, and see WIland for a survey of 




place, angst over the normative question (as it relates to reasons), and to show why one with 
this angst might not be consoled by the internalist theories so prevalent in contemporary 
metaethics. In light of our analysis, we may throw out our concepts which cause our angst, or 
revise them, perhaps making new concepts from the old. Or, if our concepts are vague enough, 
we need not revise them, but simply show that the things we thought they corresponded to do 
not, in fact, exist. We may then, since our concepts are so broad, seek other candidates for 
correspondence which would align with them. Or, perhaps, we can console ourselves by 
changing our desires. But these solutions to absurd angst deserve many pages, and I am not 
prepared, nor do I wish, to comment on them in detail. 
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ABSURD ANGST, ANGSTY THINKING AND EXTERNALISM 
(I.1) Absurd Angst and Non-Instrumental Reasons 
(I.1.1) Introduction to Absurd Angst 
To study absurd angst, I start by briefly examining two thinkers who clearly articulated their 
suffering under this angst: Camus and Tolstoy. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus describes an 
absurd world. It is, using his terminology, a world where a handful of our most intense desires 
and central goals are frustrated by the non-rational nature of the world. We desire knowledge 
and understanding of the world as it is apart from ourselves,1 profound reasons to live,2 and a 
home-like world in which to live.3 An absurd world (which our world is, per Camus) is a world 
where none of these desires can be fulfilled due to the constructed and purely human nature of 
knowledge, understanding, rationality, reasons and significance. It is a world where “all thought 
is anthropomorphic.”4 
Per Camus, we might come to recognize that the world is absurd after asking the 
question, “is life worth living?”5 This realization is painful, alienating us from the world, and 
                                                 
1 Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, 21, 23. 
2 Camus, 6. 
3 Camus, 17. 
4 “Understanding the world for a man is reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal. The cat’s 
universe is not the universe of the anthill. The truism, ‘all though is anthropomorphic’ has no other 
meaning.’”(Camus, 17.) 




breaking the illusion that we are at home in it. We might, after becoming aware of absurdity, 
continue living and “making our gestures,” but we will have realized that living and engaging in 
human activities are merely “ridiculous habits.” 
But, surely, pain doesn’t set in from merely raising the question, “is life worth living?” 
Perhaps the answer is positive, after all! What, then, causes a painful response to the question? 
Per Camus, it is that, upon raising the question, we look around for a reason to live, and can 
find none, which then leads us to believe that there are no such “profound reasons for living.”6 
Further, Camus takes it that the anthropomorphic nature of rationality and reasons rules out the 
existence of “profound reasons for living,” as if such reasons require an external guarantor.7 
 This lack of reasons to continue living follows, per Camus, from Camus’ doctrine of 
projection (that rationality and so reasons are human constructions, projected onto the world).  
For Camus there is no aspect of the world as it is in itself which could provide a source or 
ground for reasons to live, since that would require an external world somehow matched to 
rational, human conceptual structures. But the world does not contain these anthropomorphic 
properties.8 So, if we are to once more anthropomorphize the world and ask it for an answer to 
our question (“is life worth living?”), it would stare coldly at us or apathetically shrug. In less 
metaphoric terms, there are no reasons to live or die in or stemming from the world in itself--
nothing in the world can provide reasons to live or die; there is no source external to humanity 
that can ground or provide compelling reasons to live. When awareness of this lack hits, it 
strikes with the force of a painful angst. 
Tolstoy seemed to recognize a highly similar source of reasons-based angst, describing 
it as follows: 
Five years ago something very strange began to happen to me...I felt lost and became 
dejected…Then these moments of perplexity began to recur oftener and oftener, and 
                                                 
6 Camus, 6. 
7 Camus, 6, 17. 




always in the same form.9 
 
I could give no reasonable meaning to any single action, or to my whole life...Today or 
tomorrow sickness and death will come to those I love or to me; nothing will remain but 
stench and worms...Then why go on making any effort?10 
 
My question—that which at the age of fifty brought me to the verge of suicide—was the 
simplest of questions, lying in the soul of every man...it was a question without 
answering which one cannot live.11 
 
What will be the outcome of what I do today? Of what I shall do tomorrow? What will be 
the outcome of all my life? Why should I live? Why wish for anything, or do anything? Is 
there in life any purpose which the inevitable death which awaits me does not undo and 
destroy?12 
 
Had I simply understood that life had no meaning, I could have borne it quietly, knowing 
that was my lot. But I could not satisfy myself with that. Had I been like a man living in a 
wood from which he knows there is no exit, I could have lived; but I was like one lost in a 
wood who, horrified at having lost his way, rushes about, wishing to find the road.13 
 
We might be tempted to think of Tolstoy as worrying about “the meaning of life,” but what he 
might mean by “meaning” is unclear.14 What is clear, however, is the question he asks several 
times: “in the face of death, why go on making any effort?” “Why should I live?” “Why wish for 
anything, if I end up dead?” 
“Why questions” are normally requests for reasons. When we ask why we ought to do 
something, we are typically asking to be made aware of the reasons which support our acting in 
that way. Asking such questions, Tolstoy is very plausibly searching for answers in the form of 
reasons. He rushes about like one lost in a wood, but cannot find any consolation, just as 
Camus’ angsty individual, upon raising these same questions, becomes pained by their inability 
                                                 
9 Tolstoy, Leo. A Confession, 13. 
10 Tolstoy, 17. 
11 Tolstoy, 21. 
12 Tolstoy, 21. 
13 Tolstoy, 19. 
14 Some writers have analyzed philosophical, metaethical angst as primarily an angst over “the meaning 
of life.” For an example, see: (Zhao, Michael. “Meaning, Moral Realism, and the Importance of Morality.”). 
Meaning, in my view, however, is simply a casualty of denying normative reasons. That is, the primary 
worry of the angsty is that there are no normative reasons, because, in part, if there were no such 




to discover any “profound reasons for living.” The worry, or angst, for both authors, is that there 
are no “profound” or “good,” which I take to mean justifying or normative, reasons to do anything 
at all.  
I am seeking to understand one aspect of Camus’ absurd angst--the aspect of angst that 
Tolstoy and Camus both share: a worry about a lack of good reasons for living or engaging in 
what is otherwise thought of as valuable or meaningful human activity.15 For Camus, this lack is 
implied by the anthropomorphic nature of rationality and value. For Tolstoy, our inability to 
answer the simplest of questions (to point to reasons to live, etc) indicates that there are no 
such reasons. Again, there is probably more to absurd angst than I describe here, but to 
understand the angst regarding the absence of reasons to do anything at all (from here called 
absurd angst) is enough. I seek only to understand why a worry emerges from our “longing for 
happiness and for reason.”16 
(I.1.2) The Notions of Normativity and Normative Reasons 
But what is meant, here, by “normative reasons” and “normativity?”17  Like most of our 
important, non-trivial concepts, our concept of normativity is largely understood by reflecting on 
its functions. Normativity, for our purposes, is that component of moral principles and reasons to 
act which provides authoritative forcefulness--that authority and force which most of us pre-
theoretically feel backs morality. That is, normativity is that which makes moral principles and 
reasons to act compelling, forceful and obligatory. It is that element of morality and reasons 
which allows them to justify rather than merely explain. And it is the component of morality and 
reasons which we feel makes justified demands on us. What exactly this normative force 
                                                 
15 I am construing “moral claims” broadly to involve claims like “life is worth living,” “my life has value,” etc. 
It seems arbitrary to me to include “Emily has value” and “Emily should be respected as an end herself” 
as moral, but not “I have value,” “my life is valuable.” For each of these judgements appear to be 
judgements about what we have reason to do, or what things have normative significance. 
16 Camus, 28. 
17 Korsgaard’s The Sources of Normativity is the standard jumping-off point for discussions of normativity 
and sources of normativity. Much, if not most, of what I say here is pulled directly from her first chapter, 




consists in, however, is mysterious, and part of the difficulty the angsty face arises from its 
mysterious and vague nature. 
From these functional features of normativity (or functional properties of the sort of thing 
which our concept of normativity seeks to describe), we can see that our concept of normativity 
is likely of a property, particularly a property of moral claims and reasons to act. This property 
sets certain claims and reasons apart from other, non-normative claims and reasons. 
Under this terminology, we can describe absurd angst as a worry that there are no 
normative (good or profound) reasons to live or to act at all.18  
(I.1.3) The (Instrumental) Import of Normative Reasons 
I think, now, that the general nature of absurd angst is clear: it is a painful worry that there are 
no normative reasons one may cite to provide satisfying answers to the questions, “why value or 
seek anything at all?” and “Why live, or exert any effort?” But what has not been made clear is 
why the angsty place such importance on possessing reasons to act. Why care about having 
reasons? What about a lack of reasons causes some to become angsty? 
 In Chapter IV, I will give a list of painful consequences thought to follow from denying the 
existence of normative reasons (and thus anything necessary for them). Here, I can only 
describe one type of instrumental import that the angsty assign to normative reasons: they are 
necessary for the truth of our closely held moral claims, and so the consolation that their truth 
might provide. In short, moral principles and ascriptions of moral properties are important for a 
consolation which preserves happiness and motivation to act in the face of pain and death, and 
competing interests. We console ourselves by supposing that our pains have positive value. 
When we cannot convince ourselves that our pains themselves are valuable, we preserve our 
                                                 
18 Over the course of this paper, no more will be attempted than to draw out other necessary features of 
our concept of normativity and normative reasons, and to discuss what these features show about our 
moral conceptual system. Our intuitions (dispositions to believe certain things about normativity) will be 





motivation and ward off despair by supposing that  are instrumental in reaching some other 
valuable state, or that, overall, the fight through pain is beautiful, good or valuable from an ideal 
perspective: a moral perspective where we can see the true value of all subjects. In the face of 
our death and finitude, we attribute moral properties like “significance” to ourselves, our lives, 
pursuits, and the objects we take to be valuable. The angsty despair when they are unable to 
convince themselves that their sufferings, achievements, and lives have positive moral 
properties. 
(I.1.4) The Angsty Conceptual Scheme and Angsty Conceptual Commitments 
I suggest that, for those like Camus and Tolstoy, there is a tight conceptual link between 
normative reasons and moral truths.19 That is, Camus and Tolstoy are both inclined to pre-
theoretical moral rationalism.20 It seems to me that, before we poison ourselves with 
philosophical doubt, we normally take it for granted that true moral claims (ascriptions of moral 
properties and imperatives) provide for or point to powerful reasons to act in certain ways--
reasons that survive awareness of our painful mortality and conflicts arising from the (alleged) 
incompatibility of morality and self-interest. These sorts of reasons stemming from or associated 
with moral statuses I will call “moral reasons” from here. Moral reasons are normative, in that 
they justify, compel or warrant action. From here, unless otherwise stated, “reasons” will refer to 
normative reasons. In sum, the angsty feel that, if we are able to truthfully attribute consoling 
                                                 
19 I speak of “the truth of moral claims” loosely here. I recognize at least two distinctions in moral claims or 
moral truths--ascriptions of moral properties and imperatives. It is not clear to me that moral imperatives 
are able to be true or false, and I’d like to avoid this issue altogether here. When I speak of the truth of 
moral claims/truths, I mean to speak of at least the truth of moral ascriptions, and the normativity/authority 
of moral imperatives. 
20  “Moral rationalism is the claim that moral obligations are or entail sound practical reasons for action” 
(Shafer Landau, Russ. Moral Realism: A Defence, 48). In my view, moral rationalism can be construed 
more broadly than this. One might take rationalism to hold for moral truths in general, or for only particular 
kinds of moral truths, like truths about obligations. Moral truths can be divided, it seems to me, at least 
into ascriptions of moral properties and imperatives. To be a rationalist about either is to hold that the 
truth of moral ascriptions and imperatives (or the normativity of moral imperatives, if one does not think 
imperatives are truth apt) entail normative reasons to act in accord with those moral ascriptions and 
imperatives. What it means to act in accord with moral ascriptions is not obvious, but for the sake of this 
discussion, we might say that to act in accord with an ascription intrinsic value is to value the intrinsically 




moral statuses on subjects, then there must be normative reasons to value, pursue or seek 
those subjects. This is why the angsty fear and are pained by our question: they feel that, 
without normative reasons, their beliefs about the consoling and motivating moral properties of 
their ends, actions and objects would be false, and that the moral principles they live by 
(imperatives) would be unjustified and uncompelling (without normative force).21 
Given that one accepts that correct ascriptions of consoling and motivating moral 
properties involve ascriptions of normative reasons, one comes to find, upon reflection, that a 
chain of normative reasons makes up their structure of moral reasoning. As Tolstoy does, we 
might ask ourselves, “why bother to Φ?” That the question “why Φ?” is a request for justifying or 
compelling reasons to Φ seems nearly indubitable; again, in Tolstoy and Camus, this is explicitly 
affirmed, and the angsty should be trusted somewhat to analyze the meaning of their questions. 
In response to “why Φ?,” we posit some moral property of Φ-ing which is supposed to offer a 
justifying reason to Φ. But we can quickly discontent ourselves by raising the question again: 
“why care about that moral property? Why should that compel me to Φ?” A series of 
instrumentally valuable or instrumentally good subjects backing up our Φ-ing will be posited in 
an attempt to hit on, and rest in, a good, compelling or justifying reason to Φ as a satisfying 
answer to our first question: “why Φ?” Instrumental values or goods invoke or provide 
instrumental reasons. But this regress of moral properties and moral reasons cannot go on 
forever--eventually it must end in a valuable or good subject which we can no longer discontent 
ourselves with by asking “why care about Ψ? Why should Ψ compel us to Φ?” This chain, then, 
must terminate in a non-instrumentally valuable or good subject. And, since we were initially 
asking for reasons, we feel that this non-instrumentally valuable or good subject will be the 
                                                 
21 This is in itself a controversial endorsement of moral rationalism. If one can justifiably deny the 
conceptual link between normative reasons and consoling/motivating moral properties, then one can, 
perhaps, justifiably attribute consoling and motivating moral properties to subjects which are not 
supported by normative reasons. But if one, like myself, finds that, upon introspection, their moral 
concepts (such as intrinsic value and obligation) necessarily contain a certain relation to normative 




ultimate source of our reasons to Φ.22 This ultimate or final subject will be such as to provide a 
reason to Φ. The form of a satisfying answer to our initial question (why bother Φ-ing?) is that 
there is some Ψ which we have reason to do without invoking any other reasons, and that this 
reason to Ψ provides, perhaps indirectly, a reason to bother Φ-ing. That is, to satisfy a request 
for a reason to Φ, we must posit a final, non-instrumental reason--a reason which is not 
dependent on or derivative from a further morally good subject or reason. This is one way to ask 
Korsgaard’s “normative question.” That is, if one accepts the intuition that there must be 
normative reasons behind moral properties, such as obligations and normativity, to ask the 
normative question (in this way) will be to go down this chain of instrumental and non-
instrumental reasons.23 
I ask, for instance, why I should not murder my wife (for what reasons I have not to do 
so). Putting considerations of my wife’s intrinsic value to one side and assuming I do not like my 
wife, I say, first, because I would be caught, and this would result in unhappiness and suffering 
in prison. But why care about this? Because it undermines my other goals (to be happy, to have 
a new marriage outside of prison, to play with my dogs at home rather than looking at photos in 
prison). But why care about undermining my other goals? Because I value my goals. But why 
does my valuing my goals provide me with a reason to not undermine them? Why should I value 
or pursue my goals at all? Why not live a life of inconsistency, in which I learn to take joy in 
undermining my long-term goals in favor of my short-term goals? I can see no reason to act in 
accordance with my goals other than the fact that I have already adopted them. Worse, even if I 
cannot help but to adopt them, perhaps because rational agents like myself cannot avoid 
                                                 
22  Parfit argues along these lines, declaring that “it is from intrinsic reasons that all instrumental reasons 
get their force.” (Parfit, Derek. “Rationality and Reasons,” 24.) 
23 Korsgaard defines the normative question as such: it is to ask whether or not any evaluative claims are 
truly normative. The normative question is asked when one asks of an evaluative claim, “must I really do 
this? Why must I do it?” If one interprets “why” questions as requests for reasons, then, when one 
answers “why Φ?” by positing a subject with a certain moral property, this betrays their view that moral 




pursuing their own self-interest, I recognize that my valuing them may be arbitrary. For, 
presumably, logical or metaphysical necessity of my adopting certain ends doesn’t seem to 
capture the normative or moral necessity I am after here. Similarly, if I appeal to my wife’s 
intrinsic value, I suppose that this value provides me with, or indicates that I already have, a 
reason not harm her. I appeal to some final end--my wife herself--and this end, I am inclined to 
say, is backed by reasons. Though I may feel that there is such a reason, I can easily doubt that 
this is nothing more than a feeling, and recognize that feelings do not necessarily provide 
compelling, moral reasons. I recognize that there is difficulty in identifying my ultimate reasons 
for action, since it seems coherent to doubt that an appeal to the intrinsic value of our ultimate 
ends is sufficient for providing compelling reasons to set them as our ends. I am pained by this 
difficulty as it leads me to doubt that there are any final or ultimate reasons undergirding my 
subsidiary ends, and that doubt, in turn, leads me to doubt that there are any subsidiary 
(instrumental) reasons altogether. 
To clarify, the angsty (pre-theoretically) believe that they have normative reasons to act 
in various ways. Surely, also, the angsty operate under the concepts of instrumental and non-
instrumental reasons--they believe that they have some reasons to act in virtue of the action’s 
utility, and that, for other actions, they have reasons to do them regardless of the actions’ utility 
(utility broadly construed as conduciveness to some other end). But once the angsty begin to 
interrogate their existing beliefs by asking whether they really have reasons to act in those 
ways, they become disappointed. The angsty expected to find something more than they are 
able to--they expected that what they believed themselves to have reason to do would either be 
supported by further, instrumental reasons, in the case of actions which they had only 
instrumental reasons to perform, or that they would be self-justifying (non-instrumental reasons). 
And when they reflect on what these reasons could be, they realize that they have believed in 




reasons, and that these sets ground, support or justify all their subsidiary, instrumental reasons 
to act.  
The angsty, never having given much thought to the structure of their common sense 
moral system, have lived under the assumption that there is a set of final or ultimate reasons 
waiting for them;24 that, if they were to devote time to understanding the nature of morality, 
these foundationally supporting reasons would be accessible. 
I think that this sort of disappointment betrays another belief the angsty assent to 
besides moral rationalism: instrumental reasons, if they do not go on supporting one another 
forever, must be supported by non-instrumental reasons. And, perhaps, another: instrumental 
reasons cannot go on supporting one another forever. This would essentially force the angsty to 
further believe that, if there are any normative, instrumental reasons at all, then there must be 
normative, non-instrumental reasons as well. Since the instrumental/non-instrumental 
dichotomy seems to exhaust all kinds of reasons, the angsty conclude that, if any normative 
reasons exist at all, then non-instrumental reasons must exist. 
I have followed a chain of “reasons-to” up to a place where I ask for reasons to value or 
seek the things I do value and seek in/for themselves (I request non-instrumental reasons). I 
interrogate the things I feel are intrinsically valuable for a reason to value or pursue them. But I 
cannot see, or confidently feel, any reasons to value them, or how an appeal to their intrinsic 
value might provide such reasons--it is always coherent to doubt, especially in the face of 
death.25 I may always ask myself whether I really have reasons to act, love, value, cherish, or 
                                                 
24 Tolstoy again echoes this. He says that “why?” questions would occur to him, but that he would accept, 
naively, that the answers were out there already--that he could, if he wanted, come to understand the 
readily accessible foundations of morality. That, as he put it, moral progress was carrying him toward 
some valuable end, even if he was not sure, in this present moment, what that end consisted of. He 
writes, "Everything is developing, and I am developing; the reason why I am developing in this way will 
come to light, along with everything else" (Tolstoy, Ch. III). 
25 As Nagel notes, some feel that “because we are going to die, all chains of justification must leave off in 
mid-air: one studies and works to earn money to pay for clothing, housing, entertainment, food, to sustain 
oneself from year to year, perhaps to support a family and pursue a career--but to what final end? All of it 




refrain. I can’t see, taste, hear, touch or apprehend “reasons” by convincing magical ability, after 
all. I seem to worry over this as a result of unknowingly adopting an angsty principle of justifying 
(normative) reasons: reasons to seek subsidiary ends and value the merely instrumentally 
valuable depend on the reasons conferred by higher, intrinsically valuable ends. Unable to 
shake this principle, at the end of this interrogation, I either have to admit that there are no 
reasons to desire, work, live, or be moral, or that these reasons terminate in a set of final 
reasons that, mysteriously, are not explicable by positing more ends backed by additional 
reasons to pursue those ends. This allows us to begin cataloguing our angsty conceptual 
commitments. Each of the following beliefs (labeled “CCs” for “conceptual commitments”) 
describes or betrays an analysis of moral concepts which the angsty seem to possess and 
utilize. 
CC1. True ascriptions of moral properties require that there are normative 
reasons to act in accord with those ascriptions.26 
CC2. The normativity of moral imperatives requires normative reasons to act in 
accord with those imperatives. 
CC3. If there are any normative reasons at all, then there must be normative, 
non-instrumental reasons. 
This incomplete catalogue of conceptual commitments on the part of the angsty shows that 
absurd angst is produced by a non-trivial set of commitments. I will, shortly, expand upon this 
catalogue. It may be that the widespread suffering of absurd angst betrays just how widespread 
these commitments are among reflective people, at least pre-theoretically. 
(I.2) The Problematic Externality of Normative Reasons 
(I.2.1) Intro. to the Problem with Normative, Non-Instrumental Reasons 
                                                 
26 Note that CC1 and CC2 split “moral truths” into two categories: ascriptions of moral properties and 
moral imperatives. The angsty feel, overall, that “moral truths” require normative reasons. For precision, 
and because the “truth” of moral ascriptions and moral imperatives are not clearly the same sort of thing, I 
have separated the claim into CC1 and CC2. This bypasses the suggestion that moral imperatives are 
not “truth apt,” and describes the angsty as only committed to worrying about the normative force of moral 
imperatives. It is in this sense that moral truths require normative reasons: the truth of moral ascriptions 




A brief recap is in order: under our angsty conceptual scheme, if there are normative reasons 
undergirding the ultimate rules, ends and values of our moral systems, they are either 
instrumental or non-instrumental. However, instrumental reasons appear, on this conceptual 
scheme, to be necessarily parasitic on non-instrumental reasons, so that, if there are normative 
reasons undergirding our moral systems, then there must be a set of non-instrumental reasons. 
We badly desire normative, non-instrumental reasons, but cannot confidently confirm that they 
exist. We are plagued by doubts, and when we become aware of this difficulty, we worry that 
there are no such things as non-instrumental reasons, and so no normative reasons at all. We 
fear this will result in the collapse of our moral system altogether, instilling us with a deep 
unease, and destroying our moral motivation in the face of suffering and conflicts between 
morality and self-interest. 
But at this point, one might wonder where the philosophical problem lies. If the truth of 
important moral claims, the justification of our will to live, and the existence of normative 
reasons requires normative, non-instrumental reasons, why not just grant the existence of 
normative, non-instrumental reasons? What reasons (ha) could we possibly have not to?  
The difficulty in accepting the existence of normative, non-instrumental reasons stems 
from a few features of reasoning about reasons and another conceptual commitment on the part 
of the angsty. First, one can always question whether there is really a reason to act. Even if we 
really feel that we have normative, non-instrumental reasons to, say, positively value conscious 
life, we can always stir up doubts within us. Reasons are not empirical, and there seems to be 
no contradiction in the claim “reasons do not exist.” Do our moral feelings and inclinations justify 
our belief in the existence of normative, non-instrumental reasons?27  
                                                 
27 Korsgaard writes, “The difficulty here is plain. The metaphysical view that intrinsically normative entities 
or properties exist must be supported by our confidence that we really do have obligations. It is because 
we are confident that obligation is real that we are prepared to believe in the existence of some sort of 
objective values. But for that very reason the appeal to the existence of objective values cannot be used 




Second, there are those who seem to so profoundly disagree with us (in both beliefs and 
behaviors) that they appear to be unmoved by, or unaware of, the reasons we find so important. 
How, one might ask, can one continue to believe, if one, to believe, must admit that they take 
themselves to be in touch with something (“reasons” or whatever supplies reasons) that many 
others are not? This is not merely a worry about being elitist. Rather, wouldn’t we expect 
similarly constituted creatures to have the same inclinations to respond to identical stimuli 
(whether that be reasons themselves or the states we take to constitute or give rise to 
reasons)? So, if there really were such a thing as normative, non-instrumental reasons which 
prompt us to value them, then why would other beings like us--even from the same cultural 
contexts--seem to have totally different moral inclinations toward them? 
Third, and this is where the most difficult metaphysical troubles enter,  it seems that we 
(the angsty) already (pre-theoretically) believe that normative, non-instrumental reasons must 
be backed by external guarantors--that is, normative, non-instrumental reasons must, in some 
important way, be backed by a normativity which is not merely human. which are independent of 
our internal evaluative states (desires, beliefs, pro-attitudes).28 To this last difficulty I turn now. 
(I.2.2) Externalizing Normative Reasons 
This third difficulty raised by the supposed externality of normative reasons is not a simple 
matter. For one, in what way do the angsty feel that normative reasons must be “external?” The 
angsty have, no doubt, some drive to externalize (make independent of human psychology in 
some important way) normative reasons. Tolstoy seems to find consolation and reason to live 
                                                 
as one may feel as if one is falling without believing that one is moving downward, so one may feel as if 
one has to do what is morally required without believing oneself to be under physical or psychological 
compulsion, or about to incur a penalty if one does not comply...There is no difficulty about the idea that 
we feel we have to behave morally, and given the psychological conditions of the learning of moral 
behavior it is natural that we should have such feelings. What we cannot do is quote them in support of 
the doctrine of the categorical imperative” (Foot, Phillipa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives.”). 




only by coming to believe in God as a reason-giving source or as a sort of external guarantor of 
morality.29 For angsty thinkers like this, that reasons and rationality are backed only by merely 
human (merely internal) sentiments undermines their forcefulness, and disqualifies them from 
being profound or good reasons to live. This conviction that an external source or guarantor is 
necessary for reasons to be normative, however, is not uncontroversial, and it may be motivated 
by a mere feeling that the evaluations of agents like us are, on a grand scale, worthless.30 
Furthermore, the recent literature on theistic metaethics shows a deep concern with the external 
foundations of morality. For many theists, no internal source of morality is felt to do. It may even 
be, as I will argue in subsequent Chapters, that religious belief is motivated by a desire to 
preserve belief in normativity by indirectly reassuring the angsty that there are such external 
sources of normativity.31 
 But if the angsty feel that normative reasons, especially non-instrumental reasons, 
require some external component--some component independent of our limited, human 
sentiment--what would this component be? There are two ways in which we might apply 
concepts found in contemporary metaethical literature to make sense of the angsty drive to 
externalize. First, we might understand the angsty as claiming that at least some reasons, 
particularly normative, non-instrumental reasons, must be external reasons. Second, we might 
understand the angsty as claiming that at least some reasons, particularly normative, non-
instrumental reasons, require external sources of normativity. To understand these two 
                                                 
29 Tolstoy writes that he could no longer accept the consensus of his learned peers, or even all mankind, 
as sufficient to provide reasons to act. For he, reflecting on witnessing public executions, described 
himself as recognizing a need for an external grounds of morality. “I realized that even if all the people in 
the world from the day of creation found this to be necessary according to whatever theory, I knew that it 
was not necessary and that it was wrong. Therefore, my judgments must be based-on what is right and 
necessary and not on what people say and do...” (Tolstoy, Ch. III.). 
30 Note that requiring external sources for normative, non-instrumental reasons is not the same as 
requiring non-instrumental reasons to be external or categorical. 
31  See, for instance: (Adams, Robert Merrihew. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical 
Theology.) (Craig, William. “The Most Gruesome of Guests.”) (James, William. "Lectures IV-VII." In The 
Varieties of Religious Experience.) Indeed, for James and Adams, belief in God seems to allow the 




interpretations, which are not exclusive, I must give a taxonomy of reasons and sources of 
normativity (as understood in the contemporary literature).32 
(I.2.3) A Taxonomy of Reasons 
Instrumental reasons to Φ are reasons to Φ had in virtue of Φ being conducive to Ψ. Non-
instrumental reasons to Φ are reasons to Φ had independently of Φ’s conduciveness to any 
other end. Internal reasons to Φ are reasons to Φ which depend on the agent with those 
reasons having certain internal evaluative states that are promoted by Φ-ing. External reasons 
to Φ are reasons to Φ which do not depend on the agent with those reasons having any internal 
evaluative states which are promoted by Φ-ing. An agent has an internal reason to Φ only if the 
agent has or would have, under certain conditions, internal evaluative states in favor of or 
promoted by Φ-ing. I take this dependence to at least involve dependence on agents having 
actually adopted certain ends or forming certain evaluations which Φ-ing accords with; that is, 
an internal reason of an agent depends on that agent’s adoption of certain ends which Φ-ing is 
conducive to bringing about.33 External reasons do not have such a dependence. 
                                                 
32 The substance of this taxonomy can be found across the following authors, although their terminology 
may differ, in addition to how they make sense of the notion of “internal evaluative states.” (Williams, 
Bernard. “Internal and External Reasons.”) (Parfit, Derek. “Rationality and Reasons.”)  (Shafer-Landau, 
Russ. "A Defence of Categorical Reasons.") (Foot, Philippa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives.”) (Luco, A.C. “Non-Negotiable: Why Moral Naturalism Cannot Do Away with Categorical 
Reasons.”) 
33 What “having internal states in favor of or promoted by Φ-ing” amounts to, however, is difficult to cash 
out. Internalists will have varying views on which internal states are relevant, and I find it best to keep the 
discussion as general as possible. I find, however, that archetypical internalists are united in thinking that 
having internal states promoted by Φ-ing requires adopting or be disposed to adopt some end which Φ-
ing is conducive to bringing about or constitutive of. The “internalism requirement” endorsed by many 
requires that reasons must be capable of motivating, and it seems plausible to assume that capability to 
motivate requires an ability to speak to the already adopted ends of agents. So, for those who accept this 
requirement on reasons, an agent’s reasons to Φ require that the agent has adopted some end which Φ-
ing is conducive to bring about (or else these reasons would be unable to motivate). Korsgaard, for 
instance, endorses this requirement and posits that all rational agents actually adopt certain ends due to 
the inevitability of adopting a view of their own identity, and that from the act of adopting these ends 
emerge reasons and obligations. Other thinkers which endorse this requirement are Williams. Thus, I 
think it justified to say that internal reasons are reasons which depend on the ends adopted by agents 
with those reasons. See: (Korsgaard, Christine. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” 201.) and 




This taxonomy permits of various combinations of instrumental/non-instrumental and 
internal/external reasons. At first glance, we have internal-instrumental, internal-non-
instrumental, external-instrumental and external-non-instrumental reasons. For our purposes, 
the sorts of reasons relevant are internal-instrumental, internal non-instrumental and external 
non-instrumental. We may put to the side the notion of external, instrumental reasons, as 
nothing hinges on an analysis of them. I construe internal-instrumental reasons as reasons to 
Φ which depend on Φ-ing’s conduciveness to Ψ, and Ψ’s being (actually or counterfactually) 
desired or sought by the agents who possess these reasons. I take external-non-instrumental 
reasons to be reasons to Φ which do not depend on Φ-ing’s conduciveness to Ψ, nor Ψ’s being 
(actually or counterfactually) desired or sought by the agents who possess these reasons. 
These external-non-instrumental reasons, if they are had at all, may be had regardless of our 
internal, evaluative states regarding Φ (the means) or Ψ (the ends). Internal-non-instrumental 
reasons I take to be reasons to Φ depending on an agent’s actually or counterfactually valuing 
or positively regarding Φ (some end or subject), but which are independent of Φ’s utility to the 
realization of some further end, Ψ.  
Finally, two more conceptual divisions can be made, providing us with two sub-
categories of internal reasons. First, actual-internal reasons are reasons to Φ which depend 
on the actual desires, commitments or evaluative states of agents with those reasons, and 
counterfactual-internal reasons are reasons to Φ which depend on the desires, commitments 
or evaluative states agents with those reasons would have under some ideal set of conditions. 
An agent has an actual-internal reason to Φ only if that agent has actual-internal evaluative 
states in favor of Φ-ing. An agent has a counterfactual-internal reason to Φ only if that agent 




jargon of contemporary metaethics, both external and counterfactual-internal reasons are 
categorical.34 
But here an ambiguity might bother attentive readers--in what sense of dependence 
have I divided reasons by? Here it seems best to me to make two further conceptual divisions: 
between logically and metaphysically internal or external reasons (the latter of which is more 
interesting). Logically internal reasons, both actual and counterfactual, depend on the internal 
states of agents in the sense that certain agents having certain internal states is a necessary 
condition for their existence. And logically external reasons do not logically depend on any 
agents having any internal states, actually or counterfactually. 
Logically external reasons, however, probably do not exist. Both Strong Externalism 
about reasons (the view that all normative reasons are external--independent of the internal 
states of agents) and Externalism about Non-Instrumental Reasons (the view that all normative, 
non-instrumental reasons are external) would be very clearly false, if one meant by “external 
reasons” merely logically external reasons. Against both forms of externalism, consider the 
plausible claim that, if there are normative reasons to be moral, then I would necessarily, if I was 
under ideal conditions which forced me to be perfectly moral, have internal evaluative states in 
favor of being moral. It seems coherent, then, to suppose that some normative reasons, even 
non-instrumental ones, depend on the fact that agents with those reasons would form internal 
evaluative states in favor of acting in accordance with those reasons, under some ideal 
conditions. No matter how trivial this logical dependence is, it seems that these naive forms of 
externalism are false. 
                                                 
34  In the way used by Landau and Foot: (Shafer-Landau, Russ. "A Defence of Categorical Reasons.") 
(Foot, Philippa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.”). Hypothetical reasons refer to 
reasons dependent on one’s actual evaluative states (if you have these states, then you have this 
reason). Categorical reasons refer to reasons independent of one’s actual evaluative states, and thus 




Rather, I suggest that the more interesting kind of conceptual division, at least for our 
purposes, is of that between metaphysically internal and metaphysically external reasons. 
Metaphysically external reasons would not depend on the internal states of agents in the sense 
that the internal states of agents are not necessary causes of them. That is, taking causal 
relations to include constitutive or grounding relations, metaphysically external reasons are 
causally independent of the internal evaluative states of agents like us. While such external 
reasons may have internal states as a necessary condition of their existence, they are not 
constituted by them, and the causal story behind their existence. Metaphysically internal 
reasons, however, are causally dependent on such internal states. Unlike logically external 
reasons, metaphysically external reasons do not seem to be as easily dismissed as non-
existent, and so I take them to be much more interesting.35 
Note that, under our definitions of external and internal reasons, an external reason is a 
reason which does not depend on the internal states of reason-having agents. That is, an 
external reason might be had by an agent even though that agent does not have any actual 
internal state in favor of Φ-ing; its being had by an agent does not depend on that agents 
internal states. However, this leaves open the possibility that an external reason might still be 
dependent on some internal states. Consider, for instance, my reason not to throw my harmless 
pet snake at my mother. Though this reason, in my view, does not depend on my internal states 
in favor of not throwing my snake, and does not depend on my disposition under ideal states, it 
still does depend on the internal states of my mother: if my mother was not terrified by snakes, I 
would presumably not have such a reason. This example is meant to illustrate what I mean by 
an external reason: it is a reason to Φ an agent has which does not depend on what that agent 
                                                 
35 The distinction between logical and metaphysical dependence seems to be at the heart of the 
Euthyphro dilemma. For the problem Euthyphro poses is this: given that whatever the gods prefer is 
good, and vice versa (logical dependence), how do we explain goodness? Is goodness explained by the 
gods’ preferences (metaphysical dependence on preferences), or sources external to them (metaphysical 




actually or counterfactually thinks or feels about Φ-ing. External reasons are not divorced from 
the desires and internal lives of agents like us, exemplified by the dependence of my external 
reason on my mother’s internal evaluative states. Rather, external reasons are meant to guard 
against the often wicked nature of our internal states, preventing reasons from being overridden 
or wiped from existence due to the seemingly ever changing preferences of human beings. 
Once more, reasons are external or internal relative to the reason-having agent. An 
agent has an external reason when their having that reason does not depend on their internal 
states, though it may depend on the internal states of another agent, which is external to the. An 
agent has an internal reason when their having that reason does does depend on their internal 
states. 
Applying the more interesting of these concepts to the angsty, the angsty might worry 
that normative reasons, in some way, require the existence of metaphysically external reasons. 
But, looking around for reasons which do not depend on the internal, evaluative states of agents 
like us requires much metaphysical speculation, and the angsty might quickly become 
disappointed and fearful once they realize that their moral systems rest on such a speculative 
and unclear foundation. 
(I.2.4) The Concept of Sources of Normativity and a Taxonomy 
With a taxonomy of reasons out of the way, I turn to explore the concept of a “source of 
normativity” and give a taxonomy of the different kinds of sources there might be.  
There seem to be a few principles about normativity which are highly intuitive. Consider 
the following: 
Some claims and reasons are normative, and some are non-normative. 
 
Some claims and reasons are normative in themselves or because of the actions they 
describe or recommend, while others draw their normativity from other sources. 
For an instance of the first sort of judgement, we might judge that the claim “thou shalt not 




we commonly make distinctions between reasons which explain why we did something and why 
we were justified in doing something, as in recognizing the division between “I am faithful to my 
wife because I feel no one else will have me” (an explanatory, motivating, non-normative, 
internal and psychological reason), “I am faithful to my wife because no one else will, indeed, 
have me” (an explanatory, non-normative, non-internal and non-psychological reason), and “I 
am faithful to my wife because I have promised to be so” (a supposedly normative reason). 
Absurd angst, summed up as a worry that there are no “good or profound” reasons to live, is a 
worry that there are no reasons of this last kind--normative reasons. 
As for the second kind of judgement, we might suppose that “thou shalt give to the 
Redcross” is normative only because giving to the Redcross will, at the current time, do the 
most good, and, if there were some better charity, this claim would not be normative. The claim 
is judged to be normative only in relation to another claim (“giving to the Redcross will currently 
do the most good”) or state of affairs which the claim does not describe (the state under which 
giving to the Redcross will do the most good). We might speak of that further claim or state of 
affairs as a “source” of normativity (I will return to this shortly). At the same time, we might also 
judge that “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” is always normative (it always has normative 
force) regardless of one’s circumstances, or that one always has a normative reason to love 
one’s neighbor as oneself, just because to love one’s neighbor as oneself is good or valuable, 
or will always be conducive to attaining some further good or valuable end. 
Again, one might judge that “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” is itself sufficient for 
normativity--that the claim is normative in itself--or that what is described by it (the act of loving 
thy neighbor as thyself) is sufficient for making either the claim itself normative, or for providing 
us a normative reason to act in accordance with the claim. Or one might judge that it’s positive 
utility-relation to some other end, when paired with the goodness of that other end, is sufficient 




It is in this sense that we might call some state, reason, claim or entity a “source of 
normativity:” a source of normativity for x is simply some y which explains why or how x is 
normative. For instance, a source of normativity for a reason is some y which explains why or 
how this reason is a normative reason, or why/how this reason has the normative force which it 
does. Sources of normativity are not restricted, then, merely to logically sufficient or necessary 
conditions for normativity, but might be metaphysical “grounds” or (constitutive) causes of the 
normativity of imperatives and moral claims.36 
As explanations, grounds, or (constitutive) causes of normativity, sources of normativity 
might be sufficient or insufficient. Sufficient sources of normativity are considerations37 which, 
by themselves, suffice to make a reason, imperative or claim normative.38 An insufficient 
source of normativity is a consideration which, though it may contribute to the normativity of (or 
contribute to the explanation of the normativity of) reasons, imperatives and claims, it is not, by 
itself, sufficient for their normativity. Only when taken with an additional consideration can an 
insufficient source hope to suffice as a source of normativity. 
One might make, for sources of normativity, a similar conceptual divide as those 
between internal and external reasons. External sources of normativity are sources of 
normativity which do not depend on the internal, evaluative states of agents, whether they be 
actual or counterfactual internal states (states which agents actually have or which they would 
have under ideal conditions). And, of course, internal sources of normativity are sources of 
normativity which depend on the internal, evaluative states of agents, of which there are two 
                                                 
36 For an overview of how the metaphysical notion of grounding might be applied to metaethical 
explanation, see: (Väyrynen, Pekka. "Grounding and Normative Explanation.") 
37 I use the term “considerations” to refer to any object, event, state of affairs, proposition, property, or 
action which might be posited as a source of normativity. 
38 Alternatively, one could say that a sufficient source of normativity for reasons is not sufficient for 
making a reason normative (as if the reason was had already, but needed to be made normative), but 





kinds: actual-internal sources of normativity and counterfactual-internal sources of 
normativity. 
As in our taxonomy of reasons, externality is defined perspectivally. External sources are 
external from the perspective of the agent who normativity is forceful upon. Internal sources are 
internal from the perspective of the agent who normativity is forceful upon. 
A reason metaphysically depending on a source of normativity means that the normative 
force of that reason on an agent metaphysically depends on some other consideration, fact, 
state of affairs, or entity. In the case of dependence on internal sources, the normative force of a 
reason to Φ on an agent depends on their having internal states in favor of Φ-ing. In the case of 
external sources, dependence would mean that the normative force of a reason to Φ on an 
agent depends on some entity external to that agent, which potentially includes the internal 
states of other agents. 
Perhaps the angsty, possessing this concept of sources of normativity, worry that the 
existence of normative reasons requires the existence of sources of normativity which do not 
depend on the human mind. That is, perhaps the angsty worry that without external sources of 
normativity, there would be no normative reasons. 
(I.2.5) Summary of the Angsty Conceptual Scheme 
To summarize what has been said so far, the angsty worry that there are no normative, non-
instrumental reasons serving as foundational supports of all other reasons, moral ascriptions, 
and moral imperatives. But the thinking producing the angsty worry is fuzzy. Clearly, the angsty 
are caused to worry because they feel that normative, non-instrumental reasons require an 
external component. But what does this mean? Applying contemporary metaethical concepts to 
angsty thinking, we arrive at two, non-exclusive possibilities: the angsty feel that normative, non-
instrumental reasons must be external reasons, or the angsty feel that they require external 
sources of normativity. Two conceptual schemes might be given to explain absurd angst, then, 




conceptual commitments already discussed (CC1-3), but add their own distinct commitments to 
them. 
CC1. True ascriptions of moral 
properties require that there are normative 
reasons to act in accord with those 
ascriptions. 
CC2. The normativity of moral 
imperatives requires normative reasons to 
act in accord with those imperatives. 
CC3. If there are any normative reasons 
at all, then there must be normative, non-
instrumental reasons. 
CC4. Normative reasons must be either 
internal or external. 
CC5. Normative, non-instrumental 
reasons (at least those which support our 
ultimate moral ends, claims, beliefs) 
cannot be internal. 
 
 
CC1*. True ascriptions of moral properties 
require that there are normative reasons to act in 
accord with those ascriptions. 
CC2*. The normativity of moral imperatives 
requires normative reasons to act in accord with 
those imperatives. 
CC3*. If there are any normative reasons at all, 
then there must be normative, non-instrumental 
reasons. 
CC4*. If a reason, a moral principle, or some 
other subject is normative, then there is a source 
of its normativity. 
CC5*. Sources of normativity are either internal 
or external. 
CC6*. Normative, non-instrumental reasons (at 
least those which support our ultimate moral 
ends, claims, beliefs) cannot have merely 
internal sources of normativity. 
If one accepted the conceptual commitments listed above, one would infer, under the first set, 
that normative, non-instrumental reasons must be external reasons, and, under the second set, 
that normative, non-instrumental reasons require external sources of normativity. But, because 
justifying belief in external reasons and external sources of reasons seemingly involves difficult 
metaphysical speculation, the angsty have put themselves into a corner, making their ethics 
depend on their metaphysic. And, given the regress problem and the problem of moral 
disagreement/apathy (described in I.2.1), the angsty have reason to think that there are no 
external reasons or sources of normativity. 
Note that my explanations of absurd angst also serves to explain philosophical angst 
over moral anti-realism and reasons internalism. For, on anti-realism, there seems to be no way 
of making sense of external reasons or external sources of normativity, while internalism about 
reasons and sources of normativity is just the denial that such sources exist. As Joshua 




“character of morality.”39 On my analysis of absurd angst, the worrying characteristics of our 
moral systems are (a) that the truths of our moral systems requires external components, and 
(b) that the external components of these systems are theoretically problematic. 
What I’ve offered throughout this Chapter, then, are two different sets of conceptual 
commitments that can serve as explanations of absurd angst. Under each conceptual scheme, 
painful and unsavory consequences follow. In the next two Chapters, I lay out the reasoning of 






























                                                 


















WHY EXTERNALIZE NORMATIVE, NON-INSTRUMENTAL REASONS? 
 
(II.1) The Angsty Arguments for CC5 
 
The angstys’ concept of “normative, non-instrumental reasons” clearly, then, involves either the 
concept of external reasons or external sources of normativity. But either of these views raise a 
difficulty for the angsty: it is very hard, if not impossible, to justify belief in normative, non-
instrumental reasons if one feels that they must be external in either of those ways. That is, if 
one is inclined to think that normative, non-instrumental reasons are external or draw their 
normativity from external sources, then any moral theory which does not recognize sources of 
normativity independent of the psychology of human-like agents will be unsatisfying; and yet, 
the existence of external sources of normativity seems a difficult, if not impossible, thing to 
confirm (for the perhaps naive reasons given in Chapter (I.2.1)), leaving one in a painful 
skepticism about morality. For just what is an external source of normativity? What are reasons 
at all, if they are not tightly bound to our internal evaluative states? 40 
As I described in Chapter (I), absurd angst might be explained by two sets of conceptual 
commitments. The first set of conceptual commitments are reproduced below. 
                                                 
40 I borrow this phrasing of the question from Williams. Williams points out that “reasons” are taken to be 
things which agents like us can act upon or for, and can apprehend. Reasons without talk of the mental 




CC1. True ascriptions of moral properties require that there are normative 
reasons to act in accord with those ascriptions. 
CC2. The normativity of moral imperatives requires normative reasons to act in 
accord with those imperatives. 
CC3. If there are any normative reasons at all, then there must be normative, 
non-instrumental reasons. 
CC4. Normative reasons must be either internal or external. 
CC5. Normative, non-instrumental reasons (at least those which support our 
ultimate moral ends, claims, beliefs) cannot be internal. 
 
But it is still unclear why the angsty would take on such a burdensome and painful view of 
reasons. Below, I defend CC5 by putting forward several arguments in its favor, thereby 
explicating why the angsty are committed to the externality of normative, non-instrumental 
reasons. 
(II.2) The Modest Argument from Moral Escapability (MC) 
Many philosophers have devoted considerable time to arguing that categorical reasons 
(reasons which are unconditional, and therefore which must be either external or counterfactual-
internal, since actual-internal reasons are always conditional upon agent’s possessing certain 
evaluative states) are necessary, at least under our current moral framework.41 Russ Shafer 
Landau's arguments--some of the clearest in the literature--attempt to show that an unsavory 
relativism would follow from a denial of categorical reasons. For, if actual-internal reasons were 
the only sorts of reasons backing up, constituting and forming our moral reasons, obligations 
and blameworthiness, then, given a variety of actual-internal states, moral reasons, obligations 
and blameworthiness might be significantly varied. One could, in short, escape having 
                                                 
41 The sorts of arguments to follow occur in too many sources to list exhaustively. Joyce gives a 
compelling argument illustrating the tight link between categorical moral reasons and obligation (Joyce 
“The Myth of Morality”). Luco picks this up and develops it further (Luco, A.C. “Non-Negotiable: Why 
Moral Naturalism Cannot Do Away with Categorical Reasons.”). Shafer-Landau also gives variants of 
these relativistic arguments (Shafer Landau, Russ. “A Defence of Categorical Reasons.”). And, even 
Joyce—an error theorist--gives his own variant, and considers external reasons to be an obviously 
necessary component of morality (Joyce, Richard. “The Myth of Morality,” 26.) The variants offered below, 
though heavily influenced by Shafer Landau, diverge in their argumentation, and adopt my taxonomy of 
reasons given above. Again, they also argue for a more narrow conclusion--that external reasons are 





normative reasons to be moral simply by lacking actual-internal reasons to be moral. And, since 
one can escape having actual-internal reasons to be moral simply by lacking actual-internal, 
evaluative states in favor of being moral, then one could escape having normative reasons to be 
moral simply by lacking actual-internal states in favor of being moral. Since normative reasons 
to be moral are necessary for moral obligation and blameworthiness, then one could escape 
moral obligation and blame just by lacking actual-internal, evaluative states in favor of being 
moral. And such a lack seems possible. Thus, without categorical reasons to be moral, a weak 
relativism follows: some are morally obligated and blameworthy and others are (at least 
possibly) not just because of a disparity in their actual-internal evaluative states. Further, a 
stronger relativism might also follow, since if different actual-internal states can form or 
constitute reasons and obligations, then perhaps others, due to their differing actual-internal 
evaluative states, are obligated to do things contrary to what we are obligated to do, etc. 
Yet, the concept of normative, non-instrumental reasons (NNIRs) describes the sort of 
thing that supports or demands the serial killer’s obligation to refrain from killing, even though he 
might have every inclination to do otherwise. That is, it must cohere with our concept of NNIRs 
to suppose that a moral wanton--one who lacks actual-internal evaluative states in favor of 
being moral--has these reasons. 
But if the only reasons which NNIRs could be were actual internal reasons, then an 
agent would not have such reasons if they lacked the proper actual internal evaluative states 
(i.e. if one was a moral wanton). And thus, if it would cohere with our concept to say that there 
are only actual internal reasons, then it would also cohere with our concept to say that there are 
no NNIRs which the wanton can have in spite of his desires--for one who lacks desires for or 
has desires contrary to being moral lacks these actual internal, non-instrumental reasons. But 
that does not cohere with our concept, since our concept clearly pushes us to believe that there 
are at least some normative non-instrumental reasons which the wanton possesses in spite of 




The conclusion of this sort of argument tells us something modest: at least some NNIRs, 
namely those which support a very important subset of moral beliefs--those beliefs we feel must 
be backed by reasons which are not escapable just by being a moral wanton--must be 
categorical (either external or counterfactual-internal). Yet this does not require that all NNIRs 
must be categorical, allowing for the possibility that there are some actual-internal, normative, 
non-instrumental reasons.  
This argument might seem insignificant at first blush, then. For how can it show that we 
are conceptually committed to at least the categorical nature of all NNIRs? 
 Note that the foundational or ultimate set of ends, principles and beliefs which the angsty 
worry there are no good foundational or ultimate reasons to pursue are just the sort of moral 
beliefs they feel must be either inescapable or highly difficult to escape. And thus the moral 
reasons supporting these foundational moral beliefs seem to be of the sort that their normativity 
or existence cannot depend on the actual-internal states of agents who we suppose have them. 
For instance, one’s ultimate, moral foundation might include beliefs like the following: one ought 
to value oneself and others as intrinsically valuable, one ought to value the life of sentient 
creatures as intrinsically valuable, one ought to seek the flourishing of sentient creatures as an 
end itself. The normative, non-instrumental reasons which support these moral beliefs or 
principles do not seem to be compatible with supposing that one could dodge this reason by 
lacking the proper actual-internal states. So, under the angsty conceptual scheme, at least the 
final or ultimate reasons (FNNIRs)--the normative, non-instrumental reasons which support our 
foundational moral beliefs--cannot be merely actual-internal, and so must be categorical 
(external or counterfactual-internal). This conclusion narrows down the playing field: if the 
argument below is sound, to support the weakest version CC5, the angsty only need to show 
that FNNIRs cannot be merely counterfactual-internal. The conclusion of this modified, 
Landauian argument will lend support to CC5, though we need a further step to bridge the gap 




For our purposes, it is best to formalize this argument as follows (MC). 
MC1. If FNNIRs are not categorical reasons, then FNNIRs to Φ metaphysically depend 
on the fact that agents who have those FNNIRs have actual-internal evaluative states in 
favor of Φ-ing. 
MC2. If FNNIRs to Φ metaphysically depend on the fact that agents who have those 
FNNIRs have actual-internal evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing, then if an agent lacked 
actual-internal evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing, then, just because of this fact, that 
agent would not have any FNNIR to Φ. 
MC3. If an agent lacking actual-internal evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing implies that 
that agent would not have any FNNIR to Φ, then moral wantons, just by being moral 
wantons, escape having some FNNIRs. 
MC4. But moral wantons, just by being moral wantons, cannot escape having some 
FNNIRs. 
 
MC5. FNNIRs must be categorical reasons. 
MC1 and MC2 appear to be definitionally true. For if our concept of an FNNIR is not of a kind of 
categorical reason, then, since it is a reason, it would be of an actual-internal reason, or of 
either an actual internal or categorical reason. SInce the concept of an actual internal reason is 
just of a reason to Φ which metaphysically depends on agents with those reasons having 
evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing, it follows that, since at least some FNNIRs are actual internal 
reasons, then they would metaphysically depend as well (MC1). Now, if x metaphysically 
(causally, explanatorily) depends on y, then, without y, x fails to exist/obtain. So, if some 
FNNIRs depended on actual-internal evaluative states, then, without them, those FNNIRs would 
fail to exist/obtain (MC2). And, if it is coherent to say that “if those actual internal evaluative 
states do not obtain (for an agent), then it would be coherent to say that those FNNIRs do not 
obtain (for that agent),” then it is also clearly coherent to say that “FNNIRs would not exist for 
moral wantons,” since moral wantons are, by definition, those for whom actual internal 
evaluative states (in favor of being moral) do not obtain (MC3). And, given the considerations 
above regarding the nature of FFNIRs, MC4 seems to be intuitively plausible. Thus, FNNIRs 




Before moving on, I must preempt an attack which might be made on (MC2) by 
Humeans (those who attempt to ground morality and its normativity in the actual-desires or 
moral sentiments of rational agents like us). MC2 states that the coherence of one claim--
”FNNIRs to Φ metaphysically depend on agents with those reasons having actual internal states 
in favor of Φ-ing”--implies the coherence of a further claim: “if an agent lacks internal states in 
favor of Φ-ing, then that agent lacks FNNIRs to Φ.” The Humean might object to (MC2) by 
claiming that, even if that first claim is coherent, it does not follow that the second claim is 
coherent. For, surely, in their view, the second claim describes something metaphysically 
impossible--all rational agents will have actual-internal evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing, where 
Φ-ing is any act which is demanded by a foundational moral principle. The Humean is asserting 
that it is impossible for a rational agent like us to lack the actual-internal states in favor of being 
moral.  
These considerations raised by the Humean, however, are irrelevant to MC2. Notice that 
(MC2) does not claim that the coherence of metaphysical dependence of FNNIRs implies the 
metaphysical possibility any agent lacking FNNIRs. Rather, all (MC2) claims is that, if it was 
coherent to think that foundational, normative, non-instrumental reasons to Φ depended on 
actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing, then it would be logically possible (coherent) for an agent 
to escape normative reasons to Φ just because they lack actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
Such a thing would seem to be coherent if it was coherent to suppose foundational, normative, 
non-instrumental reasons consist in or depend on merely actual-internal reasons, regardless of 
its possibility. Considerations of metaphysical impossibility do not seem to touch (MC2), then,, 
since all MC wishes to establish is that there is a conflict between one perhaps purely 
theoretical supposition and our concept of normativity. Further, to even get this sort of objection 
off the ground, the Humean has to suppose that it is impossible for agents like us to lack or 
have overall immoral actual-internal states. This is a major metaphysical assumption. This sort 




(II.3.1) Arguments from Intrinsic Reasons and Intrinsic Properties (IR and IR*) 
With MC out of the way, I move to the second set of arguments in favor of externalizing 
normative, non-instrumental reasons (CC5). These arguments identity normative, non-
instrumental reasons (NNIRs) with intrinsic reasons (IRs). Intrinsic reasons are reasons to Φ for 
Φ-ing’s sake, or for the sake of whatever Φ-ing is a response to. The crux of these arguments is 
that IRs, and so NNIRs, cannot be dependent on the internal states of agents (IR3/IR*4). I 
defend the claim that IRs cannot so depend by drawing out a series of intuitions regarding IRs. 
These intuitions increase the plausibility of IR3/IR*4, but I do not pretend that they are fully 
convincing for all. 
IR1. NNIRs are IRs. 
IR2. If NNIRs were actual-internal reasons, then x having an NNIR to Φ would 
metaphysically depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
IR3. But, for any IR to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
 
IR4. NNIRs are not actual-internal reasons. 
 
IR*1. NNIRs are IRs. 
IR*2. If NNIRs were counterfactual-internal reasons, then x having an NNIR to Φ would 
metaphysically depend on x having counterfactual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
IR*3. x having an NNIR to Φ metaphysically depends on x having counterfactual-
internal states to Φ iff x having an NNIR to Φ metaphysically depends on those features 
of x which dispose x to have actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing under ideal 
conditions. 
IR*4. But, for any IR to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend on those features of x which dispose x to have internal states in favor of Φ-ing 
under ideal conditions. 
 
IR*5. NNIRs are not counterfactual-internal reasons. 
I start with the easiest premises to defend: IR2/IR*2. IR2 and IR*2 state what seem to be 
definitional truths. Per our taxonomy of reasons, an actual-internal reason is a reason 




agent must have actual-internal states in favor of acting in accordance with that reason. 
Counterfactual-internal reasons, likewise, depend on the counterfactual-internal states of agents 
with those reasons.  
 IR*3 is necessary to make sense of IR*2.  For while dependence on actual-internal 
states makes clear sense, dependence on counterfactual-internal states is much less clear. On 
what I call actual-internalist accounts, the actual-internal states of agents are something like 
psychological preferences. So, the metaphysical dependence relation is between a reason and 
some thing which actually exists (an internal state or set of internal states). Dependence on 
counterfactual-internal states, though, is not dependence on the psychological preferences 
which agents actually have. For an agent having a counterfactual-internal state in favor of Φ-ing 
does not mean that that agent actually has any internal states or sets of internal states in favor 
of Φ-ing. What an agent having counterfactual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing amounts to is for 
that agent to be disposed to form actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing under certain 
conditions. An agent can actually lack internal states in favor of Φ-ing or actually favor the 
contrary of Φ-ing, and yet it still be true that that agent would, under certain conditions, actually 
favor Φ-ing. Logically counterfactual-internal reasons are reasons which logically depend on the 
truth of a proposition about what an agent is disposed to favor. Metaphysically counterfactual-
internal reasons metaphysically depend on the fact or state of affairs which the proposition 
about the agent’s dispositions describe. The best way to cash this dependence out, it seems to 
me, is that counterfactual-internal reasons are reasons which depend on the actual features of 
an agent which dispose that agent to favor Φ-ing under some ideal conditions. Under this way of 
understanding counterfactual-internal dependence, reasons metaphysically depend on the 
actual properties or features of agents, just not their actual-internal evaluative states. This 




(and normativity) depend on the rationality of agents.42 For an agent to have a reason to Φ, that 
agent must be disposed to favor Φ-ing; but this fact obtains only because that agent is rational 
(has rational faculties). For Korsgaard, reasons just are (are metaphysically constituted by) the 
recommendations of an agent’s reason,43 and thus she seems to understand  metaphysical 
dependence as metaphysical constitution. So, the reasons of agents to Φ depend on the 
rational properties agents actually have, just not their actually favoring Φ-ing. IR*3 seems to be 
a reasonable way to make sense of IR*2. 
 IR1/IR*1 state that normative, non-instrumental reasons are intrinsic reasons, and I find 
this conceptual link highly plausible. An NNIR is a reason to Φ regardless of the utility (broadly 
construed as conduciveness toward some other end) of Φ-ing. It seems natural to describe 
reasons to Φ regardless of the utility of Φ-ing as reasons to Φ for Φ-ing’s own sake, or for the 
sake of that which Φ-ing is a response to. Reasons to appreciate a beautiful work of art without 
regard to the usefulness of that aesthetic appreciation seem to be reasons to respond for the 
sake of the artwork itself (that which Φ-ing is a response to), or perhaps for the sake of the 
aesthetic experience itself (Φ-ing itself). 
(II.3.2) Defense of Premise IR3 
Of course, the final premises, IR3 and IR*4, are the hardest to defend. First, a defense of IR3: 
how can we hope to show that our concept of IRs to Φ does not cohere with the supposition that 
they (IRs) depend on actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing? I think such a thing can be done by 
pointing to the strangeness of propositions of the forms below: 
P1. X has an IR to Φ, but X would not if they did not actually have (actual-internal) 
evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing. 
                                                 
42 “Your willing the end in a sense makes it good” (Korsgaard, The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” 
227.) “To be motivated ‘by reason’ is normally to be motivated by one’s reflective endorsement of 
incentives and impulses, including affections, which arise in a natural way” (Korsgaard, The Sources of 
Normativity, 127.). “‘Reason’” means reflective success” (Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 97.). 
43 One has a reason to act when rationality finds it “rationally necessary” to do so. (Korsgaard. “The 




P2. X has an IR to Φ, and X having this reason metaphysically depends on X actually 
having internal, evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing. 
Considering only these abstract, propositional forms, in which Φ-ing does not stand for any 
particular subject, and where the nature of intrinsic reasons is not spelled out fully, the 
strangeness of asserting claims with these forms is not evident. But when Φ-ing is made 
particular and the notion of an intrinsic reasons is spelled out more, asserting such things is 
strange in a great number of cases (especially when the claims are about IRs which are 
foundational to our moral systems--call these FIRs from here). Consider the following: 
P1*. X has a normative reason to Φ, either for Φ-ing’s own sake, or for the sake of 
whatever Φ-ing is a response to, but x would not if they did not actually have (actual-
internal) evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing. 
P1**. I have a normative reason to value Samantha as an end in herself, either for the 
sake of valuing Samantha itself, or for the sake of Samantha herself, but I would not 
have such a reason if I did not actually have (actual-internal) evaluative states in favor of 
valuing Samantha as an end in herself, or in favor of Samantha herself. 
P1***.  I have a normative reason to appreciate Vermeer’s ‘Girl with the Pearl Earring,’ 
either for the sake of appreciating the painting itself, or for the sake of the painting itself, 
but I would not have such a reason if I did not actually have (actual-internal) evaluative 
states in favor of appreciating the painting, or in favor of the painting itself. 
P1* is just the propositional-form P1 spelled out more fully, while P1** and P1*** are two 
instances of this form. Consider the same sorts of steps regarding P2. 
P2*. X has a normative reason to Φ, either for Φ-ing’s own sake, or for the sake of 
whatever Φ-ing is a response to, and X having this reason metaphysically depends on X 
actually having internal, evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing. 
P2**. I have a normative reason to value Samantha as an end in herself, either for the 
sake of valuing Samantha itself, or for the sake of Samantha herself, but my reason 
metaphysically depends on my actually having internal, evaluative states in favor of 
valuing Samantha itself, or of Samantha herself. 
P2***. I have a normative reason to appreciate Vermeer’s ‘Girl with the Pearl Earring,’ 
either for the sake of appreciating the painting itself, or for the sake of the painting itself, 
but my reason metaphysically depends on my actually having internal, evaluative states 




In each of these cases, the meaning of propositions of the form P1 and P2 are spelled out more 
clearly and instances of these forms are given. 
 The more we unpack and understand the concepts at play in claims about our intrinsic 
reasons, the more claims with the form of P1 and P2 seem strange. Do we ordinarily take it that 
our reasons to value others or to respond to beautiful works of art for their own sake really 
would vanish if our actual psychology differed (P1-P1***)? And do we ordinarily take it that these 
sorts of reasons are somehow grounded in, constituted in, or substantially explained by our 
actual-internal evaluative states (P2-P2***)? Now, if one perceives that there is some sort of 
internal tension in asserting propositions like these, I take it that this indicates something about 
one’s concept of intrinsic reasons. The strangeness of these propositions is, in my view, an 
indicator of internal tension between our concept of intrinsic reasons and actual-internal 
reasons. Intrinsic reasons, it seems, are ordinarily the sorts of things which we do not feel 
depend so strongly on our actual preferences or psychologies.  
But can any more be said in favor of this intuition of tension or incoherence? Are there 
any considerations which might bolster our confidence that IRs do not depend (either logically or 
metaphysically) on our actual-internal states? 
I think more can be said in favor of the internal tension/strangeness of P1 and P2. In 
concrete cases, when we suppose that we have intrinsic reasons to value one another or some 
object external to us, we most naturally describe this reason as rooted in or depending on the 
nature or properties of the subject which we have reason to value. I take it that the strangeness 
of P1 and P2 stem from an intuition expressible in something like, 
(ia) Our having reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing or for the sake of that which Φ-ing is a 
response to emerge from, are constituted by, or are explained by the intrinsic properties 
of Φ-ing itself, or that which Φ-ing is a response. 
(ia) expresses the intuition that intrinsic reasons are, in some very significant sense, 
metaphysically dependent on the intrinsic properties of entities which we have reason to 




properties of entities external to agents with IRs. For both the relevant properties of Samantha 
and Vermeer’s painting are external to the agent with an IR to value or respond to them in 
certain ways. 
Derek Parfit has given an intuition pump, which I have modified slightly, meant to draw 
out the plausibility of intuitions like (ia).44 Consider a person who prefers agony tomorrow to 
slight pain today. What explains or provides her with a reason to prefer slight pain today? 
Assume also that agony and slight pain are equally conducive to all her other 
ends/desires/goals. Either choice will result in the same overall quality of life, other than the 
quality added or subtracted by the experience of agony or slight pain. So, this person has no 
instrumental reasons to prefer one over the other. That is, the only reasons which she might 
have to prefer slight pain to agony are non-instrumental or intrinsic reasons. But what provides 
her with or explains these reasons? Consider a few candidates for what might explain her 
reasons to prefer slight pain over agony: 
(a) She really does prefer slight pain today, she is just not aware of her preference 
(her actual-internal states explain her reason) 
(b) She would, under some non-actual conditions, prefer slight pain today to agony 
tomorrow. (her counterfactual-internal states explain her reason) 
(c) Agony tomorrow is worse than slight pain today. (properties of external entities 
explain her reason) 
 
We can quite easily construct the thought experiment to rule out (a) as an explanation, while (b) 
raises a pesky question: why prefer tomorrow’s preferences, or preferences made under ideal 
conditions, to today’s? (c) seems to be the most natural. But then we seem to intuitively explain 
IRs such as this as stemming from or depending on objects external to us, or from the moral 
properties of objects external to us (ia). 
 This intuition that IRs depend on external entities/factors (ia) prompts another sort of 
intuition, expressed as below: 
(ib) Our having reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing or for the sake of that which Φ-ing is a 
response to would not vanish even if our actual-internal states were to change so that 
                                                 




we would not favor Φ-ing, so long as the nature of Φ-ing or that which Φ-ing is a 
response to remained the same. 
The link between (ia) and (ib) is not very clear, however. For (ia) does not seem to imply (ib), 
since it seems coherent to suppose that a reason may depend (logically or metaphysically) on 
both internal and external entities/factors, so that, just because reasons depend on external 
factors, this does not rule out the possibility that, without certain internal factors, we would not 
have such reasons.  
Reflection on (ia), however, does seem to suggest (ib). We might argue as follows: if 
intrinsic reasons to Φ depend or stem from the nature and properties of external entities, then 
why should changes or depravities in our internal states be capable of overriding those external 
factors which contribute to those reasons? That is, one might judge that, because the properties 
of external entities are felt to contribute to our having reasons, they must be valuable or 
important, and this value or importance must be a reason-giving importance. If one supposes 
the contrary to (ib) (that an actual lack of internal states in favor of Φ-ing would imply a lack of 
IRs to Φ, even if the nature of Φ-ing or that which Φ-ing is a response to did not change), then 
one seems to suppose that the actual-internal states of agents like us can override the 
importance of external entities and their natures/properties. Supposing such a thing seems to 
commit one to recognizing actual-internal states as much more important or relevant to intrinsic 
reasons (i.e. more normatively weighty; see Chapter III for an analysis of “normative weight”) 
than the intrinsic properties of external entities. For the beauty of an artwork (one of its intrinsic 
properties) would be insufficient to give rise to reasons to value that artwork, and just by an 
agent actually lacking some internal states in favor of valuing an artwork, the beauty of that 
artwork becomes totally impotent for providing reasons. If this was true, actual-internal states 
must, in some sense, have much more weight, importance or relevance than external 
entities/states/factors. But this seems to be an unpalatable conclusion, so the angsty come to 




After coming to assert (ib), the angsty will thus be drawn to confidently assert (ic): 
(ic) Our having IRs to Φ does not depend (logically or metaphysically) on our actual-
internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
For if (ic) is false (if our IRs to Φ logically or metaphysically depended on our actual-internal 
states), then (ib) must also be false (the absence of those states in favor of Φ-ing, or presence 
of states in favor of ~Φ-ing, would prevent us from having our IRs to Φ, even if none of the 
properties of Φ-ing or that which Φ-ing is a response to changed). Logical or metaphysical 
dependence of IRs on actual-internal states of agents like us would imply a denial of (ib). And 
since we have already come to find (ib) plausible, we are then drawn to affirm (ic). 
I describe the move from (ia) to (ib) and (ic) as a move from a recognition of 
metaphysical dependence on external states/entities to a recognition of metaphysical 
independence from internal states/entities. An example of this intuitive progression might be as 
follows. First, I find it intuitive to suggest that the intrinsic properties of a painting are 
responsible, in some deep way, for my having an intrinsic reason to appreciate that painting (ia). 
This leads me to think that, unless those intrinsic properties of the painting (ie beauty) changed, 
my preferences would not be so relevant to my reasons or important in themselves as to strip 
me of my reason to appreciate the painting (ib). Likewise, I am drawn to think that (ib) holds for 
others as well, and I might express this by saying that “even those with horrendously bad taste 
have reason to enjoy this painting.” But since a change or depravity in my actual-internal states 
or those of others does not imply or suggest a change in my IRs to value that painting, then my 
IRs to value that painting neither logically nor metaphysically depend on those internal states 
(ic), which is equivalent to (IR*4). 
In sum, I take it that, if one finds metaphysical dependence of IRs on external entities 
plausible (ia), then one will probably also feel the pull of intuitions which state or imply that IRs 




for explaining why (ia) might prompt such anti-internalist intuitions is to posit that something like 
the following argument underlies the move from (ia) to (ib) and (ic). 
 
SR1.1. If, for some IRs to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ metaphysically depends 
on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing, then x lacking those internal states 
would strip x of that IR to Φ. 
SR1.2. If x lacking actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing would strip x of an IR to Φ, then 
the normative weight of x’s actual-internal states would trump the normative weight of 
the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing, or that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
SR1.3. But for any IR to Φ which x has, the normative weight of x’s actual-internal states 
in favor of Φ-ing does not trump the normative weight of the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing, 
nor that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
 
SR1.4. For any IR to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend upon x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. (IR3) 
Under this formalization, (ia) and reflection on the normative weight of our internal states seems 
to lead one to find SR1.3 plausible.  
 The link between (ia) and (ib) and (ic) might also be explained by arguments from the 
sufficiency of external entities for intrinsic reasons, similar to the argument below.  
SR2.1. For any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) are sufficient for x having that IR to Φ. 
SR2.2. If, for any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) are sufficient for x having that IR to Φ, then x having an IR 
to Φ does not metaphysically depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing, 
unless those intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that which Φ-ing is a response to) 
metaphysically depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
SR2.3. For any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) which are sufficient for x having an IR to Φ do not 
metaphysically depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
 
SR2.4. For any IR to Φ which x might have, x having an IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend on x having actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing. (IR3) 
Under this interpretation of the angsty intuitive progression, (ia) serves to raise the plausibility of 
SR2.1. Parfit’s intuition pump might not just leave us with (ia)--the intuition that the properties of 




the nature of external entities are, in many cases at least, sufficient for our having IRs. The 
plausibility of SR2.3 likely will come from the angsty being unable to see why they ought to think 
that the relevant properties or natures of external entities need be metaphysically dependent on 
actual-internal states. 
Further, though these arguments might explain why one moves from (ia) to (ib) and 
(ic/IR*4), one may also find (ib), and hence (ic/IR*4), intuitively plausible in its own right. For 
when one is attempting to analyze out concepts already in their own possession, one may 
simply find themselves aware of the contents of their concepts. This seems especially plausible 
when one is attempting to draw out the meanings of their fundamental concepts. Arguing about 
the meanings or contents of our fundamental concepts often leaves us perplexed, for, when a 
concept is truly fundamental, there are no other concepts which we can define our concept in 
terms of. Our concepts of NNIRs and IRs may be fundamental in this way. In these cases, 
nothing more might be done to prove the meaning of these concepts than to reflect, as deeply 
and often as one can, on their use, and whether or not one is drawn to certain analyses of them. 
But if arguments about the meaning of NNIRs and IRs are arguments about fundamental 
concepts, then we should not be surprised when we evaluate these arguments by simply 
finding, after reflection, what meanings we take to be plausible. 
(II.3.3) Defense of Premise IR*4 
My defense of IR*4 is virtually identical to that of IV3, and so little needs to be said by way of 
introduction. Consider the following two propositional forms, parallel to P1/P2. 
P3. X has an IR to Φ, but X would not if they did not, under some ideal conditions, have 
evaluative states in favor of Φ-ing. 
P4.  X has an IR to Φ, and X having this reason metaphysically depends on x having 
certain features which dispose x, under some ideal circumstances, to favor Φ-ing. 
Now, P3, unlike P1, does not in fact seem strange to assert. For P1 and P3 claim logical 




favor of Φ-ing implies a lack of IRs to Φ, but seem neutral regarding metaphysical dependence. 
But, as mentioned in Chapter (I.2.3), one could choose a set of conditions such that statements 
with the form of P3 would not be strange or seem to involve any internal tension. For instance, “I 
have an intrinsic reason to love my neighbor only if I would, upon finding myself under 
conditions which force me to favor anything which I have reason to favor, actually favor loving 
my neighbor.” Though this example is trivial, P3 is not very strange, unlike P1. P1 is strange 
because the supposition that IRs logically depend on actual-internal states has some strange or 
unpalatable implications. But the logical dependence of IRs on counterfactual-internal states 
does not seem to have such strange or unpalatable consequences. 
 Claims like P4, however, might still be judged to be strange (as claims like P2 are), since 
they claim that IRs to Φ metaphysically depend on the counterfactual-internal states of agents. 
Since metaphysical dependence on the counterfactual-internal states of agents seems best 
described as a metaphysical dependence on those features of agents which dispose them to 
form actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing under ideal conditions, I have omitted talk of 
counterfactual-internal states from P4 (see my defense of IR*3 in Chapter II.3.1). Consider the 
following: 
P4*. X has a normative reason to Φ, either for Φ-ing’s own sake, or for the sake of 
whatever Φ-ing is a response to, and X having this reason metaphysically depends on x 
having certain features which dispose x, under some ideal circumstances, to favor Φ-
ing. 
P4**. I have a normative reason to value Samantha as an end in herself, either for the 
sake of valuing Samantha itself, or for the sake of Samantha herself, but my reason 
metaphysically depends on my having certain features which dispose me, under some 
ideal circumstances, to favor valuing Samantha as an end in herself. 
P4***. I have a normative reason to appreciate Vermeer’s ‘Girl with the Pearl Earring,’ 
either for the sake of appreciating the painting itself, or for the sake of the painting itself, 
but my having this reason metaphysically depends on my having certain features which 




A feeling that claims like P4** and P4*** are strange can be prompted by considering, again, 
intuition (ia), and how it might suggest to us (id) and (ie): 
(ia) Our having reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing or for the sake of that which Φ-ing is a 
response to emerge from, are constituted by, or are explained by the intrinsic properties 
of Φ-ing itself, or that which Φ-ing is a response. 
(id) Our having reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing or for the sake of that which Φ-ing is a 
response to would not vanish even if we did not have any features which disposed us to, 
under ideal conditions, form internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
(ie) Our having IRs to Φ does not depend on our having any features which dispose us 
to, under ideal conditions, form internal states in favor of Φ-ing. 
This progression from (ia) to (id) and (ie), just as that from (ia) to (ib) and (ic), might be 
explained by making the following sort of supporting argument (SR3): 
SR3.1. If, for some IRs to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ metaphysically depends 
on those features of x which dispose x to have actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing 
under ideal conditions, then x lacking those features would strip x of that IR to Φ. 
SR3.2. If x lacking those features would strip x of their IR to Φ, then the normative weight 
of those features of x would trump the normative weight of the intrinsic properties of Φ-
ing, or that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
SR3.3. But for any IR to Φ which x has, the normative weight of those features of x 
(which dispose x, under ideal conditions, to favor Φ-ing) do not trump the normative 
weight of the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing, nor that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
 
SR3.4. For any IR to Φ which x has, x having that IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend upon those features of x (which dispose x, under ideal conditions, to favor Φ-
ing). (IR*4) 
The plausibility of premise SR*3 will stem from the same sort of intuitions mentioned above, in 
defense of SR3, namely, intuition (ia) and the results of reflection on the relevance, normative 
weight or importance of our dispositions (counterfactual-internal states). The main idea behind 
SR*3 is that the properties or natures of entities external to us are important or weighty enough, 
at least relative to our dispositions, so that the importance or weight of our internal dispositions 
is not great enough to strip us of or change our IRs to Φ.  
 Additionally, an argument from sufficiency like the one below might also explain the 




SR4.1. For any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) are sufficient for x having that IR to Φ. 
SR4.2. If, for any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) are sufficient for x having that IR to Φ, then x having an IR 
to Φ does not metaphysically depend on x having features which dispose x, under ideal 
conditions, to form states in favor of Φ-ing, unless those intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or 
of that which Φ-ing is a response to) metaphysically depend on x having those features. 
SR4.3. For any IR to Φ which x might have, the intrinsic properties of Φ-ing (or of that 
which Φ-ing is a response to) which are sufficient for x having an IR to Φ do not 
metaphysically depend on x having features which dispose x, under ideal conditions, to 
form states in favor of Φ-ing. 
 
SR4.4. For any IR to Φ which x might have, x having an IR to Φ does not metaphysically 
depend on x having features which dispose x, under ideal conditions, to form states in 
favor of Φ-ing. (IR*4) 
Of course, one predisposed to angst might find (id) plausible in itself, and thereby find (ie) and 
(IR*4) plausible. Given that the defense of these arguments (SR3 and SR4) will be virtually 
identical to those above (SR1 and SR2), I leave the discussion of these arguments here for the 
sake of space. 
(II.4) Summary of the Arguments for CC5 
I take it that the arguments covered here (MC, IR and IR*) are accurate representations of why 
one might come to insist on the externality of normative, non-instrumental reasons, or at least 
the externality of those reasons which support our ultimate moral foundations (CC5). MC 
appealed to the felt inescapability of FNNIRs to show that they must be categorical, narrowing 
the nature of FNNIRs down to either external or counterfactual-internal reasons. IR and IR* 
attempted, via reflection on the meaning of our concepts of intrinsic reasons (IRs), to draw out 
the meaning of normative, non-instrumental reasons, and concluded that this meaning very 
plausibly describes reasons which do not depend on agents with those reasons having internal 
states in favor of Φ-ing. I doubt, however, that these arguments can convince all my readers, 
since I also doubt that the angsty conception of “normativity” or “normative reasons” is universal. 




same conception of normativity and normative, non-instrumental reasons. And, perhaps, it will 
reveal to the angsty why they are angsty, and to the non-angsty, why their friends, poisoned by 
philosophy, are suffering. 
One final note: the angsty might strengthen arguments like IR and IR* by narrowing their 
scope. As discussed in Chapter (II.2) during my defense of argument (MC), angst can be 
produced by belief in a weaker version of CC5, which states that those non-instrumental 
reasons foundational to our moral systems (FNNIRs) must be external reasons (cannot be 
internal reasons). One might, then, narrow arguments IR and IR* by seeking only to argue that 
intrinsic reasons (IRs) of the sort which FFNIRs are cannot be internal (call these intrinsic 
reasons which are foundational to our moral system “FIRs”). And this seems highly plausible, as 
discussed in (MC). For the sorts of ultimate/foundational moral claims in question are claims 
about intrinsic values, or intrinsic reasons to value as intrinsically valuable, and, in these most 
sacred of claims, we intuitively feel that we and our internal states are not the grounds, sources 
of explanations of reasons, but that intrinsically valuable subjects are. 
In the next Chapter, I seek to defend CC6*--the claim that normative, non-instrumental 
reasons depend on external sources of normativity. This defense will require a deeper analysis 


















 WHY EXTERNALIZE THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY? 
 
(III.1) The Angsty Arguments for CC6* 
 
With a defence of CC5 out of the way, this Chapter will defend its parallel under the second set 
of angsty conceptual commitments (CC6*), reproduced below: 
CC1*. True ascriptions of moral properties require that there are normative 
reasons to act in accord with those ascriptions. 
CC2*. The normativity of moral imperatives requires normative reasons to act in 
accord with those imperatives. 
CC3*. If there are any normative reasons at all, then there must be normative, 
non-instrumental reasons. 
CC4*. If a reason, a moral principle, or some other subject is normative, then 
there is a source of its normativity. 
CC5*. Sources of normativity are either internal or external. 
CC6*. Normative, non-instrumental reasons (at least those which support our 
ultimate moral ends, claims, beliefs) cannot have merely internal sources of 
normativity. 
Notice that CC6* does not require the independence of normative, non-instrumental reasons 
(NNIRs) from internal sources of normativity. Rather, CC6* only states that NNIRs depend for 
their normativity on something in addition to the internal states of agents like us, namely, 
external sources of normativity. The modesty of CC6* then makes it much easier to defend than 
CC5. For CC5 claimed that NNIRs to Φ must be external, that is, that x having an NNIR to Φ 
does not depend on x having internal states in favor of Φ-ing. CC5, in claiming metaphysical 





(III.2) The Argument from the Explanatory Power of Intrinsic Properties (EP) 
My reader might have noticed that the intuitions drawn out in support of arguments IR and IR* 
border on endorsements of source externalism (the view that the sources of normativity, at least 
for NNIRs or FNNIRs, must be external), not just of reasons externalism. In Chapter (II.3.2), I 
drew attention to the plausibility of (ia), which suggested that the natures or properties of 
external entities play a significant, indispensable role in the explanations of our having IRs 
(intrinsic reasons--reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing, or for the sake of that which Φ-ing is a 
response to). Overall, the plausibility of this intuition increases the plausibility of the claim that 
our concept of IRs, and thereby NNIRs, are of object-given reasons:45 reasons which stem from 
and metaphysically depend on the nature of external objects/entities. 
 (ia) is compelling, I take it, because we, in a great many instances, are disposed to feel 
that our intrinsic reasons (IRs), especially our foundational/ultimate, intrinsic reasons (FIRs), 
stem from the intrinsic value of acting or from acting in response to something of intrinsic value. 
A similar intuition also seems highly plausible: 
(if) The normative force of our IRs to Φ metaphysically depends on the intrinsic 
properties of Φ-ing, or on that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
(if) claims that the normative force (defined earlier as the compelling, obligating or justifying 
force) of intrinsic reasons metaphysically depends on the objects of our reasons. For example, 
the normative force of our reasons to cherish another person for their own sake metaphysically 
depends on (stems from, emerges from, is constituted by, is grounded in) the properties of that 
person, namely, those properties which we might say constitute or give rise to that person’s 
“intrinsic value.”46 The obligating power of our reasons to seek another’s good for its own sake 
stems from their own goodness (or their properties which constitute their goodness). Our 
                                                 
45 Again, I borrow the phrase “object given reasons” and much of the following arguments from (Parfit, 
Derek. “Rationality and Reasons.”). 
46 I wish, however, to avoid arguments about intrinsic value, and talk only of the reason-giving or reason-




reasons to appreciate a work of art are able to justify our love for that work precisely because 
these reasons stem from the aesthetic properties of that artwork. 
If (if) is plausible (and it seems to be plausible, especially given (ia)), then the 
compelling, justifying and obligating force of intrinsic reasons metaphysically depend on entities 
and their intrinsic properties which are external (relative to that agent). Since NNIRs are IRs, the 
normative force of NNIRs depend on external entities and their intrinsic properties. And because 
sources of normativity were defined in Chapter (I.2.4) as that which explains why/how reasons 
have their normative force, or as that which metaphysically grounds the normative force of 
reasons, it seems (if) implies that that the normative force of IRs metaphysically depends on 
external sources of normativity. One might formalize this sort of argument as follows. 
EP1. NNIRs are IRs to Φ (reasons to Φ for the sake of Φ-ing or for that which Φ-ing is 
a response to). 
EP2. The normative force of IRs to Φ on an agent is metaphysically dependent on the 
intrinsic properties of Φ-ing or of that which Φ-ing is a response to. 
EP3. If the normative force of IRs to Φ on an agent is metaphysically dependent on the 
intrinsic properties of Φ-ing or of that which Φ-ing is a response to, then the normative 
force of IRs on an agent is metaphysically dependent on external sources of normativity. 
 
EP4. The normative force of NNIRs on an agent is metaphysically dependent on 
external sources of normativity. 
EP1 seems true, so long as NNIRs are kinds of IRs. EP2 is warranted by our strong dispositions 
to cite the nature or intrinsic properties of external entities as the primary explanation of the 
forcefulness of intrinsic reasons. That is, by the plausibility of (ia) and (if). EP3 seems to be true 
given our definition of “sources of normativity” and “external sources of normativity.” 
 To clarify, EP2, and the intuition (if), claim that the intrinsic properties of external entities 
metaphysically contribute to the normative force of intrinsic reasons, and that this contribution is 
metaphysically necessary for that normative force (to arise, to attach to reasons, to back 




 Again, a more modest version of EP might be given by narrowing the scope of our 
conclusion to regard only FIRs (foundational intrinsic reasons) and FNNIRs (foundational 
normative, non-instrumental reasons). 
WEP1. FNNIRs are FIRs (IRs to value or pursue our ultimate ends). 
WEP2. The normative force of FIRs on us is metaphysically dependent on the intrinsic 
properties of our ultimate ends. 
WEP3. If the normative force of FIRs on us is metaphysically dependent on the intrinsic 
properties of our ultimate ends, then the normative force of FIRs on us is metaphysically 
dependent on external sources of normativity. 
 
WEP4. The normative force of FNNIRs on us is metaphysically dependent on external 
sources of normativity. 
The defense of the premises of this argument will be virtually identical to that of EP, so nothing 
more need be said on its account. 
(III.3) The Arguments from Normative Weight (NW and NW*) 
(III.3.1) Sources of Normativity, Normative Weight and Sufficient Sources of Normativity 
But one may cast doubt on EP2 by asking whether or not the normative force of some intrinsic 
reasons, and so of some non-instrumental reasons, could be sufficiently explained by our 
internal states. Put another way, can the normative force of some intrinsic reasons arise from 
our internal states alone (assuming that all other conditions for “having an intrinsic reason” are 
met)? Even one example of a NNIR which depends only on internal states would show EP2 to 
be false, and, if we could find such an example, it may be easier than we previously supposed 
to console the angsty with internalist theories of normativity. 
In this Chapter, I offer two non-deductive arguments for the view that internal states 
cannot serve as sufficient sources of normativity in themselves (NW and NW*). Since sources of 
normativity are either internal or external, then the success of my arguments indicates that, if 
there are normative, non-instrumental reasons, then they probably do depend upon external 
sources of normativity (assuming that normative, non-instrumental reasons require a sufficient 




states, while NW* argues for the insufficiency of counterfactual-internal states. Two 
assumptions plague these arguments. First, it is assumed in each that a sufficient source of 
normativity must carry in itself some significant measure of “normative weight.” Second, it is 
assumed that we can reliably judge, after deep reflection on reasons and their potential sources 
of normativity, whether or not a potential source of normativity has sufficient normative weight to 
be capable of serving as a sufficient source of normativity on its own. 
A brief note of introduction to the notion of normative weight is needed before delving 
into these arguments. Reflection on how we already think about normative reasons and their 
sources of normativity reveals enough about this concept to allow us to make use of it in 
argument.  
Consider first that, for any reason to act which we have, we naturally suppose that the 
normativity or normative force of that reason is explained by something or other. It seems odd to 
suppose that we have normative reasons to act, but that there are no entities, facts or states 
which explain the normative force of this reason. I have a reason to respect my wife’s 
autonomy, and it seems natural to say that something or other about my wife or her autonomy 
explains why this reason compels or obligates me. I have a reason to help those in pain, and it 
seems unnatural to suppose that no features of pain, of those in pain, of the world, or even of 
my self explain why this reason obligates me. Since anything which explains, grounds or gives 
rise to the normative force of a reason is a source of that reason’s normativity, it seems we are 
disposed to think that: 
(ig) Normative reasons to act must have sufficient sources of normativity. 
Consider next a situation in which we must either Φ or Ψ, but that these actions are contraries. 
Imagine that Φ-ing would lead to slight pleasure, and Ψ-ing the prevention of horrendous pain. 




chooses to perform, besides, of course, that one would have a moment of slight pleasure 
followed by horrendous pain upon Φ-ing, and would not experience any pleasure, but would not 
experience any pain, upon Ψ-ing. Which do we have reason to do? And, even if we assume that 
we have, in some sense, both reason to Φ and to Ψ, we can still ask which of these reasons--
our reason to Φ or to Ψ--is more compelling. Which reason are we justified in choosing? Which 
reason are we obligated to act upon?  
These seem to be questions about which of two reasons is normative, or about which 
reason is more normatively forceful. We might say that we have normative reason to Ψ, but not 
to Φ. Or, we might say that we have some normative reason to both Ψ and Φ, but that our 
reason to Ψ is more normatively forceful than our reason to Φ. In either case, I take it that we 
would ordinarily judge our reason to Ψ as the one which is normative, or more normatively 
forceful. Whichever judgement we make, I suspect that we make it precisely because we 
already assent to something like  
(ih) Horrible pain has more normative significance or weight than slight pleasure.  
We feel that something like (ih) explains why we have normative reason only to Ψ, or more 
normative reason to Ψ than Φ. And so, we feel that the normative weight of certain actions or 
the object of actions (that which actions would bring about) can explain which of two reasons is 
normative, or which of these two reasons is more normatively forceful than the other. But this 
means that the normative weight of the actions or objects of the actions involved in Ψ-ing 
explains why our reason to Ψ is normative, or why it has a certain degree of normativity 
(normative force). We might express this in an intuition (ii): 
(ii) The normative weight of an action or the object of an action explains the normativity 
or normative force of reasons to perform that action. 
Since sources of normativity are those things which explain, give rise to or ground the 




explaining or grounding the normativity of reasons to perform those actions, then it seems that 
we are disposed to see actions or objects of actions as sources of normativity. With all this in 
mind, (ii) amounts to something like (ij) or (ij*): 
(ij) The normative weight of the sources of normativity of a reason explains the 
normativity or normative force of that reason. 
(ij*) The normative force of any reason to Φ derives from the normative weight of that 
reason’s sources of normativity. 
We are, then, given to seeing sources of normativity as having more or less normative weight, 
and that this measure of weight determines, contributes to or explains the normativity or 
measure of normative forcefulness of our reasons. 
 We are also given to judging that certain postulated sources of normativity do not explain 
or ground the normativity of reasons because they do not have sufficient normative weight. For 
instance, imagine two visually identical paintings--painting1 and painting2. If a snobbish critic 
were to argue that we have a normative reason to prefer painting1 to painting2 just because 
painting1 was painted on a different but visually identical brand of canvas, we would probably 
consider this argument to be unconvincing. But why? I am tempted to say that we judge the 
choice of canvas to be totally irrelevant to our reasons to prefer one painting over another. I 
describe this irrelevance as a lack of normative weight or significance. Painting1 using this brand 
of canvas does nothing to justify our preference for it; likewise, it does nothing to compel or 
obligate us to prefer painting1. If we have any reason to prefer painting1 over painting2, the 
normativity of that reason is not at all explained by this feature of painting1. Thus, we are given 
to seeing some potential sources of normativity as having no normative weight. 
(ik) Some subjects posited as a reason’s sources of normativity lack enough normative 





Clearly, though, we also judge that other potential sources of normativity do contribute to, 
ground or explain the normativity of some reason, and to varying degrees. Given all this, a final 
intuition seems plausible: 
(il) A normative reason’s source of normativity is sufficient only if that source has 
sufficient normative weight. 
Overall, the view I’m trying to draw out here is just the view that, for a reason to be normative, or 
for us to have a normative reason, that reason must have sufficient sources of normativity, and 
that this sufficiency requires that the source of normativity has a certain measure of normative 
weight which is sufficient. 
Yet, even if one finds this way of thinking of normative reasons intuitive, what is meant 
by the “normative weight of a source of normativity” is unclear. Perhaps what I am referring to 
as “normative weight” is just a metaphor for our intuitive estimation/measure of the degree to 
which a source can make a reason normatively forceful, or of the degree to which a source can 
bring it about that we have some normative reason to act. On this account of normative weight, 
when we judge that a source is normatively weighty, what we are describing is that this entity, 
fact or consideration is actually able to contribute to the normative force of a reason, or bring it 
about that we a normative reason. Reflecting on what we have reason to do, we might “test” 
whether certain considerations--ie what an action might bring about, how an action relates to 
some subject, etc--are sufficient for our having a reason to act. We examine certain 
considerations, holding them before our mind, and attempt to measure whether or not they are 
sufficient to establish how we ought to act, or to guide our actions by providing or supporting 
normative reasons. Just as we might naively judge the value of a stone by estimating its weight 
and robustness as we pass it between our hands, we might also attempt to judge a 
consideration’s reason-giving power or relevance to reasons by turning it over in our minds. We 




compel or obligate us, nor provide us with a reason to act which is so justifying, compelling or 
obligating. And, in concluding this, we might describe our estimation of a consideration as an 
estimation of that consideration’s normative weight. The normative weight of some source of 
normativity, on this understanding, is thus a metaphor for that source’s ability to justify, compel 
or obligate us, or to provide a reason which justifies, compels or obligates us. And, in requiring 
that normative reasons have sources which themselves possess sufficient normative weight, all 
we require is that normative reasons have sources which are sufficient to justify, compel or 
obligate us to act in certain ways, or which are sufficient for our having a reason which justifies, 
compels or obligates us to act in certain ways. What a consideration’s power or ability to provide 
normative force to reasons consists in, however, is beyond me. 
This metaphorical understanding47 of normative weight might betray the reflective 
processes underlying our judgements about what we have reason to do: we take a source of 
normativity and reflect on it, turning it over in our minds, inspecting its ability to obligate or justify 
us, or provide us with obligating or justifying reasons, just as we might, when naively estimating 
the value of an object, turn it over in our hands, thereby “getting a feel” for its robustness. To 
judge whether or not a candidate can serve as a source of normativity, we place it before our 
minds, reflect on its nature and features deeply, and allow our mysterious moral faculties to 
produce a judgement of whether or not it can or should be taken as a guide to our actions or 
support for the force of our reasons. 
                                                 
47 There may be another way to understand “normative weight.” We might suppose that normative weight 
is just another way of speaking of the value of an entity, state or actions postulated as a source of 
normativity. We might intuit that the intrinsic value of some entity, state or action contributes to or explains 
the normativity/normative force of a reason to act when that action relates in some way to that entity, 
state or action. Thus, normative weight is a metaphor for intrinsic value, and the intrinsic value of entities 
can make those entities sources of normativity of reasons. This seems to line up with the intuitions of 
moral realists like Eric Weilenberg. Weilenberg starts from the intuition that “intrinsic value is connected 
with normative reasons” in the way I described here: normative reasons are determined by the intrinsic 
value of things which the actions of reasons relate to (Weilenberg, Eric. Robust Ethics, 7-8). I have 
avoided talk of “intrinsic value” to avoid getting entangled in the debate over the nature of intrinsic value, 
and whether intrinsic value can be given an internalist analysis. For a defense of an internalist conception 




This leads us to the second assumption of these arguments: if some source of 
normativity had sufficient normative weight (was able to provide for or ground a normative 
reason or the normative force of reason), then we would, upon deep reflection, probably 
recognize it as sufficiently weighty. On the metaphorical view of normative weight described 
above, our assumption becomes something like: if some considerations (entities, facts, states) 
were sufficient for our having a normative reason to Φ (or for a reason to have normative force), 
then we would likely judge, upon deep reflection, that those considerations are sufficient.  
This is, in my reading, Korsgaard’s method for establishing whether or not some subject 
can serve as a satisfactory source of normativity, and I accept it here (though not for the same 
reasons Korsgaard does). For Korsgaard, some consideration is sufficient to justify or warrant 
us in Φ-ing (i.e. is sufficient for the normative force) if, after reflecting on this consideration 
sincerely and reasonably, one finds that the consideration is sufficient to justify or compel them 
to behave morally.48 That is, some consideration is a sufficient source of normativity if it survives 
reflection and is endorsed as sufficient by reflection (is endorsed by an agent after a process of 
deep and sincere reflection).49 It seems to me that Korsgaard means this to be a metaphysical 
principle from which an epistemic principle might fall out. Normativity arises from “rational 
necessity,” and, since we have some ability to determine what is rationally necessary via 
rational reflection, we can, to some significant degree, discover what considerations can give 
                                                 
48 “For this exercise to work, we have to eliminate these possibilities, and imagine that this other agent is 
sincere and reasonable, and does really want to know...the answer we need [to the normative question] is 
really the first person answer, the one that satisfies us when we ourselves ask the normative question” 
(Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity, 17.) 
49 “The normative question is answered by showing that the points of view from which these different 
interests arise are congruent, that meeting the claims made from one point of view will not necessarily 
mean violating those that arise from another” (Korsgaard, 61). “...our ethical dispositions are judged good 
from every point of view which makes practical claims on us, including their own point of view” 
(Korsgaard, 78). That is, to establish the normativity of morality, one need only to reflect on some 
considerations and find them forceful (from one point of view), while also finding that they do not violate 




rise to normativity. She titles this reflective process of testing sources of normativity the 
“reflective endorsement method.”50  
This strong implication seems to be supported by Korsgaard’s view of normative reasons 
themselves: an agent having a normative reason to Φ is just for it to be true of the agent that, if 
they reflected rationally on Φ-ing, they would judge that they should Φ, would Φ , would desire 
to Φ , would think Φ-ing is good, etc.51 For Korsgaard, having a reason to Φ  is just for Φ-ing to 
be a thing which would be endorsed in judgement as a result of the process of reflective 
endorsement (survive the test of reflection). If “reasons to Φ ” is shorthand for Φ -ing being 
something which would be endorsed under ideal, reflective conditions, then (presuming all 
reasons are normative reasons) the source of normativity for reasons to Φ  seems to be actual 
or counterfactual reflective endorsement of Φ-ing itself. And since the process of reflective 
endorsement is the sort of thing reflective, rational agents presumably have epistemic access 
to, it seems rational agents (which, presumably, we are) would be able to predict or discover 
which sorts of actions are or would be endorsed by us after a process of reflection. Thus, it 
seems likely that deep, thorough reflection could reveal to us the sources of normativity, since 
its various counterfactual endorsements of actions are the sources of normativity of reasons to 
perform those actions, and we have access to the process which would produce those 
endorsements. 
Anyone reading the previous Chapters of this essay will know that neither I nor the 
angsty will buy such an internalist reduction of reasons and their sources, at least not without 
good arguments. But, even though this internalist means of warranting our second assumption 
(which claims that our judgements of normative weight and/or of the sufficiency/insufficiency of 
                                                 
50 Korsgaard, 89. 
51 “...the reflective endorsement test is not merely a way of justifying morality. It is morality itself” (89). 




sources of normativity are, post deep, thorough reflection, justified) is not available to the 
angsty, the angsty can still rest assured that this assumption is not without grounds. While we 
cannot warrant this assumption on the grounds of a metaphysical reduction, we can instead 
appeal to the fact that our concept of normativity is ours. That is, our project in this essay is a 
complex process of conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis is an attempt to draw out the 
meaning and contents of concepts already in our possession. As moral beings, as beings which 
guide themselves with reasons, and as beings which utilize the concept of normativity daily, we 
should expect to, to some extent, be able to, on some level, understand these concepts. Our 
concept of normativity includes in it, as discussed in Chapter (I.2.4), the notion of causes, 
explanations, or grounds of normativity--our concept of normativity includes the concept of 
sources of normativity. It is not, then, implausible to assume that we have some idea of what 
sorts of things can serve as sources of normativity. These sorts of assumptions permeate 
philosophy, so unless philosophy rests on a set of mistaken or unwarranted assumptions, then 
this assumption seems permissible. How can we suppose that we can discover the proper 
criteria of epistemic justification, if we are unwarranted in assuming that deep reflection on 
candidate criteria would produce justified judgements on which criteria are proper and which are 
improper? How can we suppose that we can tell the difference between proper and improper 
logical/inferential principles, if we are unwarranted in assuming that deep reflection on these 
principles would produce justified judgements regarding their status? How can we suppose that 
we are able to tell what has intrinsic value, without also assuming that our deep reflection on the 
nature of things will produce justified judgements of value? 
As this discussion comes to a close, I must admit that I have no clue as to what the 
criteria of “sufficient normative weight” involves. Rather, I suggest than intuitive, deep and 
thorough reflection on candidates can suffice. Note also that the causes of absurd angst must 




relies on and is fueled by so many non-trivial intuitions and conceptual commitments not listed 
in our set of conceptual commitments. The human mind drives itself into states of suffering and 
anxiety for reasons unknown even to those who primarily identify as their minds. 
(III.3.2) The First Argument from Normative Weight (NW) 
(NW): First, let us assume that our concept of normative, non-instrumental reasons does not 
contain either counterfactual-internal or external sources of normativity as necessary conditions. 
If this was so, then our concept of normative reasons could be satisfied (sufficiently instantiated) 
by reasons which were backed only by actual-internal sources of normativity. If such a reason 
could satisfy our concept of NNIRs, then, we would expect to judge, after deep reflection, that 
the actual-internal states of agents like us are alone sufficient sources of normativity. We would 
expect to judge that these actual-internal states are sufficient sources of the normativity of 
reasons without positing any external entities or states as contributing to the normativity of these 
reasons. And so, the actual-internal states of agents like us would have to be intrinsic sources 
of normativity. This, however, is a difficult pill to swallow. For if actual-internal sources could be 
intrinsic sources of normativity, sufficient in themselves for providing normativity to non-
instrumental reasons, then they would have to, without external or counterfactual-internal 
sources, have sufficient normative weight in themselves to obligate or justify us, even without 
counterfactual-internal or external sources of normativity. And if this were so, we would expect 
to judge, after deep reflection, that the actual-internal states of agents like us have very 
significant normative weight in themselves, regardless of the existence of external or 
counterfactual-internal sources of normativity. 
But most of us do not, I think, believe such a thing, even after deep reflection. For there 
are many examples of agents valuing subjects or setting goals which are intuitively felt to be 




immoral--to be irrelevant to or in violation of the force of normative reasons--that I cannot see 
any reason to suppose that our actual-internal evaluative states carry sufficient normative 
weight in themselves. A bland example might be the preferences of my mother: my mother 
preferring Φ does not necessarily confer good, powerful, compelling, justifying or obligating 
reasons to Φ, so why would the preferences of other agents, even when added together? 
Two more extreme (and perhaps more convincing) examples make reference to human 
depravity. Imagine that a serial killer desires, favors or values very much the stabbing of young 
women. The killer recognizes that sharpening his knife would be conducive to realizing ends 
which he actually values. It seems right to say that, while the killer has actual-internal states 
which strongly favor sharpening his knife, he has no reason for doing so. We might even say, 
depending on our view of reasons, that our killer has a reason to sharpen his knife (a motivating 
or psychological reason), but not a normative reason. In either case it seems obvious to me that 
the killer does not have a normative reason to sharpen his knife in virtue of those actual-internal 
states strongly in favor of doing so. And this holds even if we assume that the killer has no 
actual-internal states which would favor him refraining from sharpening his knife, or from 
seeking to kill young women. So, actual-internal states in favor of Φ-ing are insufficient for 
normative reasons to Φ, or, put another way, they do not carry enough normative weight in 
themselves to provide the normativity which normative reasons require. 
Additionally, borrowing Korsgaard’s example and modifying it slightly, why should we 
care so deeply about the actual evaluative states of the species which produced the Nazi’s?52 
The sort of thing actual-internal evaluative states are are the same sorts of things that motivated 
Nazi’s to dehumanize and eliminate millions, or which were felt to have justified their evil. It does 
not seem likely, under our admittedly vague conception of normativity, that actual-internal states 
                                                 




of agents like us carry enough normative weight to suffice as sources of normativity or 
normative reasons. The evaluations of agents like us really do not seem, upon deep reflection, 
to carry such normative weight, for the reasons covered above, which is exactly the opposite of 
what we would expect if, under our concept of normativity, such actual-internal states could 
serve as sufficient sources of normativity. 
These remarks apply to reasons in general--both instrumental and non-instrumental. But 
consider that non-instrumental reasons to Φ are reasons to Φ for Φ-ing’s own sake. To suggest 
that the normativity of NNIRs is able to be fully explained by or grounded in actual-internal 
states, one suggests that the actual-internal, evaluative states of agents like us have such 
significant normative weight in themselves as to provide a normative reason to Φ for Φ-ing’s 
own sake, or to make our reasons to Φ for Φ-ing’s own sake normative rather than merely 
explanatory. But this boils down to the suggestion that an agent’s preference for Φ  can carry so 
much normative weight as to justify, compel, or obligate them to Φ . But why would we suggest 
such a thing, in light of the depravity which these states are capable of possesing? It seems 
that, even if the actual-internal evaluative states of agents like us do carry intrinsic normative 
weight, they do not carry enough weight to, by themselves, justify, compel or obligate those 
agents to pursue or act in accordance with those desires for the sake of those desires or what is 
desired in itself. 
Thus, if there is any source of normativity for normative, non-instrumental reasons, then 
it seems that, probably, our actual-internal evaluative states are not enough, and so we are in 
need of either counterfactual-internal or external sources of normativity. 
(III.3.3) The Second Argument from Normative Weight (NW*) 
Similar concerns can be raised against counterfactual-internal reasons (though the case is 




necessarily require external sources of normativity, then we would expect to judge, upon deep 
reflection, that counterfactual-internal sources could be intrinsic sources of normativity. But, if 
counterfactual-internal sources of normativity could be intrinsic sources of normativity, then they 
would have to be, without external reasons, normatively significant, to such an extent that they 
could provide us with obligating or justifying, non-instrumental reasons to act. 
But, as mentioned in argument NW above, human desires and commitments, as well as 
the desires and commitments of rational beings like us, do not in themselves carry much 
normative weight (at least, this is a view that the intuition of the angsty pulls them towards). If 
we do not give sufficient normative weight to the actual-internal evaluations of agents like us, 
why should we give that weight to the evaluative states we would choose under certain ideal 
conditions? For to suppose that our counterfactual-internal evaluative states can provide 
normative reasons presupposes that the evaluative states we would have under certain 
conditions have normative weight which our actual-internal evaluative states do not. But what 
makes such a difference between our counterfactual- and actual-internal evaluative states? 
There seems to be no difference in the sort of evaluative states they are: for counterfactual and 
actual evaluative states are still both evaluative states of agents like us, and we have judged 
that those, in themselves, lack sufficient normative weight already, even after deep reflection on 
the nature of those sorts of states (that is, when the angsty enter into the process of reflective 
endorsement, they seem to conclude contrary to Korsgaard). 
Another way to put this might be the following: the faculty which would produce 
counterfactual-internal states is either the same faculty which produces our actual-internal 
states, or is a faculty which is highly similar to those which produce our actual-internal states. 
Why suppose that the counterfactual deliverances of such a faculty have more normative weight 
than its actual deliverances? 
A Kantian might respond by trying to show what sets actual and counterfactual 




not ad hoc to think of counterfactual-internal states as sufficiently normatively weighty, the 
Kantian must show two things. (a) that there are some features of counterfactual-internal states 
which confer on them greater normative weight than actual-internal states. (b) that we have 
reason to suspect that these difference-making features and their ability to confer greater 
normative weight do not depend on external sources of normativity. If the Kantian cannot deliver 
on (b), we have no reason to think of counterfactual-internal states as themselves sufficient, and 
so the difference-making features of counterfactual-internal reasons could not overcome our 
suspicion (drawn out in NW) that the sorts of things internal states are carry insufficient weight. 
Argument NW has shifted the epistemic burden onto those who think of counterfactual-internal 
states as sufficiently weighty. 
But can any differences posited between actual-internal and counterfactual-internal 
states (a) confer sufficient normative weight on some counterfactual-internal states and (b) 
without help from external sources of normativity? Can they, (b) without any help from external 
sources of normativity, explain (c) why actual-internal states are inadequately weighty while 
counterfactual-internal states are adequately weighty?53 
To be clear, Kantians like Korsgaard do not ground normative force in counterfacts, but 
in the actual nature of reason. On this view, it is not that counterfacts (about what internal states 
agents would have in ideal circumstances) make or ground the truth of reasons-claims or that 
these counterfacts make reasons normatively forceful (the counterfacts themselves are not 
sources of normativity). Rather, these sorts of counterfacts are made true by the actual nature 
of rationality or judgemental processes within all rational agents, and it is these features of 
rationality or rational processes which are sources of normativity or grounds of reasons. For 
Korsgaard, it is not the truth of some abstract proposition about what I would value (the true 
                                                 
53 Dr. Eric Reitan, commenting on a manuscript of this essay, put the question like this: “can we 
adequately explain why the internal states possessed under ideal conditions are more normative than 
under other conditions? Why do these conditions qualify as ideal without reference to some external 




claim that I would, after engaging in the process of reflective endorsement, judge Φ-ing to be 
necessary, good, permissible, desirable, etc) which ‘makes’ me have a reason, or ‘makes’ my 
reason normatively forceful or authoritative. Rather, it is that which this true proposition refers to 
or describes which performs this function. It is the nature of the deliberating, inferring and 
judging faculty within me that confers normativity on reasons or which constitutes what I have 
reason to do. An agent having a reason to Φ is just for that agent to have the sort of cognitive 
faculties which would cause one to judge that Φ-ing is necessary or good. Likewise, a reason or 
moral rule is ‘made’ normatively forceful for us by the actual nature of the rational faculties 
already within us. Regardless of ignorance or the contents of my consciously held evaluative 
states, my reason actually demands that I Φ, and my reason doing so constitutes normatively 
forceful reasons, makes moral claims normatively forceful, and obligates us to follow them.54 For 
externalistic moral realists, the normative force of reasons flows from the nature or attributes of 
entities external to agents, whatever these might be. For the Kantian, the normative force of 
reasons emanates from certain features of the rationality within rational agents. Both these 
views deny the Humean claim that normativity emanates from the actual preferences of agents. 
What sets them apart is not their commitment to preference-independence, but their theory of 
                                                 
54 For Korsgaard, these counterfactual-internal states are the commitments to certain self-conceptions 
that rational agents have. Obligation, reasons, and the normativity of certain imperatives arises for each 
individual as a result of the rationality within each individual actually being such that it endorses or finds 
as necessary certain actions, beliefs, and imperatives. “Finally, I believe that the answer must appeal, in a 
deep way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of identity. As I have been emphasizing, morality can 
ask hard things of us, sometimes even that we should be prepared to sacrifice our lives in its name. This 
places a demanding condition on a successful answer to the normative question: it must show that 
sometimes doing the wrong thing is as bad or worse than death. And for most human beings on most 
occasions, the only thing that could be as bad or worse than death is something that for us amounts to 
death--not being ourselves anymore” (Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity, 17-18). “To be motivated 
‘by reason’ is normally to be motivated by one’s reflective endorsement of incentives and impulses, 
including affections, which arise in a natural way” (Korsgaard. The Sources of Normativity, 127.). “...the 
fact that you will an end is a reason for the end. It’s not exactly that there has to be a further reason; it’s 
just that you must take the act of your own will to be normative for you. And of course this cannot mean 
merely that you are going to pursue the end. It means that your willing the end gives it a normative status 
for you, that your willing the end in a sense makes it good” (Korsgaard. “The Normativity of Instrumental 
Reason,” 227) [emphasis mine]. “The answer in the case of the instrumental principle is that I make a law 




what subjects confer normativity. In other words, explaining normative force by citing 
counterfactual-internal states is to explain normative force by citing actual features or states of 
real entities (minds with rational faculties) or processes (the processes of minds with rational 
faculties). An externalist realist and Kantian both attempt to explain the normativity of reasons 
by pointing to something other than our actual preferences which they consider capable of 
‘making’ reasons normative or ‘conferring’ on us reasons. Any disagreement will regard whether 
the entities posited have such a power (and, in my view, talking of ‘normative weight’ is a 
heuristic tool for deciding whether or not they have such powers). 
After clarifying the general form of Kantian approaches, the problems raised above 
should be understood as thus: (a) are any of the actual features of the rational faculties within 
agents like us capable of ‘making’ or fully explaining the normative force of reasons?; (b) are 
any of the actual features of the rational faculties within agents like us capable of ‘making’ or 
explaining the normative force of reasons on their own (without any appeal to aspects of the 
world external to rational agents)?; (c) are there any differences between the actual features of 
the rational faculties within agents like us and the easily corruptible or depraved actual-internal 
evaluative states mentioned above, such that these differences would explain why the former 
are capable of ‘making’ or explaining the normative force of reasons on their own, but not the 
latter?  (I will continue to call these sorts of features ‘counterfactual-internal evaluative states,’ 
since they are the features or states which make counterfacts about the internal states of agents 
true.) 
It seems to me that there are four features of counterfactual-internal evaluative states 
which may explain their greater normative weight: the contents of counterfactual-internal states, 
the conditions under which counterfactual-internal states are formed, the faculties which 
produce counterfactual-internal states, and the universality of counterfactual-internal states.55  
                                                 
55 Some sources of normativity, for Korsgaard, can be the actual-internal states of agents like us. For 




However, though each of these difference-making features (of counterfactual-internal states) 
does seem to confer more normative weight on counterfactual-internal states than merely 
actual-internal states, I do not see any reason to think that they do so without depending on 
external sources of normativity. For it may be supposed that each feature confers greater 
normative weight only because those features draw their own weight from external sources of 
normativity (i.e. the nature of these features themselves). And so pointing to these features of 
counterfactual-internal evaluative states does nothing to defeat our charge of ad-hocness. 
If one supposed that the contents of a certain set of counterfactual-internal states are the 
source of the normative weight of those states, then it seems plausible to say that something 
external to (independent of) our internal states would be serving as the ultimate source of 
normativity. For it seems that the contents of counterfactual-internal evaluative states, and not 
the internal states with those contents, provide the normative weight to these internal states. For 
instance, our actual-internal states which constitute our favoring loving our neighbor are 
insufficiently weighty to be sources of normativity for our reason to love our neighbor. But why 
would our counterfactual-internal states, which would constitute our favoring loving our 
neighbor, be sufficient? On this view, our actually having certain faculties which would lead us to 
                                                 
intrinsically valuable (Korsgaard, 121). Yet, still, Korsgaard posits that these actual-internal states derive 
their normative weight/authority--their ability to serve as sources of normativity--from a certain set of 
counterfactual-internal states of rational agents. To defend the normative weight of these further 
counterfactual-internal states, Korsgaard, as our token Kantian, posits that this authority-conferring-
difference lies in both the faculties responsible for producing counterfactual-internal states and their 
universality or inescapability, and seems to think that these differences make them more weighty than 
actual-internal states. Korsgaard suggests the following for universality: because rational creatures like us 
cannot fail to value ourselves as intrinsically valuable, every rational creature like us would form some 
internal evaluative state in favor of what we are (Korsgaard, 121). But it would be inconsistent, per 
Korsgaard, to extend that value to oneself and not to all other humans. Thus, because the evaluative 
states of rational agents are logically consistent, a being like us, under the ideal condition of rationality, 
will form an internal evaluative state which considers all beings like us as ends in themselves. “We have 
no option but to say yes” [to such an internal state, that is, to endorse it] (Korsgaard, 123). From this 
counterfact about all agents like us, the universality of a core counterfactual-internal state follows, and 
from this commitment, Korsgaard thinks one can begin to build at least a minimal moral system. Further, 
the faculties which would produce these internal states are purely faculties which all rational creatures 
share. That is, the faculties of rationality and those which enable intensional-reflexivity (Korsgaard, 122-
123) are responsible for producing the foundational internal-states from which morality is built. Actual-
internal states may, in contrast to this set of counterfactual-internal states, be formed by processes and 




endorse loving our neighbor as necessary or valuable is not what explains why we have reason 
to love our neighbor, nor why that reason is normatively forceful. Rather, it seems at least 
equally plausible to think of the normative force of reasons to love our neighbor as stemming 
from the nature of loving our neighbor (which is external to us). Likewise, the killer’s actual-
internal states in favor of sharpening his knife are insufficient for him having a reason to do so, 
but why are his counterfactual-internal states in favor of seeking psychiatric help sufficient for 
him having a reason to do so? At the very least, I see no reason to think that the rational 
faculties within me can do what my preferences cannot. For supposing that the faculties within 
me demand certain attitudes and behaviors seems theoretically unnecessary to explain the 
normativity of my reasons or why I have reasons. Why think it necessary to include facts about 
our faculties in the explanation for the normativity of our reason to love our neighbor? The 
object-given, externalist explanation seems sufficient, though the ‘metaphysical mechanism’ by 
which the nature of loving our neighbor grounds reasons or makes reasons normatively forceful 
is not fully understood.56 Thus, attempting to postulate the contents of counterfactual-internal 
evaluative states as setting them apart from actual-internal states (with regard to their power to 
confer normativity on reasons) seems at best ad hoc, and at worst a covert way of embracing 
externalism. 
                                                 
56 By ‘metaphysical mechanism of grounding or making,’’ I mean a detailed account of how the features of 
objects can be reason-conferring or normativity-conferring. We can sufficiently explain the birth of a child 
by citing general descriptions of the powers of objects (the ability for a male to impregnate a female, the 
ability of a pregnant female to ‘grow’ a baby and bring it to term so long as they push during labor) and 
specific facts (that a male did so impregnate a female, that this female was capable of growing a baby 
within her, that there was nothing standing in the way of the natural processes of pregnancy, and that, 
during labor, the female pushed the baby out). Yet this is not a full explanation—it does not tell us of the 
mechanisms behind impregnating a female, the mechanisms of the processes for growing babies, nor the 
mechanisms of pushing out babies during labor. It seems a good enough explanation of childbirth, but 
something more is wanted. Regarding sources of normativity and reasons, that certain attributes of 
entities external to us can confer normative force or ground reasons seems a good enough explanation, 
but not a very detailed one. This tells us nothing of how these attributes do so, or what this relation of 
making amounts to. We want something like a detailed causal chain, as in explaining pregnancy. 
However, looking for such a mechanism of grounding may be wrongheaded. For, presumably, normative 
force is an imperceptible, immaterial aspect of reality, and it is not clear what a causal mechanism for 
immaterial realities would be beyond, perhaps, that one immaterial object existing is sufficient for another 




Likewise, explaining the difference in weight between actual and counterfactual internal 
states in terms of a difference between conditions or faculties is also to posit either an external 
source of normativity or to arbitrarily insist that certain features internal to agents ‘just are’ 
capable of conferring normative weight. For positing that the difference in normative weight 
between our easily depraved actual-internal states and our counterfactual-internal states lies in 
the conditions under which counterfactual-internal states would be formed seems to make their 
normative weight dependent on something external to agents: the conditions which those 
agents might find themselves in. Further, to say that this difference in normative weight 
(between our actual preferences and the preferences we would have) is due to our actual 
preferences being caused by different sets of faculties than the preferences we would have 
(under ideal conditions) seems ad hoc. For even if reasons or normative force flow (in part) from 
faculties which the Kantian takes to be more normatively weighty than those causing our actual 
preferences, the question can be raised: are these faculties by themselves sources of 
normativity, or do they derive their sources of normativity from something external to agents? 
The Kantian, to avoid relying on external sources of normativity, must give some reason to think 
that these faculties are by themselves sufficiently weighty or powerful. I am aware of no such 
reasons besides the feeling of sufficiency. And, even though I grant that a strong sense of 
sufficiency may warrant us in taking certain conditions as sufficient sources of normativity 
(Chapter V.2.4), the angsty, even after prolonged reflection, are given to feel that these faculties 
are insufficient by themselves! Thus, to treat certain faculties as capable of conferring normative 
force or reasons while denying that other faculties have this power (i.e. those which produce our 
actual, corruptible evaluations) seems either arbitrary. 
Further, the universality of certain counterfactual-internal judgements does not seem to 
be a good explanation for the normative difference between actual- and counterfactual-reasons. 
For it is also true that, under certain, less-than-ideal conditions, rational agents would 




ground normativity. And, even if one could place such value on universality itself in order to 
explain why universality can confer some counterfactual-internal states more normative weight 
than actual-internal states, then one’s explanation of the normative weight of some 
counterfactual-internal states is dependent on sources of normativity not reducible to the 
internal states of agents themselves, and not dependent on agents.57 
Allow me to summarize this argument: if counterfactual-internal states can plausibly 
serve as sources of the normativity of NNIRs, then they are able to do so only by having certain 
difference-making features which confer on them greater normative weight (power) than actual-
internal states. But the ability of each difference-making feature to confer greater normative 
weight on counterfactual-internal states (than actual-internal states) can plausibly be taken to 
function as or depend on external sources of normativity, so that these difference making 
features seem arbitrary. Further, I argued that we have reason to suspect the internal states of 
agents like us to be inadequately weighty (in NW). The Kantian, in order to overcome NW*, 
must give us reason to think that these difference-making features need not themselves depend 
on external sources of normativity. But because it is at least equally plausible to suppose that 
these difference-making features do depend on external sources, they have not overcome NW*. 
Overall, then, I find it implausible to suppose that counterfactual-internal states of agents like us 
can plausibly serve as sources of normativity for our NNIRs. That is, I find it plausible to think 
that our NNIRs must rely on sources of normativity other than the internal states of agents like 
us. And since sources are either internal or external, I find it plausible to think that our NNIRs 
must rely on external sources of normativity. 
I might express the gist of arguments NW and NW* much more simply: upon even deep 
reflection, the angsty find it that our actual-internal states are insufficient for normative reasons 
                                                 
57 It may be that universality of evaluative judgement indicates that these judgement are right or 
warranted, so that, if rational agents universally judge that we have normative reason to act, then it is 
likely that we do have such reasons. But the question is not whether universality can indicate normative 




(NW), and also find counterfactual-internal states to be insufficient (NW*). That is, upon deep 
reflection, the angsty cannot see how either Humean- or Kantian-internalist solutions suffice to 
explain the normativity of our reasons, particularly our non-instrumental reasons, and, further, 
they are attempted to judge that they are insufficient given the easily depraved nature of these 
states.58 
(III.4) Summary of Arguments for CC6* 
In sum, argument EP attempted to show that external sources of normativity were plausible 
explanations for our having normative, non-instrumental reasons. A weakened version of EP, 
WEP, was given, arguing that, for any of our foundational, non-instrumental reasons, their 
normative force on us is plausibly explained by external sources of normativity. Argument NW 
attempted to defeat the claim that “actual-internal sources of normativity can be sufficient 
sources of the normativity of non-instrumental reasons” with appeals to the insufficient 
normative weight of actual-internal states. Finally, NW* appealed also to normative weight, and 
raised the challenge of arbitrariness against the Kantian (who posits counterfactual-internal 
states as sufficient sources of normativity): what explains the great difference in normative 
weight between actual-internal and counterfactual-internal states? Since the potential Kantian 
responses were found inadequate to overcome this charge, NW* concluded that, probably, 
counterfactual-internal states are insufficient sources of normativity. Thus, the conclusions of 
NW and NW* imply that, if there are sources of normativity, then they must be external.  
Ultimately, the conclusions of the arguments from Chapters (II) and (III) suggest that the 
internal evaluative states of agents can align with or violate reasons, and also that these states 
                                                 
58 To clarify, my objection to internalist theories in NW* is that this normative force seems to require 
sufficiently normatively weighty sources of normativity, and that the actual features of rational agents qua 
rational agents which Kantians posit as sufficient sources of normativity do not have this weight (or, at 
least, I see no reason to think they have this weight). Similarly, in EP, I argued that the intrinsic properties 
of objects external to rational agents are metaphysically responsible for (cause, make, ground) the 
normative force of reasons. For Kantians, even though the intrinsic properties of external objects are 
important, perhaps even necessary, elements in grounding normativity, the force of normative reasons 




can align with or violate the sources of normativity (if there are any), but that this alignment or 
violation cannot adequately ground or explain the existence of normative, non-instrumental 
reasons. These arguments lead us to an overall picture of the moral world which requires an 
external guarantor or source of reasons. 
 In the next Chapter, I will further explicate absurd angst by drawing attention to the 
various painful consequences of denying the existence of external reasons and sources of 
normativity. This Chapter will, necessarily, retread a bit of ground, framing what has already 
been discussed in slightly different ways. I beg my readers for patience, as I seek to explain to 














THE PAINFUL FEATURES OF AN ABSURD WORLD 
So far, I have attempted to describe the sort of philosophical angst that arises out of moral 
speculation, particularly from speculation regarding ultimate or final reasons. This “absurd 
angst,” as I have called it, is a worry that there are no normatively forceful, non-instrumental 
reasons to engage in the activities one assumed to be morally significant prior to deep moral 
speculation. Two sets of conceptual commitments were posited as causes of consciously held 
worries over reasons (though, I admit, these conceptual commitments are much more sterile 
than what is probably the true conceptual causes of absurd angst within the minds of the 
angsty). Both explanations of absurd angst put forward involve attributing an externalizing 
tendency to angsty thinkers. One is prone to externalize moral normativity in virtue of being  
drawn to think of normative, non-instrumental reasons (or at least ultimate non-instrumental 
reasons) as external reasons, or as relying for their normative force on external sources of 
normativity. Paired with an inclination to moral rationalism, angsty thinkers’ externalization of 
reasons make moral truths and authority contingent upon mysterious and unanalyzed 
metaphysical entities: “external reasons” or “external sources of normativity.” Unable to verify 




would be, the angsty begin to worry that there are no such reasons or sources, and so come to 
doubt important moral truths or the authority of morality.  
Up until this point, then, I have described a way of understanding the normative 
question, and have postulated two potential causes of moral skepticism. But I have not, in any 
detail, worked out why skeptical worries over moral normativity are painful. What is it about an 
absurd world--a world without normative, non-instrumental reasons--which is problematic for the 
angsty? Further, what is it about a world without external reasons or sources of normativity 
which pains the angsty (besides, of course, a lack of normative non-instrumental reasons)? 
What do external reasons and sources provide which would be lost in an absurd world?  
Below, I describe several painful features of a world in which moral agents have either 
no normative, non-instrumental reasons or external reasons. I have labeled these features “F1-
F8.” 
(F1) A Lack of Reasons and Rationality: We view ourselves as a rational species, and 
feel that our identities are heavily bound up with our status as rational animals. We have come 
to value what we take to be good reasons in themselves, and desire to have them. The 
suggestion that there are neither external reasons nor external sources of normativity strip 
morality of reasons all-together, given that they would, if our angsty intuitions described in the 
previous Chapters are correct, rule out normative, non-instrumental reasons. 
A lack of reasons for our ultimate ends and moral truths (which must be normative and 
non-instrumental) pains us, I think, because we value having good (normative) reasons for its 
own sake, or because we value being rational (at least in our most significant endeavors) for its 
own sake.  
Regarding our valuing normative reasons for their own sake,  consider what James, 
explicitly pulling from Tolstoy, writes: 
In the practical life of the individual, we know how his whole gloom or glee about any 
present fact depends on the remoter schemes and hopes to which it stands related. Its 




nowhere, and however agreeable it may be in its immediacy, its glow and gilding 
varnish.59  
 
I take James to be describing the psychology of the angsty: those who are susceptible to absurd 
angst will have evaluations of Φ which depend substantially on how Φ fits into their overall 
scheme of ends. That is, a person’s positive evaluation of Φ will be shaped by the 
instrumentality of Φ in achieving their ends. For whatever reason (and I refrain from passing 
critical judgement), when one comes to realize that the ends themselves “lead to nowhere,” the 
positive evaluation of Φ drops out or is tarnished. This “leading to nowhere” in Tolstoy seems to 
describe a lack of a rational basis for pursuing our ultimate and final ends.60 Since James 
explicitly identifies Tolstoy's existential condition with the one he diagnoses in others, this 
“leading to nowhere” in James is likely to be the same lack of reasons. Any views which deny 
the existence of external, non-instrumental moral reasons pain us, because we recognize that 
our final ends must “lead to nowhere” in this sense. A person might enjoy or value the ends they 
were pre-theoretically committed to, yet still be prone to this sort of despair. When I have felt 
this pain, I have not suddenly ceased to value myself and others, and my motivation to pursue 
well-being was not totally undermined. I felt that the significance of these pursuits, however, had 
diminished, and I became (and regularly become) dejected.61 Since this pain may arise despite 
one still having psychological motivation to pursue these ends, and seems to arise just from a 
feeling that there are no reasons (or no good reasons) to pursue one’s final ends, it seems to 
me that a lack of normative, non-instrumental reasons to pursue our final ends is painful in itself. 
                                                 
59 James, William. "Lectures IV-VII." In The Varieties of Religious Experience, 141. 
60I take it that there are two ways in which reasons or ends can avoid “leading to nowhere.” First, by 
leading to another end which we desire, like experiences of pleasure, ad infinitum. Second, by terminating 
in some final end(s) we consider to be so valuable and worthy that, though the chain of our ends as well 
as our experiences of those final, very valuable ends are finite, those ends being attained is able to make 
life worth living, has provided good reasons to live, etc. 
61 Camus notes something similar: the pain and fear of absurdity does not motivate the angsty to commit 
suicide, or to simply stop caring for themselves. Rather, valuing well-being and striving to live are deeply 




And so, a world without external reasons and sources of normativity is perhaps a painful 
prospect because it threatens to strip us of something we value for its own sake. 
Alternatively, one may be pained by a lack of normative, non-instrumental reasons 
because one feels that this would no longer allow oneself to identify primarily as a rational 
being. As Korsgaard and Scanlon note, there are two dominant approaches to defining talk of 
reasons and rationality: define rationality in terms of (a correct response to) reasons, or reasons 
in terms of (the demands of) rationality.62 If one is given to conceiving of rationality as being 
capable of appropriately responding to reasons, and one finds themselves doubting the 
existence of normative reasons (as a result of doubting the existence of ultimate reasons), then 
the ability to understand oneself as a rational being will be greatly diminished. Identifying 
oneself as a rational being to some extent might be consistent with denying the existence of 
normative reasons, if one takes it that rationality might also consist in responding to merely 
pragmatic (non-normative) reasons. Still, to deny the existence of normative, non-instrumental 
reasons will be to deny oneself the ability to respond to a whole realm of reasons which one 
might have previously thought existed. So, in the eyes of those who previously thought of their 
rationality as a response to a host of normative reasons, this will severely limit the profundity of 
rationality, if it does not strip rationality of its value altogether.63 It may be, then, that doubting 
the existence of normative, non-instrumental reasons (and so external reasons and sources) is 
painful due to the fact that we value rationality for its own sake, and feel that our rationality 
would be lessened or ruled out if our doubts were realized. 
                                                 
62 (Korsgaard, Christine. The Normativity of Instrumental Reason, 225.) (Scanlon, T.M. Being Realistic 
About Reasons, 8.) 
63 One could argue that rationality has intrinsic value only if there are normative reasons to value it as 
such. But this would, on our angsty conceptual schemes, require normative, non-instrumental reasons. 
So, if one is given to the sort of angst I have already described, one will still lose something valuable they 
thought they previously had--morally significant or valuable rationality. And this will suggest a lessening of 




(F2) Lack of Intrinsic Value and its Consolation: Earlier I wrote that morality and 
moral considerations are important due to their supposed ability to console. Consolation in the 
face of suffering is sought by casting suffering as instrumental to achieving some intrinsic good 
or intrinsically valuable end. The role of art in providing an artist with some sort of consolation 
reveals the power that intrinsic value has to console (at least pre-theoretically). Everyday 
aesthetic judgements appeal to the intrinsic value of art as a way to ground its importance. The 
intrinsic value of art is also used by many as a means for consolation--an artist may seek to live 
past their death or overcome their otherwise painful life by creating something longer-lasting 
and intrinsically valuable. The artist might describe their ambition as contributing to the 
goodness of the world by adding one more valuable object to it, and find themselves consoled 
by that suggestion. 
Further, appeals to one’s own intrinsic value play an important role in ethical 
judgements. For even the most self-absorbed value themselves as if they were intrinsically 
valuable, so that many can, despite great differences in moral character, assent to foundational 
moral principles, if only to aid their own self-preservation. Some authors have described belief in 
one’s own intrinsic value as, at the very least, a foothold for morality.64 Intrinsic value and 
ascriptions of intrinsic value are thus important features of human life and morality (since the 
values of things are taken to ground or shape our duties toward them), our view of the world 
(since the values of things are taken to explain and set their place in the life of a human 
                                                 
64 Korsgaard takes an Enlightenment conception of the self as being impossible to avoid (Korgaard, The 
Sources of Normativity, 117, 123.) and argues that this enlightenment conception can force one to extend 
this same conception to others (Sources of Normativity, Lecture 4). A belief in at least one’s own intrinsic 
value as a “broader, ultimate concern from which it is impossible to step back” is hinted at by Nagel in 
(Nagel, Thomas. “The Absurd,” 155) and developed more fully, but through talk of an external point of 
view, in (Nagel, Thomas. “Universality and the Reflective Self.” In The Sources of Normativity.) Nagel 
seems to think of a recognition of one’s own worth as leading one to entering into this external point of 
view, if for no other reason than to preserve their own ability to consider themselves and demand that 




society), and our efforts to console ourselves (since the values of things are taken to impart 
fleeting life with non-fleeting import). 
Given their assent to moral rationalism, however, the angsty will be drawn to think of 
intrinsic value as requiring normative reasons, which in turn require non-instrumental reasons. It 
may even be the case that the angsty person’s concept of intrinsic value as requiring non-
instrumental reasons  informs their inclination to moral rationalism, rather than being informed 
by moral rationalism. It seems highly plausible to think that some subject is intrinsically valuable 
only if any agent who comes into contact with that subject has a normative reason to value that 
subject as intrinsically valuable, or as an end in itself, regardless of its utility. But, the sort of 
normative reasons which one could have to value some subject for its own sake, regardless of 
its instrumental value, seem most naturally to be non-instrumental reasons, although it may be 
that one has such a strong instrumental reason to value something for its own sake that this 
instrumental reason is a reason to value it regardless of its utility. In either case, however, some 
subjects having intrinsic value requires, for the angsty, the existence of normative reasons to 
value that subject, which in turn requires normative, non-instrumental reasons. 
The intuition that intrinsic value requires external sources or reasons may be 
strengthened by arguments like those given previously regarding the contributions of intrinsically 
valuable entities to the normative force of non-instrumental reasons. It was argued (in Chapter II 
especially) that there is a tight link between the intrinsic properties of valuable entities, or the 
valuable, intrinsic properties of entities, and our normative, non-instrumental reasons to respond 
to them. Spelling out what these intuitions might reveal about the link between intrinsic value 
and reasons, however, must be left for another time.65 
                                                 
65 The link between value and reasons is so tight that some have given accounts of value which reduce 
value to the presence of reasons. See the following for introductions to these accounts: (Scanlon, T. M. 




(F3) Lack of Moral Significance for Finite and Historical Goods: Recognizing that 
human lives and efforts are finite brings one to ask “why bother?,” and a natural answer to this 
question is to posit that human activities, however finite, are morally significant. Tolstoy seems 
to have been brought into his angsty state by fully realizing that his future was to lie with dirt and 
worms.66 James, again commenting on Tolstoy, also takes the recognition of finitude to be the 
catalyst for this angst.67 Morality is invoked to answer the question by preserving the 
significance of human life. But morality does this by positing the intrinsic value of human lives 
and efforts--our lives and projects are felt to be worth it because they have intrinsic value or 
connect our lives to ends with intrinsic value, and this intrinsic value is not stripped away by the 
finitude of the valuable. But human life having intrinsic value or being connected to intrinsically 
valuable ends is problematic without external, non-instrumental reasons (F2). So, to the extent 
that the moral significance of the finite depends on its intrinsic value or relation to intrinsically 
valuable ends, moral significance of the finite depends on the existence of external, non-
instrumental moral reasons or sources of normativity. 
(F4) Lack of Meaningfulness: On certain conceptions of the meaning of life, meaning is 
(a) a key component of the good life, (b) naturally desired by human beings, and (c) a 
                                                 
66 Tolstoy’s primary pain is over moral significance: he asks for a reason to live or work in the face of a 
painfully finite existence. His consolation is found in his new religious beliefs, including a belief that this 
existence--that man and it’s goals--are related to the infinite, and, in response to coldness, that this 
infinite positively regards us (Tolstoy, Leo, 58-59). He does not respond by giving powerful moral 
reasons, but by eliminating finitude, death, being forgotten and coldness (Tolstoy, Leo, 46, 59). Without 
finitude, the painful demand for reasons seems to be less painful, and we may content ourselves without 
finding reasons to live when we suppose that our lives are enjoyable overall, and will be enjoyably 
extended into eternity. But this does not remove the need for a reason totally, if the desire for reasons 
(F1) is genuine. 
67 “Mankind is in a position similar to that of a set of people living on a frozen lake, surrounded by cliffs 
over which there is no escape, yet knowing that little by little the ice is melting, and the inevitable day 
drawing near when the last film of it will disappear, and to be drowned ignominiously will be the human 
creature’s portion. The merrier the skating, the warmer and more sparkling the sun by day, and the 
ruddier the bonfire at night, the more poignant the sadness with which one must take in the meaning of 




relationship between one's private/personal ends, commitments, projects, activities and those 
which are worthy of love or pursuit in themselves.68 But as Nagel notes, 
One may try to escape the position by seeking broader ultimate concerns. From which it 
is impossible to step back… Those seeking to supply their lives with meaning usually 
envision a role or function in something larger than themselves… But a role in some 
large enterprise cannot confer significance unless that enterprise is itself significant.69 
That is to say, talking of significance or worthiness of love and commitment seems to involve the 
notions of intrinsic value and/or normative reasons. Significance itself, as I have described in 
F3, invokes these concepts, and thus, on these conceptions of meaning, and under our angsty 
conceptual commitments, meaningfulness requires the existence of external, non-instrumental 
reasons to value, love, commit oneself to, etc. A world without such reasons would then be a 
world without (this sort of) meaningfulness, nor the consolation which sincere and informed 
belief in meaningfulness of one’s actions can provide. 
(F5) Disturbing Relativism, Easily Escapable Morality, and Moral Authority: As 
argued in Chapter II.2, a denial of categorical reasons to pursue our ultimate ends results in a 
disturbing relativism about normative reasons, under which moral wantons are able to escape 
the demands of reasons just by being moral wantons. But categorical reasons are unconditional 
reasons--they are reasons to Φ which hold regardless of one’s actual commitments. So, 
categorical reasons must be either external or counterfactual-internal. Given the angsty 
conceptual commitments of the previous Chapters, only external, non-instrumental reasons will 
suffice, according to the angsty, for categorical reasons. In the minds of the angsty, then, 
reasons to be moral would be easily escapable without external, non-instrumental reasons. But, 
given a commitment to moral rationalism, the angsty will also believe that moral obligation and 
blameworthiness require normative reasons to conform to moral standards. Thus, moral 
                                                 
68 Susan Wolff develops most clearly this conception of meaning/meaningfulness in (Wolff, Susan. 
“Meaningfulness: A Third Dimension of the Good Life.”). Michael Zao picks up Wolff’s conception and 
attempts to make it cohere with what he calls “teleological moral realism” (Zhao, Michael. “Meaning, Moral 
Realism, and the Importance of Morality.”). 




reasons, obligations, and blameworthiness would become grossly escapable without external, 
non-instrumental reasons. 
This dependence on external, non-instrumental reasons for moral inescapability also has 
implications for the authority of morality. I take it that an awareness or sense of the authority of 
morality is something like a sense of the far-reaching, normative force of morality. I sense that I 
ought to bring myself into conformity with the moral law; I sense that others ought to value what 
I take to be intrinsically valuable. We take it that the reasons we have to be moral and the 
reasons others have to adopt our evaluations are not based merely on whim, but are 
compelling. This same sense of moral authority which strikes us as compelling and forceful also 
leads us to expect this same recognition in others. If morality is authoritative over us, it seems 
that the authority of morality would bind others like us (for it would be ad hoc to suppose 
otherwise). The force of the intuition that we are subjected to the authority of morality is equaled 
by intuitions that the morally obstinate ought to be moral as well, even those who obstinately 
refuse to recognize morality as authoritative, or who are uncommitted to the ends which we take 
to be the ends of moral behavior. For just as legal authority binds those who disregard the law, 
we sense that moral authority cannot be escaped by merely refusing to acknowledge it. When 
confronted with heinous acts done by those who appear to be without a conscience, or who 
appear to have willingly calculated that their wrongdoing was in their best interest, we do not 
ordinarily hesitate to feel that the wrongdoer has good reasons to refrain from doing wrong, 
even if it would have undermined the realizations of their desires or goals. And so too do we 
take the selfish serial killer to have been obligated to refrain from murder, in spite of the fact that 
we may suspect that the killer had made it their goal to kill, and had consciously disregarded the 
dictates of morality, setting immoral ends as their goals. Surely, also, we may blame the killer 
for killing. Our inclination is to assume that those disinterested in being moral still have 
compelling, normative reasons to be moral, and are likewise obligated to be moral, even though 




If we are to trust our moral intuitions regarding moral authority, it seems we are to be 
committed to recognizing as obligated and blameworthy (and as acting against moral reasons 
which they possess) even those obstinate and morally uncommitted wrongdoers who baffle us. 
But without supposing that these wrongdoers have categorical reasons to be moral which they 
act against, the only reasons which they may have will depend on their own interest in and 
commitments to morality. And, since it is possible that their commitments are immoral, it is 
possible that they have no such reasons. Given the angsty drive to externalize categorical 
reasons, a lack of external reasons to be moral would rule out the presence of categorical 
reasons, and thus prevent us from accepting our moral intuitions regarding authority and its 
reach over the obstinate. This would then make the existence of external reasons necessary for 
morality to be authoritative in the far-reaching way in which we feel it is. 
(F6) The Unreliability of Intuition: For those of us who fear the absurd, our intuitions 
strongly indicate (rightly or wrongly) that there are or ought to be powerful moral reasons. 
James, again acutely perceiving the fears we have, relates what an angsty patient might feel: 
The strangeness is wrong. The unreality cannot be. A mystery is concealed, and a 
metaphysical solution must exist. If the natural world is so double-faced and unhomelike, 
what world, what thing is real?70 
To deny that there are non-instrumental reasons would be to deny that there are powerful moral 
reasons--to deny that there are reasons to esteem things, to pursue things, to love things 
despite their transience and impracticality. And this would be to discard our deepest gut feelings 
as unreliable. It would undermine the reliability of our less-than-indubitable intuitions, intuitive 
concepts and faculties, and to call into doubt our entire way of seeing the world.  
(F7) Crippled Means of Moral Exhortation in the Face of Hardship: In the absence of 
external, non-instrumental reasons to act, we look to our desires to motivate us to act. But in the 
absence of powerful reasons and any desire to act, we fear we cannot be consciously motivated 
                                                 




to act for the good. For we often feel that what we ought to do conflicts with our desires, or we 
find there is simply a lack of desire to do what we ought. One who wishes to commit suicide 
may feel that they have reasons to “keep on trucking” because of the intrinsic and instrumental 
value of their life. We, too, attempt to convince them of their value, and this is why we so often 
tell the suicidal that “there are reasons to live! Life is worth it!” and in the same breath say “we 
love you, your suicide would hurt us!” By appealing to the intrinsic and instrumental value of life, 
we attempt to draw awareness to the reasons we feel they have for refraining from suicidal or 
self-destructive desires. But to deny that there are external reasons results in a denial of 
intrinsic value (F2), and of normative, forceful reasons all together (F1). If the suicidal person 
shares our angsty intuitions, and comes to deny the existence of external moral reasons, then 
by what means can we exhort them to live? Certainly not by any rational or reasons-based 
approach (if one takes rationality to depend on reasons, and not the other way ‘round). Worse, 
appeals to the intrinsic value of life or persons, as we have seen, are questionable without being 
able to appeal to reasons. It seems to me that, if we deny the existence of external moral 
reasons, and yet knowingly continue to make use of the concept to persuade and exhort 
ourselves and others, that we are engaging in mere self-deception and manipulation.71 And this, 
perhaps because of the value we place on rational deliberation and truthfulness, pains us. 
(F8) Moral Futility and a Cold, Indifferent World: Finally, a denial of external, non-
instrumental reasons would suggest72 a cold or indifferent world--a world in which we could not 
expect our environment take us into consideration at all. In the absence of external, non-
instrumental reasons, why expect any divinity or transcendent entity to look on at us with 
anything but total indifference (unless we anthropomorphize the entity to have human-like 
                                                 
71 David Enoch similarly attempts to show that there would be no means of settling disputes impartially, or 
encouraging impartial solutions to disputes. (Enoch, David. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of 
Robust Realism, 17-22.) 
72 Note that I do not say that a lack of reasons or external sources would imply a cold or indifferent world. 
There are too many problems surrounding voluntarism to confidently assert that a lack of reasons implies 




sentiments which cause it to positively regard us, though without reason to)? Why suspect that 
God, Nature or the gods would value mankind at all? One might answer by positing the intrinsic 
value of human beings or the created world. But the problem described in (F2) then arises: 
without external, non-instrumental reasons, human life can have no intrinsic value. So, unless 
we want to anthropomorphize God and company, or assume that God values mankind or 
creation necessarily yet arbitrarily, it seems there is no reason to expect that we have found in 
our world a home. 
To be clear, while an anthropomorphised God is certainly conceivable, for many, 
including myself, such a thing seems improbable. A lack of reasons, then, does not imply that 
there is no God or god-like entities which care for us, but does cause some theoretical strain. 
There are problems in postulating a voluntaristic deity, but considering these problems would 
take us too far afield here. It is sufficient to explicate the worry of the angsty, and at a later time 
critically address these worries. 
 For those who have denied existence to anything like God, it is easier to see why they 
might worry about a cold world. With nothing like God, and nothing like moral entities or 
reasons, there is, plausibly, nothing “out there” which shares our concern for one another. 
Camus paints a picture of the world in which it is a matter of total indifference whether we live or 
die, love or hate, build or destroy. For most, the existence of God or some transcendent, rational 
aspect of Nature provide ways for making sense of mankind’s value: external, fundamental 
reality considers mankind valuable or at least significant. Mankind features in the plans and 
values of God, or has proper functions placed upon it by Nature.73 This secures humanity’s 
relevance and provides “meaning.”  
                                                 
73 Some have supposed that the important features of morality can be preserved if God or something like 
God exists, since human beings could positively connect their lives to that being. But even if such a being 
existed, there is no guarantee, without external moral reasons, that humans have been given the 
opportunity to positively connect their lives to that being. Further, if the important features of morality 




Perhaps many humans have a strange, irreducible desire--a desire for a cosmic parent 
or moral authority who looks on at us with care. This is not just a desire for something like God 
to exist, but for a caring, loving divinity or cosmos. It is tragic, if no such entity exists, that we 
would have such a strong desire, since nothing could possibly fulfill it.  
I cannot explain why it is a terrible thing that the universe is so cold without consulting 
my desires, which I do not suppose to be rational or even possibly fulfillable. Yet I just do desire 
a home-like universe, and I desire to be cared for by and connected to something like God, 
Nature, etc. So, to myself and many others with these desires, it would be a terrible thing for the 
world to be so cold. It is not unnatural to think of human beings as seeking a “cosmic home,” or 
a sense of “cosmic belonging.” 
A painful implication of the irrelevance of mankind to external reality is that we also lose 
any reassurance that our overall lot in life is congruous with what we take to be good. For not 
only are there no moral reasons for us to secure good lives for ourselves and others, but none 
for anything outside of us. To doubt the existence of powerful moral reasons is to doubt that 
nothing, not the universe, nor the gods, have any reasons to arrange a non-painful lot in life for 
us. Nothing assures us that ours is a kind world, or that our lives will be overall pleasant. Even 
given the existence of God, why expect that God would seek to give His creatures a happy, 
overall pleasant life? For this seems to presuppose that God values His creatures as intrinsically 
valuable, and why expect that God would value His creatures in the absence of external, non-
instrumental reasons to do so? Unless we anthropomorphize God, Nature, etc, it is difficult to 
explain why they would seek to give mankind a good lot in life. Further, the human desire for 
“final justice” or the realization of a highest good seem also to depend on God or Nature not 
only having the power to bring these ends about, but having an interest in bringing them about. 
In the absence of reasons for a being such as God to direct history to moral ends, why suppose 
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that this being has any interest in doing so? To believe that there is no guarantee or assurance 
that one’s life is moving towards overall goodness and final justice is disheartening and painful, 
as we desire and even expect progress toward goodness and justice. 
 For the angsty, then, a world without normative, non-instrumental reasons, and thus a 
world without external reasons or sources of normativity, is a world in which some of our 
deepest desires are thwarted and our conception of ourselves as rational is undermined or 
hampered. What’s more, consolation and moral motivation is threatened by a recognition of this 
lack of reasons, and a new, non-normative way of viewing our world begins to encroach on us. 
These are, I take it, features of an absurd world that many would find painful, and it is not 






























 TOWARDS CONSOLATION 
(V.1) Consolation and its Obstacles 
(V.1.1) Angst and Consolation 
The angsty are driven, on my account, to their angst by two characteristics internal to them: a 
tendency to externalize normative, non-instrumental reasons or sources of normativity, and a 
host of conceptual commitments which demand morality and moral properties be backed by 
non-instrumental reasons. Externalization of reasons and sources of normativity, paired with 
these conceptual commitments, put the angsty in a theoretical bind: in order for the angsty to 
continue to hold to these conceptual commitments, which recommend themselves so strongly to 
the angsty mind, and still believe (without significant cognitive dissonance) in the normative 
force, authority and reason-backed nature of morality, they must believe that there exist entities 
corresponding to “external reasons” or “external sources of normativity.” But just what external 
reasons or sources would be if they existed is mysterious: even through our lengthy discussion, 
there has been no attempt to make sense of “reasons” or talk of reasons, and, similarly, sources 
of normativity have been given only a vague analysis. The angsty find themselves desiring the 




The angsty desire consolation for their angst, but it is unclear if any consolation is 
available. Nor is it clear what consolation might consist in. Surely, one feature of consolation in 
the face of absurd angst will be an easing of the pain associated with our worry. But what might 
ease the pain of absurd angst, and can anything ease this pain? Further, ought we embrace any 
means of consolation which we can come by, or are there proper and improper means of 
consolation? 
(V.1.2) Evolutionary Difficulties for External Reasons and Sources of Normativity 
What’s more, there is a troubling epistemic problem facing the angsty. In order to understand 
my final, rough remarks on the nature of consolation, as well as my proposed path to 
consolation, it is necessary to briefly discuss the most oft-discussed form of these obstacles: 
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (though thoroughly grappling with these objections to 
externalism and moral realism is best done elsewhere). These problems stand in the way of 
belief in a consoling metaethic, and so any means to consolation which involve affirming the 
accuracy of our angsty moral conceptual system will have to contain some sort of solution to 
them. 
 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are currently the most favored kind of 
objection to externalist metaethical theories. Variants of these arguments are numerous,74 and 
what each share is an insistence that the evolutionary history of moral faculties, concepts, and 
beliefs is problematic, though the features or implications of evolutionary development taken to 
be problematic for externalistic realism in particular differ between variants. EDAs are epistemic, 
and seek to show that externalism/realism, when paired with the fact of evolutionary 
                                                 
74 There are many variants of evolutionary debunking arguments in the literature. Wielenberg identifies at 
least five, attributing them to Harman, Ruse, Street, Joyce, and Kahane (Wielenberg, Eric. Robust Ethics, 
146-164). Note that EDAs do nothing to undermine my externalist analysis of moral concepts, but rather 
raise problems for postulating that claims utilizing these externalist concepts can be true by 
correspondence to extramental/external reality/realities. For an overview of EDAs, see also: (Kahane, 
Guy. “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.”) To be clear, Kahane’s article does not only discuss EDAs 




development of the moral faculties or the content of our beliefs, implies (or makes likely) that our 
moral beliefs are unjustified. This result is taken to be implausible, since proponents of EDAs 
would like to preserve moral knowledge. So either one must deny externalism/realism or the 
evolutionary history in question, of which the latter is more burdensome to deny.  
Some EDAs appeal to the distorting influences of evolutionary processes on the content 
of our moral intuitions or beliefs.75 Other EDAs suggest that the evolutionary history of moral 
intuitions and beliefs indicates that these intuitions and beliefs are not caused by the truth of 
these beliefs, nor by contact with the entities which would correspond to the concepts utilized by 
these intuitions.76 These arguments assume that, in order for a belief to be justified, either the 
truth of the belief must be a part of the proper explanation of the belief, or that epistemic contact 
with the realities which correspond to the belief must be part of the proper explanation of the 
belief. Since we probably do not come into epistemic contact with moral entities such as 
reasons or sources of normativity (for if we were in epistemic contact with them, why would we 
spiral into doubt over their existence?), then the justification of our moral beliefs is at least 
doubtful insofar as they appeal to them. 
(V.1.3) Consolation as an Easing of Pain 
In response to these problems, a non-speculative solution to absurd angst may recommend 
itself to the angsty--a means of consolation which does not involve a consoling metaphysical 
affirmation of reasons or their sources, but, rather, a change in desire or outlook. Reflection on 
this way of consoling ourselves leads us to better understand the sort(s) of consolation the 
angsty truly desire, and so I turn to it now.  
                                                 
75 Sharon Street states that evolutionary processes have shaped the content of our moral beliefs (Sharon 
Street. "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value."). Justin Horn argues along the same lines 
(Horn, Justin. “Evolution and the Epistemological Challenge to Moral Realism.”). 
76 Wielenberg, in his survey of EDAs, attributes these sorts of arguments to Harman, Ruse and Joyce. 
Additionally, he interprets Street’s variant of the EDA as falling under this category, though it is not clear 




One might suggest that we are pained by a lack of normative reasons or external 
sources only because we have set our hearts on them or on what we believe them to be 
necessary for (meaning, significance, intrinsic value, rationality, etc). If we were to stamp out or 
modify our externalist desires (perhaps by clinging to new, less problematic concepts of 
normative reasons while also learning to content ourselves with belief in moral truths making 
use of these new concepts), then perhaps we would no longer be pained by the non-existence 
of reasons which correspond to our first set of concepts. Or, perhaps, we could simply numb 
ourselves to the non-existence of reasons, and, by successive acts of our will, condition 
ourselves to no longer hope for  those things which reasons are meant to preserve. 
 Surely if such a reconditioning was possible, we could achieve a sort of consolation. For 
instance, as Richard Taylor suggests, the painful bite of meaninglessness does not merely, if at 
all, stem from the fact that our lives, actions and goals lead to nothing of cosmic or lasting 
significance, nor from having a “point.”77 Rather, despair and angst over meaning arises from 
our considering them to lead to nothing of worth, significance, nor of having any point. For to 
imagine ourselves as Sisyphus eternally rolling his boulder is revolting and painful, but to 
imagine ourselves as Sisyphus truly enjoying this labor for eternity does not evoke such a 
strong reaction. Our angst over meaninglessness as a lack of significance or intrinsic value (in 
reasons jargon, our angst over meaninglessness as a lack of ends backed by external, 
normative reasons or sources of reasons), is eliminable just by coming to evaluate our lives as 
sufficiently meaningful for us. It seems perfectly possible to change our desires and views so as 
to be contented with life without externally guaranteed meaning, reasons, moral authority, 
normativity, etc. So, the suggestion goes, why not work to do so? Why not work towards 
consolation of this sort? 
                                                 




 This suggestion, however, should give us pause: even if we suppose that we can 
change our views, desires and concepts so significantly as so take away the bite of an absurd 
world, we can still ask ourselves whether or not it is good or reasonable to do so. And, unless 
we eliminate from ourselves the desire to be good or reasonable (respond to normative 
reasons), we will remain angsty. And so, failing to do this, the question still bothers us: should 
we, do we have reason to, would it be good to, numb ourselves a lack this sort of reasons? To 
this sort of reason-backed intrinsic value, significance, meaning, etc? Even if we did so 
eliminate these desires as well, all we have done is ease our pain--we have not solved the 
philosophical or speculative problem; we have not answered the question, “what reasons, and 
of what sort, do I have, if any?” Unless we can first show ourselves that this sort of reason does 
not exist--that this sort of value, meaning, significance does not exist--we have done nothing but 
ease our pain through suppression of a desire we found naturally in us, and we risk violating 
reasons or obligations which we might have. Thus, we could not conclude, without first finding a 
satisfactory answer, that it would be good to, that we ought to, or that we have reason to numb 
or content ourselves with less than we currently desire.  
To dismiss the angsty as needlessly angsty, and to recommend to them this sort of 
consolation, then, is to beg the question. To be clear, I do not deny that human desires are so 
plastic as to be, by successive acts of the will, reshaped so significantly as to eliminate the pain 
of absurd angst. But we can take this means of consolation only by suppressing deep parts of 
ourselves, those parts which involve our nature as thinking and desiring beings; by putting away 
something in us which we naturally find so important in order to cope with the pain of 
disappointment.78 But, since we are assuming it to be both permissible and proper to change 
                                                 
78 James thinks of the Epicurean and Stoic as offering this sort of consolation. “The Epicurean said: “Seek 
not to be happy, but rather to escape unhappiness; strong happiness is always linked with pain; therefore 
hug the safe shore, and do not tempt the deeper raptures. Avoid disappointment by expecting little, and 
by aiming low; and above all do not fret.” The Stoic said: “The only genuine good that life can yield a man 




our desires, concepts and natural impulses for the sake of consolation, then why not suppress 
or change our evidential or theoretical standards? We might cling to God as a source of 
normativity or as a means of consolation.79 Or we might posit a moral realm, filled with “reasons” 
or “reason-giving entities.” All this to say, that not only does this sort of consolation beg the 
question against the angsty externalist, but it is only one among equally effective means of 
desire-changing consolation, of which others make room for belief in external reasons, and so 
avoid suppressing these moral desires. 
Note that I do not wish to say that those seeking this sort of consolation are immoral, 
irrational, etc (nor do I attribute this position to any writers in particular). If I suggested such a 
thing, I would not be taking my skepticism about the existence of external reasons or sources of 
normativity seriously. For to suggest that we have an obligation or normative reason to avoid 
this “cheap” consolation would be to assume that there are, in fact, external reasons or sources 
of normativity. Further, those who have already decided that there are no entities or properties 
corresponding to our concepts of external reasons or sources of normativity may only have 
recourse to this sort of consolation, and, if they have good reason to deny the existence of 
external reasons or sources, then clearly they do not beg the question.  
(V.1.4) Consolation as the Peace of Reflective Equilibrium 
If we understand consolation as mere easing of the painful bite of angst or a quieting of worry, 
then the sort of solution described above is surely consoling. Those who will not find this sort of 
consolation palatable or compelling will likely be those who are undecided on the existence of 
(entities corresponding to our concepts of) external reasons or sources of normativity. What, 
then, would the sort of consolation they desire look like, and can it be attained?  
                                                 
a philosophy of despair in nature’s boons...In the one the hot blood has grown cool, in the other it has 
become quite cold” (James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience, 143). 
79 This, I take it, is exactly the solution Tolstoy embraced. He does not seem to have, in the end, come to 
believe or develop a theory of reasons or ethics which would console him, but turned to Russian 
Orthodoxy as a way to quiet his angst. He cites a sense of community, history and significance, but not a 




It seems to me that the undecided angsty seek a deeper, more significant80 kind of 
consolation: reflective equilibrium, or an easing of pain which is not at the expense of some 
desire or strongly held conceptual commitment.81 This significant consolation, I suspect, is 
preferable over our first sort of consolation which merely eased our pain (call this mere 
consolation), and that only significant consolation involves both a philosophically and 
emotionally satisfying solution to absurd angst. 
 Korsgaard describes this sort of consolation--for her the form of an answer to the 
normative question--as coherence or congruence among reflective perspectives.82 One 
perspective, in particular, demands the discovery of an unquestionable consideration which can 
serve as a moral foundation,83 and in which one can be satisfied by finding it a sufficient ground 
for normative authority. This is what Korsgaard calls the unconditioned: “something which will 
bring the reiteration of ‘but why must I do that?’ to an end.”84 For Korsgaard, then, the only 
philosophical consolation to absurd angst over the normative question is the discovery of the 
unconditioned and reflective equilibrium (understood as balance--an elimination of tension and 
conflict--between differing reflective points of view).  
The angsty want a consolation which allows them to retain their moral conceptual 
scheme and belief in the value or significance of their ultimate ends (or which allows them to 
revise them without incurring dissonance between the various reflective points of view or 
                                                 
80 The angsty want consolation that can ease their pain while preserving what they take to be morally 
valuable or significant. But moral value and significance, for the angsty, require external reasons or 
sources of normativity. And so, even in desiring consolation about reasons, the undecided angsty desire 
and make use of the notion of reasons. 
81 I take it that coming to no longer hold, for some good reason, one of our conceptual commitments and, 
as a result, realizing that we do not really desire external reasons or sources, would count as significant 
consolation. Perhaps an internalist may convince us of the genuine normative force of merely internal 
reasons--I will not rule this out here. 
82 “Thus the reflective dissonance that might lead you to reject the authority of moral claims can arise 
from any of a number of points of view we use in assessing motives and actions.” (Korsgaard, Christine. 
The Sources of Normativity, 55.) “The understanding, when it reflects on its own operations, falls into 
doubt about itself and so subverts itself. But the moral sense approves of and so reinforces itself” 
(Korsgaard,  62). 
83 That is, a foundation for which are unable to raise questions like “why care?” 




sacrificing something they feel is unable to be sacrificed).85 The angsty want an answer to the 
normative question which, at least, allows them to believe in normative reasons to live, wards off 
relativism, subjects wantons to moral authority, and preserves normative significance and value, 
all without violating their strongly held theoretical commitments or evidentiary standards. And it 
is this sort of consolation that I wish, now, to discuss. 
(V.2) Towards Significant Consolation 
(V.2.1) Two Kinds of Significant Consolation 
Taking what has been said about reasons and sources of normativity in the previous Chapters, I 
offer up two forms of answers which I take to be sufficient for significant consolation. The first 
kind of consoling answer to the normative question will involve postulating external reasons or 
external sources of reasons/normativity without violating strongly held, “non-negotiable” 
theoretical doctrines or evidentiary standards. This would be to both endorse our angsty moral 
conceptual scheme as accurate, and to do so without violating any of our other strongly held 
theoretical commitments. Further, imagine that the angsty were to somehow discover that there 
existed normative, external reasons and sources of normativity, but that these reasons were 
reasons against pursuing their final ends--this would not be very consoling. This first kind of 
significant consolation, then, will require that the reasons and sources postulated support or 
back the ultimate, non-negotiable ends which we value. 
 The second kind of consoling answer will revise at least our conscious understanding of 
our expectations, desires and concepts to some extent, though without violating or demanding 
sacrifice of the unsacrificable. This sort of peace may be achieved by reflecting on what we 
really desire, what we really think we need for normative authority, value, significance, etc, and 
finding, as a result of this reflection, that we never really needed external reasons or sources of 
normativity, but that the externalism infecting our moral conceptual scheme stemmed from a 
                                                 




sort of confusion. This would differ, however, from the mere consolation offered above: it would 
not be to sacrifice anything critical within us for the sake of easing our pain, but, instead, to cling 
more tightly to those natural aspects of our practical and theoretical selves. 
I do not claim to know, in any more detail, what this second sort of significant consolation 
would look like, or how it might be pursued; after reflection on the angsty conceptual 
commitments laid out above, I have found nothing within myself to suggest that what I really 
desire or require for reasons, significance and value are anything but external, non-instrumental 
reasons or external sources of normativity. Further, I have no insight into what might count as 
“non-negotiable” or “unsacrificable” concepts, beliefs, standards or desires. But a better thinker 
might come along and reveal the angsty to themselves, and so this sort of consolation is worth 
describing, even if only roughly. 
(V.2.2) The Negative Consolation of Internalism 
I can, in these final Chapters, offer up a brief sketch of how we might pursue the first sort of 
significant consolation. This suggestion will, of course, be controversial and partisan (in favor of 
theism), and working it out in full will require much more effort than I can give it here. But, I 
hope, it will set an agenda for some, especially for those working within the area of overlap 
between Philosophy of Religion and Metaethics. 
 My suggestion is this: we take seriously the negative consolations of internalist, 
especially Kantian and Humean, accounts, while also taking seriously the positive consolation 
which revelatory, theistic religion can offer to us. In addition, internalist thinkers have certain 
epistemic considerations which may also offer positive consolation. With these three taken 
together—the negative consolation of internalism, the positive consolation of revelatory religion, 
and the positive consolation of internalism—the angsty might be consoled. 
Thinkers following Kant and Hume have sought to show that there are no convincing 
reasons or no reflective points of view from which one could warrant forsaking moral ends and 




reflective equilibrium by removing questions or problems which threaten to throw us into 
reflective disequilibrium, without positively establishing the existence of, say, normative reasons 
or sources of normativity.  
This negative approach can be helpful in at least two ways. First, by showing us how to 
think about those whom we take to be totally indifferent to moral ends. As Scanlon notes,86 and 
as I suggested in the preface to this essay, absurd angst often sets in as a response to conflict 
with others: how could those close to us appear to be uninterested in moral concerns? How can 
anyone be so calloused and unmoved by the sufferings of others, by the works of art we take to 
be beautiful, by the happy laugh of a child? We might wonder how we can be in touch with 
“normative reasons” given our opponent’s callousness to the considerations which we take to 
provide or be constitutive of reasons. How could, we might ask, someone of similar cognitive 
faculties and abilities fail to be moved as I am? But, if one could show that our calloused 
interlocutor, even by their own standards of reasoning, is exhibiting a deliberative defect, then, it 
is supposed, that it is no far stretch to assume that we may be in touch with something which 
they are not (i.e. reasons, moral entities, moral truths, etc). We intuit that the existence of 
similarly constituted beings with radically different takes on moral issues, and who are unmoved 
by considerations of reasons, indicates a problem for our position (though I am not quite sure 
what to make of this intuition).87 I suggest that charging them with irrationality or inconsistency 
may be a way of lessening the significance of their disagreement, especially insofar as it allows 
us to overcome the objection that we are overestimating our own ability to reason.  
                                                 
86 Scanlon argues that a strength of Kantian ethics lies in the fact that, if one could pull off grounding 
ethics in rationality, then one would have a foothold in arguing with the morally obstinate. A charge of 
irrationality or inconsistency is more effective than stomping one’s feet, and repeating “but you are 
violating your reasons!” (Scanlon, T.M. Being Realistic About Reasons, 12-14). 
87 We might articulate this intuition as an instance of, or at least a corollary of, the problem of 
disagreements among peers. That is, we may worry that those we take to be morally insensitive “see” 
something which we do not, but which, if we were aware of, would make us similarly insensitive. For an 




Second, one can be thrown into reflective disequilibrium upon considering their reasons 
to be moral from multiple vantage points. The demands of morality, or acts which we take 
ourselves to have normative reasons to perform, may sometimes conflict with what we perceive 
to be in our best interests. This may lead us to wonder why we should give precedence to the 
moral point of view rather than to self interest. By reconciling these deliberative points of view, 
the negative approach can, I hope, reveal to us that this conflict is illusory, or at least much less 
troublesome than we previously thought. 
Without dwelling on the negative approach for too long, consider the arguments put 
forward by Korsgaard and Nagel. Korsgaard argues that, even from a purely self-interested 
point of view, there are no convincing or persuasive considerations which count in favor of being 
a moral wanton. For if one forsook the moral ends and principles which guide us--if one went 
against what one very strongly suspects that one has reason to do--one would also be deprived 
of many social goods.88 Further, one may violate an unavoidable and personally important 
conception of one’s own identity--a conception of oneself which one feels be worth dying for.89 
Similarly, Nagel argues that being able to consider oneself as inherently worthy or intrinsically 
valuable necessarily commits one to deliberation from an external point of view under which 
every agent’s interests have equal weight, since the concept of inherent worth involves others 
as being obligated to view one’s own interests as equally weighted with theirs.90 While these 
arguments do not, it seems to me, fully answer the normative question, they are capable of 
reducing reflective disequilibrium in the ways described above, and that surely moves us 
towards significant consolation. 
                                                 
88 (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity, 59-60) 
89 (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity, 58) 
90 “I believe that the crucial question he has to answer is whether he is prepared to regard that individual, 
reflectively considered, as worthless...Egoism as a general principle is equivalent to regarding myself as 
valueless from a reflective point of view, because it says that my interests, like those of every other 
person, provide others with no reason for action except in so far as they can be linked to the other 




(V.2.3) The Positive Consolation of Revelatory Religion 
As for the positive consolation which revelatory, theistic religion might offer, I can say much 
less, and must first qualify my suggestion. I do not mean to lay the foundations for a moral 
argument for theism or any other religious claims. For, as should be obvious by now, I have 
taken doubts about moral authority, normativity, reasons and truths very seriously. To argue to a 
metaphysical claim (i.e. “God, the source of goodness, exists”) on the basis of moral claims first 
requires those moral claims to be justified.91 Since we have just spent a great deal of space 
laying out doubts about our intuitive moral systems, and so providing ammunition for the moral 
skeptic, we cannot simply try to console ourselves by postulating the existence of God and 
taking Him to serve as the source of goodness, normativity, reasons, etc. This would, it seems 
to me, increase reflective disequilibrium by overlooking or violating the concerns of our internal 
skeptic. So, we cannot warrant a consoling, theistic metaphysic/metaethic on the basis of our 
moral convictions, feelings or beliefs, since these convictions are themselves the subjects of 
doubt, and this is not at all what I am about to suggest.92 
Rather, the consoling power of revelatory theistic religions I have in mind stems from the 
possibility that justified belief in the core doctrines of these religions can provide indirect 
                                                 
91 Foot and Korsgaard both note something similar to the point I am making here. Korsgaard writes, “The 
difficulty here is plain. The metaphysical view that intrinsically normative entities or properties exist must 
be supported by our confidence that we really do have obligations. It is because we are confident that 
obligation is real that we are prepared to believe in the existence of some sort of objective values. But for 
that very reason the appeal to the existence of objective values cannot be used to support our 
confidence” (Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity, 40.). And Foot writes, “Just as one may 
feel as if one is falling without believing that one is moving downward, so one may feel as if one has to do 
what is morally required without believing oneself to be under physical or psychological compulsion, or 
about to incur a penalty if one does not comply...There is no difficulty about the idea that we feel we have 
to behave morally, and given the psychological conditions of the learning of moral behavior it is natural 
that we should have such feelings. What we cannot do is quote them in support of the doctrine of the 
categorical imperative” (Foot, Phillipa. “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.”). 
92 This applies equally to theoretical moral arguments, which attempt to evidence, say, theism on the 
basis of moral truths, and to practical moral arguments, like Kant’s, which attempt to show that one has 
(practical) reason to believe in God in order to preserve something like moral motivation. For an overview 
of Kant’s various arguments, see: (Pasternack, Lawrence. Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason.). For one of the most popular instances of theoretical moral arguments, see: (Craig, William. 




epistemic access to a consoling metaethic. (In what follows, I restrict myself to talk of 
Christianity, as it is the religion I am most familiar with, while recognizing that Judaism and Isalm 
may be equally consoling.) For instance, if one could establish the truth of Christ’s teachings, 
and if one included in these teachings explicit affirmations of intrinsic value, then it seems to me 
that one would have some degree of warrant for belief in external, non-instrumental reasons or 
sources of normativity. The divinity and resurrection of Christ in particular help us to see the 
point: if, as historical Christianity supposes, Christ is God incarnate, and if His teachings were 
vindicated by resurrection, then, in affirming that some beings (namely humans) have intrinsic 
value, it seems that Christ also affirms, to some extent, the accuracy of our moral conceptual 
system. Though Christ is never on record having entered into a discourse regarding the nature 
of intrinsic value or moral truths, He does, without qualification, endorse the value of creation 
and humanity: 
Therefore I say to you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or what you will 
drink; nor about your body, what you will put on. Is not life more than food and the body 
more than clothing? Look at the birds of the air, for they neither sow nor reap nor gather 
into barns; yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not of more value than they?93 
 
Are not two sparrows sold for a copper coin? And not one of them falls to the ground 
apart from your Father’s will. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Do not 
fear therefore; you are of more value than many sparrows.94 
To describe my hopeful suggestion freely, God, the foundation and base-level of reality, 
condescends to humanity, taking on human faculties, including moral faculties of the same sort 
which produce our angst and moral concepts, and affirms that certain beings are intrinsically 
valuable or worthy of love and care. Barring divine deception, we have two plausible 
possibilities. First, our other conceptual commitments laid out above are correct, and 
value/worth of this sort require the existence of external reasons or sources of normativity, in 
which case, barring divine deception, we have reason to suspect that these entities, whatever 
                                                 
93 Matthew 6:25-27 (NKJV) 




they are, exist. This moves us towards the first means of significant consolation described 
above. Second, our conceptual commitments are incorrect, and intrinsic value/worth does not, 
for instance, require external reasons or sources, but in such a way that we can stil meaningfully 
make claims about intrinsic value or moral worth, getting us closer to the second sort of 
significant consolation described above. 
 Finally, theism might provide the metaethicist with a helpful account of moral knowledge. 
This explanation might overcome the difficulties raised by some variants of evolutionary 
debunking arguments against moral realism. If God, in His wisdom and beneficence, has 
arranged for an evolutionary process, with the intention of producing in us moral beliefs and 
concepts which align with moral entities, normative reasons, etc, then it is not difficult to see 
how we might explain the harmony of moral reasons and properties on that which benefits us. 
That is, the existence of God could aid in explaining the harmony of morality with not just self-
interest, but on that which has been evolutionarily advantageous. An inability to explain this 
harmony as anything more than a lucky coincidence has been assumed to be a major 
weakness of moral realism, and theism may be able to provide us with the start of a hopeful 
response (although I do not think it is the only response one can give to this sort of argument).95  
Further, a theistic account does not seem to make human moral knowledge dependent 
on direct epistemic or causal contact with moral entities (namely, reasons). Rather, humans 
may, again, through the wisdom and goodness of God, be inheritors of a reliable moral system 
arising out of an evolutionary process, but which has not been caused by direct interaction with 
                                                 
95 The variant this addresses on this front is attributed by Wielenberg to Street. The argument suggests 
that, if moral truths describe external realities (i.e. external reasons or reason giving entities), then, since 
the evolutionary history of humanity causes us to have moral beliefs insofar as they are evolutionarily 
advantageous, and not because of the existence of what moral truths describe, then the reasons why we 
hold moral beliefs are not because of moral reality, but because of these “distorting” influences. This, in 
turn, is supposed to undermine the justification of moral beliefs on realism, since it seems a great and 
lucky coincidence that our moral beliefs track external, moral entities (Wielenberg, Eric. Robust Ethics, 
153). Justin Horn seems to echo this sort of evolutionary debunking argument, saying that “the challenge 
for the realist is to provide some defensible account of the relationship between the putative stance-





moral entities (just as a map, because it is designed by a mapmaker, may accurately represent 
a street without the features of the map being caused to represent by the characteristics of that 
street).96  
Justified belief in divine revelation and its moral teachings may even act as a corrective 
to the evolutionary influences on the content of our moral beliefs and patterns of moral 
reasoning, which would allow  for the externalist/moral realist to admit that unreliable (non-truth-
tracking) evolutionary processes have shaped our moral beliefs, while still admitting that there is 
a process of deliberation or reflection allowing us to discover and correct these evolutionary 
errors, perhaps by including the teachings of divine revelation as among the data which 
reflection seeks to balance.97 
Of course, the contributions which religion can make towards consoling us in our absurd 
angst will depend on whether or not we can adequately justify religious belief, and this is not the 
sort of essay which can afford to enter into that discussion. For one cannot embrace religious 
beliefs just for the sake of consolation without sacrificing other aspects of themselves (i.e. their 
inner skeptic), thereby inviting reflective disequilibrium. However, my remarks on the positive 
                                                 
96 I borrow this analogy from Eleonore Stump, who shows that theists as far back as Aquinas have made 
use of reliabilist considerations in epistemology (Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas, 252). This may serve as the 
start of a response to the arguments attributed to Harman and Joyce by Wielenberg. Roughly, these 
arguments both assert that, if the truth of P is not a cause of our belief that P, then P is unjustified (though 
both, per Wielenberg, hold to this principle for distinct reasons). Since the evolutionary history of our 
moral beliefs shows that the truth of P is not a cause of our moral beliefs, we then have reason to suspect 
that our moral beliefs are unjustified (Wielenberg, Eric. Robust Ethics, 146-148, 156-159). What sort of 
explanatory/causal role the truth of a belief P must play in the formation of that belief in order for 
justification is not clear to me, however. 
97 As Guy Kahane notes, EDAs are epistemic arguments which conclude that our moral beliefs are 
unjustified (or unjustified on moral realism). In order for these arguments to justifiably conclude that moral 
beliefs are unjustified given the distorting influence of evolutionary processes, it is not enough to show 
that these processes (a) shape our moral beliefs and (b) are unreliable/not truth-tracking. Rather, one 
also has to show that (c) there are no other reliable processes of belief-formation which may correct these 
unreliable evolutionary processes. That is, the proponent of EDA has to show that there is no reliable way 
for us to correct or calibrate our moral beliefs. (Kahane, 106-107.) Perhaps including divine revelation as 
an element in reflective equilibrium can be a means of correcting these evolutionarily distorted beliefs. For 
one would have to make their moral beliefs cohere not just with their own intuitions, but with the teachings 
of divine revelation, with a recognition of evolutionary distortion, and with all other data available. It is only 




consolations of religion may reveal an important function of religious belief: theoretical moral 
consolation. Many have already supposed that religious belief has the power to console in a few 
ways: by reassuring us that we will have a happy life eternally, that the record of our lives is 
impossible to erase from the mind of God, that we are loved and have significance in the eyes 
of extramental reality, that we have a proper function, and that all things will be made right in the 
end. Surely, these are the sort of consoling considerations which brought Tolstoy and many 
others a measure of peace upon sincere conversion.98 But the supposed ability of religion to 
vindicate our strongly held moral beliefs, and to reassure us that our moral systems are, at least 
to some extent, endorsed by God Himself, must be listed among the functions of religious belief 
(or at least among the functions which some impart to religious belief). 
(V.2.4) The Positive Consolation of Internalism 
Finally, consider the concept of normative force (which I have referred to as “normative 
authority,” “the normative force of reasons,” “the normativity of reasons,” “the normative 
weight of reasons,” etc.). Through this tedious project I have not found any satisfactory 
analysis of the concept of normative force, but at most have suggested that the normativity of 
reasons might reduce to the notion of external reasons or sources of normativity. I suspect 
that much of the angsty problem described here stems from this conceptual fogginess. We 
sense that there is something more to moral truths or moral reasons than their motivational 
(i.e. internal) force. For when the internalist suggests a (reductive) analysis of the force of 
reasons as motivational force, the angsty bristle. 
However, we might examine the notion of normative force by attempting to put forward 
fitting verification or justification conditions for it (that is, conditions under which propositions 
utilizing the concept would be considered to be true or justified). What, then, would lead us to 
                                                 
98 As James notes, certain forms of religion provide us with hope of a “life not correlated with death, a 
health not liable to illness, a kind of good that will not perish, a good in fact that flies beyond the goods of 




judge that “we have a normatively forceful, non-instrumental reason to Φ?”, or “that 
“consideration x is sufficient for the normative force of our reason r?” What would satisfy us 
when we incessantly ask of our ultimate, foundational reasons, “why should I care?” I, for one, 
can only imagine myself to be totally satisfied in these judgements given an overwhelming 
apprehension of these reasons or considerations as normatively weighty. That is, the best 
verification conditions I can think up for "we have a normative, non-instrumental reason to Φ," 
or "x is a sufficient source of normativity for r" are just these: upon apprehending Φ-ing, or that 
which p Φ -ing is for the sake of, or x, I would be (a) drawn very strongly to agree that we 
have reasons to Φ for it's own sake or that x provides me a reason to Φ, and (b) drawn in 
such a way that I cannot entertain any serious doubts about the judgements in (a). A source 
of normativity, or the normative force of reasons, seems to me to be that which would prompt 
us to endorse it in ways (a) and (b). 
But isn't this is just a variety of the internalism which we have been resisting through 
these many pages? For instance the Kantian-internalist analyzes non-instrumental reasons as 
what reason would endorse as necessary to do independently of how that action (or that for 
which the action is performed) relates to other ends the agent might have or which reason 
might dictate. A reason is just what reason dictates as necessary.99 Korsgaard describes the 
normative force or authority of these reasons--the weight we put on these judgements which 
makes violating them sometimes worse than death--as stemming from certain internal 
states.100 The potential verification conditions given above seem to align very strongly with this 
                                                 
99 “One has a reason to act when rationality finds it ‘rationally necessary’ to do so. (Korsgaard. “The 
Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” 223.)” “‘Reason’” means reflective success” (Korsgaard, The 
Sources of Normativity, 97.). 
100 For Korsgaard, these counterfactual-internal states are the commitments to certain self-conceptions 
that rational agents have. Obligation, reasons, and the normativity of certain imperatives arises for each 
individual as a result of the rationality within each individual actually being such that it endorses or finds 
as necessary certain actions, beliefs, and imperatives. “Finally, I believe that the answer must appeal, in a 
deep way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of identity. As I have been emphasizing, morality can 
ask hard things of us, sometimes even that we should be prepared to sacrifice our lives in its name. This 
places a demanding condition on a successful answer to the normative question: it must show that 




sort of internalism: I take it that sufficient sources of normativity or reasons with normative 
force would be recommended by reason in such a way that, upon apprehending them, I would 
be convinced that this source was indeed sufficient, or that this reason was indeed 
normative/backed by normative force (assuming I am free from any sort of rational 
distortions). Isn't this just the internalist position? 
Not quite: I am not analyzing normative force or sufficient sources of normativity in 
terms of internal states. Instead, I'm proposing that the verification/justification conditions for 
when a reason is normative are internalist. These are epistemic conditions. I am not 
convinced that the nature of normative force, sufficient sources of normativity, etc. can be 
analyzed in these internalist terms. Neither am I sure what the nature of normativity is, or 
would be, if it existed. 
Korsgaard seems to want to make ethics independent of (externalist) metaphysics.  
But there are at least two ways to take this: are things like reasons, normative force, and 
sufficient sources of normativity metaphysically independent of externalist realities, or is 
knowledge of them independent from knowledge of these realities? For Korsgaard, both 
questions can be answered affirmatively. However, perhaps by adopting an internalist view of 
moral justification, we can justify our moral beliefs just by finding what reason very strongly 
demands. This sort of justification seems more likely attainable than complex metaphysical 
knowledge.  
                                                 
occasions, the only thing that could be as bad or worse than death is something that for us amounts to 
death--not being ourselves anymore” (Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 17-18). “To be motivated 
‘by reason’ is normally to be motivated by one’s reflective endorsement of incentives and impulses, 
including affections, which arise in a natural way” (Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 127.). “...the 
fact that you will an end is a reason for the end. It’s not exactly that there has to be a further reason; it’s 
just that you must take the act of your own will to be normative for you. And of course this cannot mean 
merely that you are going to pursue the end. It means that your willing the end gives it a normative status 
for you, that your willing the end in a sense makes it good” (“The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” 





So, perhaps we should consider this aspect of internalism to provide another possible 
avenue to positive consolation: we may be able to identify our normative, non-instrumental 
reasons or sufficient sources of normativity (and so verify the truth of certain normative 
propositions) by studying reason and what it presents to us as necessary, even if we cannot 
identify which sorts of metaphysical realities might ground or correspond to these judgements 
about reasons, sources of normativity, normative properties, etc. This is not an internalist 
account of reasons (an internalist metaphysic or analysis of the concept), but an internalist 
epistemology. Internalists define reasons in light of reason. The arguments concerning object-
given reasons perturb me too much to adopt an internalist account; I cannot help but be drawn 
to viewing reason in light of reasons and other normative properties of external objects. 
Further we may consider reason to have an isomorphism to reasons or that which grounds 
reasons--that which reason dictates as necessary may indeed match up to that which is truly 















CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE NOTION OF A MORAL PARADIGM 
I have, from the beginning of this essay, referred to the notion of a moral ‘conceptual scheme,’ 
and have sought to describe the cause of absurd angst as a problem arising out of reflection on 
these schemes. By moral conceptual scheme, I mean something like a Khunian paradigm: a 
way of conceiving of some aspect of experience or thought, which is in some sense a unified 
structure functioning like a "map" or "schematic." This unified, structured system is not only 
constructed or derived or evidenced, but, once adopted, is used to derive or evidence further 
beliefs, and one who holds this conceptual map in their head may discover (what they supposed 
to be) further, extra-paradigmatic truths just by investigating the structure or content of this 
schematic.101  
The moral conceptual scheme I have described pictures moral attributes and claims to 
be organized in a hierarchy (Chapter I.1). On this scheme, the prolific number of instrumentally 
valuable ends (including activities and objects) terminates in a set of ultimate, non-instrumental 
ends, and the conceptual structures of reasons and obligations involve parallel (isomorphic) 
                                                 





hierarchies. Those like Tolstoy and Camus, after they perceive this conceptual structure, begin 
to inquire into the nature of those final, ultimate ends, reasons or duties; theoretical difficulties 
open them up to doubt the existence of such ends or reasons. Here, I have focused purely on 
difficulties surrounding talk of ultimate or final reasons and their normativity: while we seem to 
comfortably talk about instrumental reasons, how and why one has a reason to do something 
for its own sake is less clear. That is, one realizes that the notion of an ultimate or non-
instrumental reason is far from clear, and, trying to get clear on this, one discovers that the 
solutions widely given are not adequate. At least, one discovers that these solutions (namely, 
internalist accounts of ultimate reasons or sources of the normativity of reasons) do not feel 
adequate. By then turning to reflect on that feeling of inadequacy, one comes to recognize that 
the 'picture' one had of morality painted normative reasons and sources of normativity as, in 
some very significant way, motivationally independent (or independent of internal states like 
motivational states) (Chapters II-III). Further reflection reveals that this 'picture' of morality also 
demands of any normative truths that they be backed by reasons and thus sources of 
normativity. But without any alternative to an internalist account of reasons, one begins to get 
angsty about moral truths and beliefs--one's whole scheme for deliberating, for consoling 
oneself, and for understanding oneself as living a meaningful or valuable life, is threatened 
(Chapter IV). This angst I called “absurd angst.” 
Despite the variety of ethical theories plaguing the history of philosophy, the conceptual 
structure of the angsty moral paradigm (besides, of course, its externalizing tendencies) seems 
to me to be widely spread across all but nihilistic accounts (this claim is not essential to this 
project, so I need not defend it here). Details on what has value, and to what degree, and also 
as to the general principles which ought to guide us, are disputed and vary widely. But the 
notion of a hierarchy of ends, terminating in ends which are valuable, worthy, desirable, or 
reasonable seems to permeate the majority of pre-metaethical views. So, too, are parallel, 




I have described at length here, are just these: ‘under the conceptual structure of our moral 
paradigm, are merely internal reasons or merely internal sources of normativity satisfactory?’ 
‘Should a denial of external reasons and sources of normativity move us towards throwing away 
this moral paradigm, or can internalism be made to cohere with that structure?’ Assuming that 
moral authority and normative force are central, non-negotiable aspects of this moral conceptual 
scheme, one way of reformulating these worries is as follows: ‘does the absence of external 
reasons and sources threaten our moral paradigm by ruling out the normative authority or force 
of reasons?’   
The position I have argued for here is not, then, an endorsement of externalism, nor an 
affirmation that there exist external reasons and sources (whatever these would amount to). 
Rather, it is that the moral conceptual scheme, taken to include (as an essential element) strong 
normative authority and force, is incompatible with internalism about reasons and sources. The 
painful angst produced are the pains of an involuntary paradigm shift--the moral paradigm which 
has made sense of so much, the angsty feel, is crumbling away before their feet, as they come 
to recognize the theoretical difficulties regarding normative authority and force (that is, as they 
begin to ask the normative question). The theoretical simplicity and explanatory power of 
internalist accounts of reasons and sources is felt to threaten this framework, because, while 
internalism seems to be a viable account of moral meaning, motivational force, and knowledge, 
its ability to explain the nature of motivation-independent normative force is doubtful.  
On my view, internalist accounts have such a difficulty (from the point of view of the 
angsty) because the moral paradigm of the angsty includes, as an essential or central aspect, a 
robust, nearly supernatural view of normative force. This robust view requires, so the angsty 
think, that normative force must be independent of the internal states of rational agents like us, 
be they actual or only ideal (Chapter I.2.2). This externalism may not be a feature primary to the 
moral conceptual scheme of the angsty, but something ‘read off from’ its other features which 




robust view of normative force that, when taken together, indicate the centrality of externalism. 
First, the moral paradigm of the angsty paints normative truths about reasons and their authority 
as capable of obligating those who do not have any pro-moral, internal states (Chapter II.2). 
Second, reasons and normative force are seen as stemming from the intrinsic properties of 
objects (Chapters II.3, III.2). Third, the sources of normativity, on this moral paradigm, are 
supposed to be capable of conferring a degree of normative force (import) on reasons which 
goes far beyond the force (import) of that conferrable by human preferences, given that human 
preferences can be, and often are, base (Chapter III.3). Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, 
the paradigm of the angsty assigns an important function to moral/normative truths: the ability to 
console. However, a denial of some form of externalism would strip consolation from the angsty 
by committing them to recognize a host of unpalatable features of the world, thereby 
undermining the picture of moral/normative truth which the angsty has adopted (Chapter IV). 
These features of the moral paradigm taken together (far-reaching authority, object-given nature 
of reasons and sources, the great import or weight of normative force, and the consoling nature 
of morality) indicate, to the angsty, that externalism is necessary in order to preserve such a 
view of morality. However, the theoretical problems regarding externalism weigh heavily on the 
mind, and angst sets in. 
Having described all this in as much detail as I am capable, I surveyed a possible but 
unsatisfactory solution to absurd angst (Chapter V.1). This suggested remedy can now, by 
invoking the notion of paradigm, be understood more fully: the suggestion that we ought to 
reshape our desires so as to be more amenable to internalism involves a painful paradigm shift, 
not merely a reshaping of desires. This is met with hostility by the angsty because we cling 
tightly to what we feel is the non-negotiable, conceptual structure of normative thought (whether 
we are correct in this, I do not know). The sort of consolation I earlier called "significant" is, then, 
a hope on the part of the angsty that there will be some way to preserve this strongly ingrained 




consolation I have suggested can similarly be understood: internalist arguments can help justify 
us in continuing to hold this angsty moral paradigm, particularly by showing us that the nature of 
rationality, even the nature of merely self-interested deliberation, commits us to key components 
of this conceptual structure (Chapter V.2.2). Arguments supporting the truth of certain revelatory 
religions indirectly warrant the preservation of this paradigm, so long as these religions are 
committed to that paradigm (Chapter V.2.3). Finally, internalist thinking may offer us promising 
accounts of how to verify what counts as a normatively forceful, whether we have ultimate or 
non-instrumental reasons, or what we should consider to be sufficient sources of normativity, 
thereby removing some of the epistemic threats to our moral paradigm, allowing us to preserve 
it, at least for a little longer, without adopting internalist metaphysical accounts (Chapter V.2.4). 
But whether these solutions, or this paradigm, ought to continue to be adopted, is ultimately 
beyond the scope of this essay, and I am not very hopeful that human reason can settle the 
issue with anything approaching satisfactory confidence, as I can see no potential way to 
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